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ABSTRACT 
Higher education reform is an international phenomenon and one that greatly impacts on the 
form and function of Universities in society. I set out in this study to investigate the 
University of Malawi’s (UNIMA) experiences with governance reforms after observing that 
no comprehensive study of this process had been undertaken following the implementation of 
these reforms from 1997. I used Bhaskar’s Critical Realist Theory as my main theoretical 
framework because my intention was to understand the mechanisms from which such 
reforms emerged: the emergent governance practices and properties enabling or constraining 
governance reforms in UNIMA. I employed Archer’s Social Realist Theory in my research 
design and interpretation of the results, which entailed that I focus on issues of structure, 
culture and agency in UNIMA governance.  
 
I have established that the governance context in UNIMA in 1995 at the time the reforms 
were being considered was one that promoted the continuation of the status quo because the 
Malawi Government’s vested interest then was to exercise great control over UNIMA at 
system, institutional and disciplinary level of governance due to the political imperatives of 
the time in Malawi. However, this situation was frustrating to many in the University as it 
greatly impeded academic freedom. Furthermore, in 1995 the University relied heavily on 
Government’s financial structures. When these were subjected to structural reforms under the 
influence of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund in the early nineties the 
impact seriously undermined the University’s revenue base and threatened to challenge 
further the realization of the University’s objectives. This prompted changes in the 
administrative and academic governance structures and culture intended to improve 
utilisation of the available limited resources as well as to broaden the University’s revenue 
base.  
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The governance reform measures that were introduced were mainly influenced by New 
Public Management (NPM) ideologies. Most of the reforms intended to transform the 
administrative structures and culture were successfully implemented. The study revealed that 
this was enabled by the interests of those operating at disciplinary levels who were frustrated 
by the previous constraining governance context and who viewed such reforms as bringing 
about the self-governance they lacked. However, the majority of the reforms that were mainly 
targeted at academic restructuring were resisted because they were construed as contradictory 
to the interests of those in the academy particularly those concerned with matters of academic 
freedom. The study further revealed that the academic reforms were constrained by a lack of 
agency for change management and weak leadership at the top senior level of the University. 
In addition, there have been delays in amending the UNIMA Act, which should have 
catalysed some of the reforms, a scenario that has perpetuated many aspects of the 
institutional level of governance.  
 
Consequently, compared to the situation before the reforms were introduced, governance in 
UNIMA at the time of reporting manifested two scenarios: (a) an elaboration in governance 
practices at systems level where Government machinery exercises control and at enterprise 
(college) level where faculties and academic departments operate promoting cultural 
morphogenesis, or changes at the level of ideas, beliefs and values, which in turn is exerting 
pressure on governance practices at institutional level; and (b) morphostasis, or lack of 
change, at institutional levels of the governance exacerbated by the lack of amendment of  the 
UNIMA Act and weak leadership. The findings have also led to uncertainty regarding the 
unitary nature of the University. There are fears that once the UNIMA Act is amended the 
four colleges forming UNIMA might break away to become separate universities.  
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Chapter 1 	  
INTRODUCTION 
1.0 Background of the study 
Higher education governance systems have over the years undergone reforms particularly in 
the eighties and early nineties and Malawi has not been spared. In the literature one observes 
that numerous investigations have been conducted to explain the driving forces behind these 
reforms; the actual reforms that have been undertaken or attempted to be undertaken; and the 
extent to which higher education governance practices have been moulded by such 
interventions specific to the Universities, countries or regions of interest to researchers.  For 
example, Clark (1983) has researched and reported about governance reforms that have taken 
place in American and European Universities; Neave, Frans & Vught (eds.) (1994) have 
carried out a comparative study about the higher education governance reforms in the three 
continents of Asia, Africa and Latin America; Mok (2003) and Kai (2009) have investigated 
higher education governance reforms that have been initiated in Asian Universities; George 
(2006) and Harman & Treadgold (2007) have investigated governance reforms in Australian 
Universities. In the continent of Africa, Assie-Lumumba (2006), Adesina (2006), Sawyer 
(2004) and Aina (2010), among others, have carried out studies on governance reforms. 
There have also been some researchers who have studied the higher education governance 
reform specific to the Sub-Saharan African region, such as Teferra & Altbach (2004) and 
Zeleza & Olukoshi (2004). However, little is known empirically about the experience of 
higher education governance reforms specific to Malawi.  
 
In 1995, the University of Malawi (UNIMA) engaged the services of the Malawi Institute of 
Management (MIM), a Government consulting firm, to recommend to it reform measures 
that could be introduced in the governance systems in the University. The reform measures 
	  2	  
	  
were adopted by the UNIMA Council in 1997. These reforms have been implemented 
gradually over the years but there has never been any comprehensive empirical study that has 
been conducted to understand the driving force behind the reform; the actual reform measures 
that were recommended and the ones that were eventually implemented. As a result, little is 
known empirically about these reforms, let alone the impact they have had on governance 
practices in the University. Most fundamentally, nothing is known regarding the mechanisms 
that have enabled or constrained the implementation of governance reforms in UNIMA.  
 
I have come across a study that was conducted by Gawa (2006) on the governance reforms 
that were introduced in UNIMA following the implementation of MIM recommended 
governance reform measures. However, the study was specific to reform measures that led to 
the outsourcing of non-core business services in UNIMA. It compared the cost of providing 
services such as catering, security and maintenance of both infrastructures and ground 
services by the University before the reform was initiated with the cost of the provision of the 
same services after private providers took over. The study was limited to the cost benefit 
analysis of the implementation of this particular reform. The study was done in partial 
fulfilment of the requirements for the award of the Master’s Degree in Business 
Administration in UNIMA. Apart from this study I have not come across any other scientific 
study conducted on the governance reforms which were initiated in UNIMA in 1995.  
 
Of interest to note in most of the investigations carried out in the field of higher education 
governance reforms is the diversity in the research approaches used by various researchers 
and hence the explanations offered. This study investigates shifts in governance practices in 
the University in Malawi following the implementation of governance reforms from 1997 to 
2013 using Critical Realism and Social Realists theories. The former is used as a Metatheory 
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to inform what constitutes knowledge claims in this study (ontology); how such knowledge 
can be accessed (epistemology) and the potential limitations in knowledge generation 
(judgemental rationalism). The latter is employed in the design of the study as well as in the 
interpretation and reporting of the findings. The actual data collection was conducted from 
June 2013 to November of 2013 in the University of Malawi where I had previously served 
as a Deputy Registrar. However, preparatory work of the research work started in March 
2011.  
 
1.1 About the University of Malawi 
It is important to note that up until 1996 Malawi had only one public University, the 
University of Malawi (UNIMA). According to 2006 UNIMA Calendar, the University was 
created through a provisional Act of Parliament of 1964. The idea that Malawi should have a 
University was conceived soon after the country got its independence in 1964.  In the same 
year the educational needs of the country were surveyed by the American Council on 
Education (ACE) and the then British Inter-University Council on Higher Education 
Overseas (BIUCHEO). This led to the founding of the University in October 1964 under the 
University of Malawi Provisional Council Act of 1964, which was later replaced by the 
University of Malawi Act of 1974. Teaching in UNIMA started on 29th September 1965. It 
started with 90 students due to limited infrastructure, academic and administrative staff 
(UNIMA Calendar, 1998). As of 2013, enrolment in UNIMA both in undergraduate and 
postgraduate programmes was approximately 8000 students spread out in its four constituent 
colleges located in different geographical areas.  
 
UNIMA has at the moment four campuses: The Chancellor College which is in Zomba about 
292 kilometres away from the capital of Malawi; The College of Medicine which is in 
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Blantyre 320 kilometres away from the capital of Malawi; The Polytechnic which is also in 
Blantyre; and the Kamuzu College of Nursing which has two campuses one is located in 
Lilongwe, the capital city of Malawi and the other campus in Blantyre. UNIMA had a fifth 
campus (Bunda College) but it broke away to form a separate University in 2012 and is 
known as Lilongwe University of Agriculture and Natural Resources. All four campuses are 
coordinated by a Central Office situated in Zomba where the Vice-Chancellor and the 
University Registrar are based. Since its inception, the University has not undergone any 
comprehensive governance reforms similar to those reported on here. The governance 
reforms that were initiated in 1995 and implemented gradually from 1997 were therefore 
unprecedented.  
 
1.2 Research goal and objectives 
My main research goal for undertaking this study was to investigate the emergent governance 
practices in UNIMA arising from the implementation from 1997 to 2013 of governance 
reforms. The key research question this study wanted to answer is: What are the emergent 
governance practices in UNIMA arising from the implementation from 1997 to 2013 of 
governance reforms and what has enabled or constrained them?  Specifically, the study 
sought to get answers to the following questions:  
 
i) What were the objectives of the reforms in the governance of UNIMA? 
ii) What specific reform measures were introduced in UNIMA governance practices 
through the implementation of the MIM recommendations between 1997 and 2013? 
iii) What are the emergent governance practices arising from the implementation of 
governance reforms in UNIMA and what enabled and constrained them in the period 
between 1997 and 2013? 
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1.3 Rationale for the study 
There are several studies that have been conducted in the field of higher education 
governance policy and practice as noted in section 1.1. From my findings through the 
literature research conducted, the majority of these studies have examined changing roles of 
the Government and higher education relationships in the wake of global trends (for example, 
Clark 1983; Neave, Frans & Vught (eds.), 1994; Mok 2003; Sawyer, 2004; Zeleza & 
Olukoshi, 2004; Adesina, 2006; Assie-Lumumba,2006; George, 2006; Harman & Treadgold, 
2007; and Kai, 2009). Such studies agree that governance changes in higher education have 
been enabled by many drivers in the global economic and political spheres some of which 
are: Globalization, Neo-liberalisation, Internationalization and Entrepreneurship. These 
global trends featured most prominently in the eighties and early nineties and are discussed in 
detail in Chapter Four. Accompanying these trends have been ideologies such as the New 
Public Management discussed also in Chapter Four which pushed for the infusion of private 
sector governance practices in the public higher education sector. This study expands on the 
studies conducted in the higher education governance field arising from some of the above 
observed global trends and it therefore contributes to a growing field of study.  
 
Part of what motivated this study was the realization that the majority of the studies that have 
been carried out in the field of higher education governance have examined higher education 
governance reforms from the perspective of American, Asian, Australian and European 
Universities. Fewer studies have been done in the African higher education governance sector 
and, more crucially, in Sub-Saharan Africa. In addition, of the few studies undertaken and 
reported about in Sub-Saharan Africa most of them have been done in South Africa 
especially during the post-apartheid era (for example, Cloete & Bunting, 2000; Hall & 
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Symes, 2005; Weinberg & Kistner, 2007; McKenna, 2012; Maistry, 2012; 2014). This study 
therefore contributes to the research on sub-Saharan higher education reforms.  
 
Given that there are varied experiences of reforms due to differences in the structural and 
cultural dynamics of regions of the world (Vaira, 2004), this study provides a forum for 
revealing the experience of higher education reforms in the wake of global economic trends 
from the perspective of one Southern African country, Malawi.  
 
An additional contribution specific to this study is that it grounds itself in a Critical Realist 
orientation and takes a Social Realist Theoretical approach in its investigations. In this 
respect, this study takes further the scope and breadth of these theories in the social sciences 
and argues that the realist position, discussed in depth in Chapter Two, allows for a move 
beyond the documenting of multiple experience of governance reform, to the tentative 
identification of the mechanisms constraining and enabling its emergence. This study also 
challenges the ‘taken-for-granted’ perspectives and assumptions regarding governance 
reforms in UNIMA in the absence of a comprehensive study, thereby creating scientific 
knowledge about higher education governance from the perspective of a public university in 
Malawi.   
 
1.4 Thesis Road Map 
The thesis is divided into eight chapters. Chapter Two introduces the theoretical perspectives 
that underpin this study. It argues that in science, any quest for knowledge must start from a 
philosophical premise regarding what would warrant valid claims about the social world. It 
therefore explores different schools of thought that have provided frameworks for 
approaching the quest for knowledge creation and thus justifies the choice of the Critical 
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Realist Theory as the Metatheory grounding the ontological and the epistemological premise 
of the study. The chapter also argues that the pursuit for knowledge must take cognizance of 
the theories that pre-exist, implying that in social research it is important to utilize knowledge 
already generated in order to access knowledge of the unknown. In this connection, the 
chapter introduces Social Realist theory as the main analytical and explanatory framework 
used in the study.  
 
Chapter Three describes the research methodology utilised in this study. The chapter explains 
the design of the study. That is how the study moved from the known to the unknown. 
Specifically, the chapter explains how data was collected, how the research participants were 
identified and sampled, how data was analysed and interpreted using Social Realist 
theoretical frameworks of morphogenesis, analytical dualism and institutional configurations 
developed by Archer (1995) and explained in Chapter Two. The chapter also explains how 
fallible knowledge creation can be and reflects on some of the practical measures that were 
undertaken in the study in collecting, analysing and interpreting the data to ensure that the 
results of this investigation are credible.  
 
Collier (1994:50) has argued that: ‘we can’t have an explanation until we know what is to be 
explained’. This underscores the importance of understanding the objective existence of the 
phenomenon first before one embarks on a project of investigating it. In Chapter Four 
therefore, I present my findings regarding the concept of higher education governance as 
understood in this study according to the literature search. The chapter begins from the 
premise that social research must begin from an ontological position regarding the object of 
the phenomenon being investigated. In this regard the chapter attempts to answer the question 
I have reconstituted from Bhaskar (1998), namely: What must the structure of higher 
	  8	  
	  
education governance be like for scientific knowledge to be possible? What follows later in 
the chapter is an attempt to find out what is known about higher education governance from 
the current literature. The chapter specifically defines higher education governance in the 
context of this study. It also identifies concepts that have informed higher education 
governance practice as presented in the literature as well as presenting governance structures 
that seem to have characterised University governance. Models that have been developed as 
theoretical underpinnings for higher education governance practice are interrogated together 
with the trends that may have possibly conditioned them globally as well as particular to 
Africa.  
 
Chapter Five is dedicated to locating UNIMA’s governance configurations in the period 
before the governance reforms were initiated. The chapter reports on the findings regarding 
the events and what was experienced regarding the UNIMA governance period before the 
governance reforms were initiated. Using Archer’s (1995) morphogenetic theory in this 
chapter I interrogate the constitutive particles of structure, culture and agents within the 
domain of the actual that created the context of UNIMA governance in 1995 when the 
reforms were being initiated. In this chapter I also present my findings regarding the 
objective of the governance reforms; that is, the intention the corporate agency had in 
entertaining this project in 1995 mindful that in social realism, it is people’s intentions that 
mediate either morphogenesis (change over time) or morphostasis (a lack of change over 
time) (Archer, 1995).  
 
In Chapter Six I present my findings regarding the reform measures that were adopted by the 
Council of the University of Malawi (UNIMA) arising from the Malawi Institute of 
Management (MIM) Report. In this chapter I interrogate the constitutive governance 
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practices that formed the essence of the governance reforms in UNIMA. I also examine the 
reform measures that were eventually implemented and those which were not implemented 
and the reasons attached to each from the perspective of the research participants. In this 
chapter I also reflect on the extent to which the governance reform measures proposed in 
UNIMA have drawn from the NPM ideology. An argument is finally advanced in this chapter 
that the implementation of governance reforms in UNIMA has by and large brought about 
unintended consequences. These are perceived in the form of emergent governance practices 
and are presented in Chapter Seven.  
 
In Chapter Seven I therefore interrogate the emergent governance practices in UNIMA as 
well as their enabling and constraining mechanisms in the period between 1997 and 2013. 
Conclusions are drawn in Chapter Seven regarding the emergent governance context of 
UNIMA in 2013.  
 
Chapter Eight summarises key findings of the study. It also highlights lessons to be learnt 
from it as well as the unique contributions the study is making in the field of the higher 
education governance reforms. The chapter also identifies possible areas for future research.  
 
As is discussed in more detail in Chapter Four, it is important to note that the term ‘reform’ in 
this study is used interchangeably with the term ‘change’ and takes the dimension of the 
definition offered by Badat (2009:456) to refer to the substantial changes with considerable 
impact on the existing dominant social relations within higher education and the wider social 
relations in the polity, economy and society. In Social Realist terms ‘reforms’ could as well 
in this regard refer to the process leading to the elaboration of the governance context in the 
higher education.   
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Chapter 2  
THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES 
2.0 Introduction 
This chapter introduces the theoretical perspectives that underpin this study. In science, any 
quest for knowledge must start from a philosophical premise regarding what would warrant 
valid claims about the social world. There are different schools of thought that provided 
frameworks for approaching the quest for knowledge. Lincoln & Guba (2000) categorised 
these schools of thought into five groups namely positivism, post-positivism, critical theory, 
constructivism and participatory theory. It would appear though that positivist and post-
positivist theories seem to have been the major broader divide. Positivism was the first to 
dominate research enquiries whereas post-positivism and the other categorisations arose as 
the critique of the former.  
 
Positivists generally believe that reality exists as ‘objective’, ‘out there’, and independent of 
those who created or observed it. Knowledge can thus be accessed through distanced and 
independent investigation. It is assumed in this philosophy that the natural world is 
constituted by fixed empirical regularities that are closed to change (Cruickshank, 2010). 
Experimentation is the best approach in accessing such knowledge because it is believed that 
constant conjunctions of events are scarcely ever found outside laboratories.  While the above 
could be true in the natural sciences, Danermark, Ekstrom, Jakobsen and Karlsson (2002) and 
Bhaskar (1998 and 2008) have observed that this cannot be correct in the social sciences 
because unlike in the natural sciences, inquiries are undertaken in an open environment that is 
stratified and amenable to change. 
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Post-positivists believe that reality cannot be understood in such an objective, fixed way as 
that demanded by the positivists. Many post-positivists understand reality to be a construction 
of the mind. It does not exist ‘out there.’ Reality is a construction of individuals through their 
interaction with the social world. In this regard, reality is understood to exist but in multiples 
in any given context (Lincoln & Guba, 2000).  
 
When I examined all the above ontological positions, or views of knowledge and how 
knowledge can be accessed, against the objective of my study I favoured Critical Realism 
because it is believed to be the best understanding of the way the world actually is. It is 
important to note that my aim in this research project is to study a social phenomenon: the 
University of Malawi’s (UNIMA) governance practices. My main research goal is to 
investigate the emergent governance practices arising from the implementation of the 
governance reforms in UNIMA in 1997. From this goal, it was imperative to begin my 
investigation from the premise that there is reality regarding UNIMA governance that is 
beyond that which is experienced and this aligns to Critical Realist philosophy.  
 
Besides, a search for knowledge, what I am looking for needs to be grounded in an 
appropriate research philosophy that assists me to understand the phenomena I am 
investigating. From my literature search it appears that the Critical Realist perspective is the 
most suitable philosophical approach to use in my study. Before I demonstrate how Critical 
Realism is aligned to my research aim and the most appropriate approach for this study, it is 
important to note that the whole essence of science as a relevant means of accessing 
knowledge has in the past been under attack.   
 
	  12	  
	  
Feyerabend (1975) has argued that science does not contain any attributes to make it superior 
in informing knowledge. He did not believe that any institution or persons possessed the 
moral grounds to prescribe how knowledge can be accessed, as doing so would restrict the 
knowledge that would emerge. Feyerabend’s (1975) theory was grounded in ethical 
consideration regarding liberties that individuals have. He advocated that individuals should 
enjoy freedom to exercise whatever they wanted including deciding how they wish to search 
for knowledge.  
 
Feyerabend’s (1975) understanding of human freedom has however been found wanting. As 
Chalmers (1999) has observed, freedom should not be viewed from a negative angle, that is, 
free from constraints, overlooking the positive aspects of it, which is the degree to which 
individuals have free access to the means with which to achieve their desired end. It would 
appear from Chalmers’s (1999) argument that Feyerabend’s (1975) thesis overlooked the fact 
that individuals are born into a society that pre-existed them and is full of features that they 
do not have any choice but to use (Archer, 1995; Bhaskar, 2008).  As such, in any pursuit of 
life endeavours, including the search for knowledge, one will need to utilize tools that pre-
exist, suggesting that in scientific investigation, one must take cognizance of the theories that 
pre-exist.  
 
2.1 Critical Realism 
According to Harvey (2002), Critical Realism is an elision of two terms, each of which is 
important in understanding Bhaskar’s contribution to the philosophy of social science. 
Bhaskar first addressed ‘realism’ which he described as transcendental realism. In this school 
of thought Bhaskar refined the positivists’ idea that knowledge is grounded entirely in sense 
certainty. Positivists such as Kant, according to Harvey (2002), had earlier argued that claims 
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about reality are claims about things or objects that can be experienced. Kant had further 
argued that there is always a priori knowledge about reality, suggesting that our judgment 
about what we experience is always filtered through the knowledge that existed before us. 
While Bhaskar did not quarrel with Kant’s philosophy, he felt that Kant’s idea of reality was 
putting the cart before the horse. That is to say, Kant was trying to explain what he had not 
described. Bhaskar (1978) argued that before one can talk about knowledge of the world, or 
knowing a social phenomenon, it was imperative to know first the form of that world or 
social phenomena as an object of knowledge. In Collier’s (1994:50) words: ‘we can’t have an 
explanation until we know what is to be explained’.  This implies that before one embarks on 
a task of understanding the world or its social phenomena, it is imperative that one 
comprehends first the objective existence of such an object or social phenomenon. The 
understanding being that one must comprehend the constitutive components of that 
phenomenon (Danermark et al, 2002). The fundamental contribution that Bhaskar made in 
transcendental realism according to Harvey (2002) therefore, was to focus the attention of 
scientists on the following ontological question in their pursuit for knowledge: ‘What must 
the structure of the world be like for scientific knowledge to be possible?’ (Bhaskar, 
2008:13). 
 
The search for knowledge must therefore begin from the conceptualization of what the world 
is first. This is what Danermark et. al. (2002) refer to as conceptual abstraction; that is finding 
the means of extracting the constitutive components of a phenomenon. As far as Bhaskar 
(2008) is concerned the social phenomenon has a stratified nature. By this Bhaskar meant that 
nature was layered hierarchically into the levels of the empirical, events and the real and that 
scientific investigation must take cognizance of this structure of the world.  Knowledge of the 
world in this regard, or of a phenomenon within it should therefore involve observing or 
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understanding what is experienced at the level of the empirical and the events that generates 
what is experienced at the level of the actual. It should also go beyond by digging into the 
deeper layers or underlying properties or causal mechanisms at the level of the real that make 
an object behave the way it does naturally (Collier, 1994; Harvey, 2002; Danermark et al, 
2002 Bhaskar, 2008). The precise way in which Bhaskar (2008) described the level of the 
empirical, the actual and the real that comprise reality is discussed further in section 2.1.1. 
 
After dealing with transcendental realism, Bhaskar (2008) addressed the other word in the 
term ‘Critical Realism’, which he described as having taken the form of critical naturalism. 
In this second project according to Harvey (2002), Bhaskar first attempted to address the 
question as to whether it was possible to come up with laws that could account for society 
and human behaviour in a systematic way, as is the case in the natural sciences. This was a 
particular concern considering that society was an open environment which could never be 
duplicated in a closed laboratory setting.  
 
In this regard, Bhaskar (2008) argued that the social world was differentiated in the sense that 
there exists in it transitive knowledge which is knowledge created through social interactions 
which science has generated through scientific inquiry and intransitive knowledge which was 
embedded in societal structures and mechanisms. The pursuit of knowledge should therefore 
focus on accessing the intransitive – that is the knowledge of mechanisms. In this connection 
and consistent with his transcendental mind-set, Bhaskar addressed the question of: ‘what 
properties do societies and people possess that might make them possible objects for 
knowledge?’ (2008:23). Here, according to Harvey (2002), Bhaskar critiqued the works of 
philosophers such as Emille Durkheim, Max Weber and Peter Berges and this critique 
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culminated in his proposition of the Transformational Model of Society/Personal connection 
(Harvey, 2002).  
 
Before I elaborate on Transformational Model of Society/Personal, it is important to explain 
what these three philosophers had argued about the properties of society. Durkheim’s 
philosophy was built around the belief that society was a by-product of powerful institutions 
(reification of society) working on people by transforming their everyday life.  Put simply, 
people were what they were because it is the society that shaped them (Bhaskar, 2002).  
Weber’s philosophy on the other hand was premised on the philosophy that it was people’s 
activities that reproduced the society. By this it was argued that society was an aggregation of 
people’s activities (reification of people). Unlike these two philosophers, Peter Berges took a 
middle line approach by theorizing that society was an outcome of both society and 
individuals’ dialectical activities (Bhaskar, 2002). That is, society preceded people and was in 
turn re-shaped by their actions. Bhaskar therefore building on the above diverse philosophies 
argued that society was neither the antecedent nor the by-product of people’s activities 
(Collier, 1994; Bhaskar, 2002; Harvey, 2002). Neither was society an outcome of the 
combination of both.  
 
To Bhaskar (2002), society provided the necessary conditions for activities of humans. That 
is, society provided the enabling and the constraining mechanisms for the activities of 
humans. Since humans were endowed with reason, or a reflective mind, depending on the 
situations presented to them by emergent properties of their interactions with societal 
structures, they could alter their material conditions through their own interaction as humans 
as well as through interacting with the structures they inherit (Archer, 1995; Bhaskar, 2002, 
Harvey, 2002). In so doing, society gets either elaborated or regenerated.  
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In this connection, Bhaskar concluded by arguing that society was both the ever-present 
condition and continuously reproduced product of humans’ activities (Collier, 1994 and 
Harvey, 2002). Hence, explaining the Transformational Model of Society/Personal 
connection which states that 'society stands to individuals ... as something that they never 
make, but that exists only in virtue of their activity' (Bhaskar, 1998: 42). This is the position 
that this study takes regarding UNIMA governance context. 
 
If we were to look at an organization as a form of society, the Transformational Model of 
Society/Personal developed by Bhaskar leads me to approach this study from the perspective 
that UNIMA governance is both the ever present condition and continuously reproduced 
product of humans’ activities (Harvey, 2002). In this regard, the governance reforms that 
were initiated in 1997 were meant to transform the pre-existent governance structures. From 
this understanding it follows that because UNIMA is peopled, its structure is the ever-present 
condition that is continuously being reproduced by humans’ activities and hence a scientific 
enquiry of its structure must take a historical perspective as advanced by Critical Realists.  
 
Critical Realism is grounded in three theses: ontological realism, epistemological relativism 
and judgmental rationality (Groff, 2004). I now engage with each one of these in turn and 
demonstrate how Critical Realism underpins the theoretical framework of this study. 
 
2.1.1 Ontological realism 
Ontological realism, according to Bhaskar (2002), is premised on the transcendental realist 
understanding that there exists a world independent of our mind, perception and activity. 
Applied to a scientific study, this presupposes that any scientific research must begin from 
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the basis that objects of scientific investigation have ‘real’ properties independent of our 
knowing and potentially ‘out of phase’ with actual patterns of events (Bryant, 2011). By 
‘real’ it means objects of nature have cause or effect. They have a distinct and independent 
existence that can cause people to act or behave in ways they would otherwise have not acted 
had it been that those entities were absent.  
 
According to Bhaskar (2008) and Bryant (2011) ‘real’ properties must therefore be analysed 
as tendencies because they can be unexercised; exercised but unrealized; or realised and 
experienced, implying that there are some ‘activities’ beyond our present knowledge that 
generate events that make things happen which scientists must aim at identifying.  What is 
experienced is not all that is to be known about the world. Rather, Bhaskar (2008) believes 
that there are the causal stimuli for particular events to happen that generate what is 
experienced. These are, according to Bhaskar (2008), the properties that make an object what 
it is and what makes it behave in the manner that it does. These are ‘a way of acting of a 
thing’ (Bhaskar, 2008: 42), implying that if these properties did not exist, the phenomenon or 
object would not acquire its natural state of ‘being’ (Groff, 2004:17). These are also 
considered as natural tendencies in the sense that they are there whether they are known or 
remain unknown to us.   
 
Expounding on the foregoing, Groff (2004:17), understood Bhaskhar to have in this regard 
claimed that ontological realism: 
 
... is the general belief that in the natural world there are processes or events that occur and 
entities that exist without human intervention. Likewise, the social world is neither an 
intended outcome, nor can it be reducible to, the thoughts or actions of individuals.  
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From this understanding, reality is conceived to be stratified into the domains of the 
empirical, the events and the real. What is observed or felt is the domain of the empirical 
(Groff, 2004) and is the emergent properties of some ‘events’, they themselves being 
emergent properties of underlying causal mechanisms as they are not irreducible to them. 
There is therefore a causal link between what is observed or experienced, the events 
catalysing them as well as the generative mechanism for such events.  
 
These generative mechanisms are the underlying causal mechanisms at the domain of the 
‘real.’ They are considered to be entities because they are not empirically easy to access but 
are responsible for the changes that occur. These entities according to Collier (1994) and 
Bhaskar (2008), are in excess of their manifestation. This is why Danermark et. al. (2002:56) 
have pointed out that generative mechanisms must be conceptualized in terms of “tendencies, 
liabilities and causal powers inherent in the object but not reducible to it.” 
 
Collier (1994) elaborated on the concept of tendencies using an example of a batsman and his 
talent to hit the ball.  I would like to use a similar example to illustrate the notion of 
tendencies. Serena Williams is a world class American tennis player renowned for her talent 
of hitting hard drives on the ball when she is on the tennis court. However, while this talent is 
inherent in her, when she is sitting back home not playing tennis, the talent remains 
unexercised. Similarly, when on the tennis court Serena Williams can make a hard drive on 
the ball but it may land beyond the tennis surface. In this respect, the talent has been 
exercised but unrealised because it has not hit the target. This is how tendencies in their 
natural setting ought to be conceptualised from the realists’ point of view. According to 
Bryant (2011:70): “Here the point to be borne in mind is that objects are always in excess of 
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any of their local manifestations, harbouring hidden volcanic powers irreducible to any of 
their manifestations in the world.”   
 
 Domain of the real Domain of the actual Domain of the 
empirical 
Mechanisms •    
Events •  •   
Experiences •  •  •  
	  
Table 2.1: An illustration of how stratification is conceptualized from realist perspective 
(from Bhaskar 2008) 
	  
	  
According to Collier (1994), Table 2.1 means that in the domain of the empirical there are 
only experiences; that is the world as we observe it in multiple ways. However, what we 
experience emerges from few events that have been actualised or triggered. The domain of 
the actual therefore contains the events that have been actualised and are being experienced. 
But there may be other events that remain unactualised and are nonetheless ‘real’ and may 
emerge as events under other conditions. Furthermore, the actualised events and multiple 
experiences all emerge from the activation of mechanisms at the level of the real. The above 
Table also portrays that nature is stratified in a horizontal manner. The lower explain without 
replacing the higher (Collier, 1994:48), implying that scientific work should progress from 
the known to the unknown and in that way science would help to deepen our knowledge of 
nature (Collier, 1994; Bhaskar, 2002; 2008; Danermark et. al., 2002).  
 
The importance of Critical Realism in the context of this study is that it guided me on how I 
should approach my study. It demonstrated to me that it would be imperative in this study to 
begin by interrogating the constitutive practices and ideas that form the social phenomenon 
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known as higher education governance. That is to describe what higher education governance 
is all about and the form it takes as a social phenomenon in the domain of the empirical. 
Description according to Archer (1995:27) “is a mental conception of the being”.  Critical 
Realism thus helped me to begin my investigation by first carrying out an abstract 
conceptualization of the constitutive properties that render higher education governance its 
objective existence as an object of social enquiry. The manner this was done is described in 
the methodology chapter, Chapter Three.  
 
Critical Realism philosophy also assisted me to understand that when approaching my study I 
should not be carried away in thinking that what I may observe in document search or hear 
from my research participants is all that there is to know about UNIMA governance. For the 
outcome of this study to generate new knowledge, it must not only interrogate events that 
explain the experiences but move further into deeper layers of social events where structures 
and mechanism or mechanisms1 operate – that is, my study needs to move into the domain of 
the ‘real’ that generates a phenomenon. This entailed that I take an approach in my study that 
moves me from what is knowable about UNIMA before and after the MIM governance 
reforms (transitive knowledge) to begin to tentatively identify the intransitive mechanisms 
from which UNIMA governance emerged. The premise being that ‘real’ properties that 
constitute UNIMA governance exist but remain unknown. The process whereby I move from 
a description of the experiences (empirical), the multiple events of UNIMA governance 
(actual), to the identification of the mechanisms at the level of the real regarding higher 
education governance is described in detail in Chapter Three. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	   In the context of Critical Realism according to Danermark et. al. (2002), structure is used to refer to 
constitutive properties of an object whereas mechanism is something which is efficacious.   
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The notions of a layered ontology and generative mechanisms mentioned in the preceding 
sections have however received criticism. Kivinen and Piiroinen (2004), operating from a 
pragmatist perspective, observed that the idea that there is a world existent outside of 
humankind’s conception is useless unless fleshed out with such qualifiers as: for whom, 
when, and under which conditions (Kivinen & Piiroinen, 2004). These authors argued that 
there is nothing knowable out there which is independent of linguistic description such that 
ontologies should be construed as a language that helps make sense of what is happening and 
not something abstract2. Secondly, the authors further argued that in social science it is hard 
to pin-point particular generative mechanisms as responsible for an event because there are 
constellations of causal mechanisms. In this connection, any attempt to gain knowledge 
through investigating the generative mechanisms is of no use, according to them, as it will 
not result in narrowing down to specific causal mechanisms. However, these arguments by 
pragmatists are problematic from Critical Realists’ perspective because as Danermark et. al. 
(2002) put it, they reduce science to knowledge about what is already known or observed. 
 
I believe Kivinen & Piiroinen (2004) here present strong arguments worth serious 
consideration and I revisit them towards the end of Chapter Three when I discuss the 
limitations of this study. But be that as it may, Danermark et. al. (2002:20) have observed 
that ordinarily in life, we often hear such insights as: ‘something is going on below the 
surface’ or ‘there must be something else behind this’, whenever a phenomenon occurs. This 
is common in my own society in Malawi, particularly when people are puzzled with a 
phenomenon that has just occurred and is just beyond their comprehension or description. By 
asking these questions, they are asking transcendental questions; that is, they do not only 
want to understand what is experienced but they are acknowledging, whether knowingly or 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 The term abstract is used here to mean something divorced from reality and not something inherent in the 
object as described by Critical Realists.	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unknowingly, that there are events beyond what has been experienced that can help to explain 
that phenomenon. This is where the scientific approach of Critical Realism is useful. Critical 
Realists therefore inspire social researchers to understand and describe phenomena before 
they can explain them. This is why both Collier (1994) and Archer (1995) argue that you 
cannot explain something that has not been identified. 
 
Furthermore, the ontological premise advanced by Critical Realists above has also received 
criticism from Kemp (2005) who has argued that beliefs about the stratified features of the 
social world by Critical Realists are merely philosophical as they are not grounded in a 
successful scientific inquiry. This, according to Kemp (2005), is unlike similar claims made 
by Bhaskhar regarding Physics and Chemistry which were preceded by a successful scientific 
inquiry. In Kemp’s (2005) view the omission of testing the ontological premise through 
experimentation as was done in Physics and Chemistry renders ontology as a weak guide to 
social science inquiry.  
 
However, from the studies that have been carried out so far in social science using the 
ontological premise of Critical Realism, the results have been credible. Implying, the theory 
does provide a reliable scientific premise for social science research. To many researchers in 
social science, Critical Realism is used as an under-labourer. Meaning, it allows researchers 
to apply other theories in the course of their investigation, which in my view re-affirms the 
firm theoretical base it claims to have.   
 
In the context of this study the ontological realism provided me a descriptive framework for 
understanding higher education governance in general and UNIMA governance in particular 
through the literature search. Furthermore, the ontological framework assisted me to apply 
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Social Realist theory in attempting to extricate the dispositional properties that account for 
the emergent governance practices in UNIMA after implementation of governance reforms 
from the analysis of the data I collected through the observations and interviews I conducted. 
This helped me to pinpoint the conditioning mechanisms for UNIMA governance to be what 
it is at the time of this thesis. Admittedly, there were a constellation of causal mechanisms 
that I had to identify and undoubtedly my success in this regard has been partial. However, 
through the methodology of retroduction (Danermark, et. al., 2002) which is elaborated on in 
Chapter Three, I was able to hone in at least on some of the particular generative mechanisms 
that can tentatively be identified to have been responsible for UNIMA governance practices.  
 
As indicated in section 2.1 Critical Realism is grounded in three theses: ontological realism, 
epistemological relativism and judgmental rationality (Groff 2004). What I have described so 
far in this section is the first thesis, ontological realism. I now wish to turn to the second 
thesis in section 2.1.2, epistemological relativism in the pursuit of demonstrating why I chose 
Critical Realism as the study’s Metatheory. 
 
2.1.2 Epistemological relativism 
Bhaskar’s (2008) epistemological relativism thesis rests on the question of how knowledge is 
accessed; that is, having established the structure of the object under investigation (the 
ontological premise), scientists must be able to explain it. This is why Archer (1995) has 
argued that ontology, the nature of reality, must inform the methodology. We should resolve 
ontology and therefore find a way of explaining it, which is methodology. Epistemological 
relativism is therefore about the how of the phenomena. Furthermore, epistemological 
relativism admits the fallibility of humans.  The understanding being that while Critical 
Realists take the position of ontological realism, as discussed in section 2.1.1 above, they also 
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accept that our knowledge of this world is always partial and fallible. They thus accept that at 
the level of epistemology, or knowledge of the world, relativism is inevitable. 
 
This is the case because according to Critical Realists knowledge claims are ‘socio-historical 
artefacts’ which are produced and not discovered. Furthermore such claims change over time 
(Groff, 2004). According to Bhaskar (2008), knowledge creation does not have to start from 
scratch. No researcher enters a study as a tabula rasa: a researcher always brings knowledge 
to the creation of new knowledge. This is the knowledge that is given to us through social 
transmission as transitive knowledge. This transmitted knowledge is then reproduced or 
partially transformed using the cognitive tools at our disposal. Knowledge generation 
therefore is the outcome of transformation of existing ideas and not the production of new 
ones.  
 
By this it is claimed by both Groff (2004) and Collier (1994) that Bhaskar avoided two 
fallacies that underpin many scientific explanations: The first being the idea that knowledge 
is passed on to us by the world (ontic fallacy) which was the preoccupation of many social 
scientists of positivist persuasion and the second being the view that what we know about the 
world is the world (epic fallacy). This in a way is to suggest that we do not have to assume 
that the transitive dimension is the same as the intransitive dimension. This does not mean 
however that Bhaskar completely dismissed ontological and epistemological fallacies. As 
clarified by Bryant (2011), what Bhaskar did in the thesis of epistemological relativism is to 
enlighten us to avoid mixing questions of ‘what’ with questions of ‘how’ and vice versa in 
scientific research.  
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Viewed from the foregoing, with epistemological relativism, Critical Realists encourage 
social researchers to use transitive knowledge of that which they are investigating, that is 
knowledge of the world, to access the intransitive dimension. Stated differently, the Critical 
Realist perspective inspires social researchers not to be complacent by thinking that all that is 
there is what is already known, nor to be arrogant about what knowledge had been produced 
beforehand. Researchers should utilise their experience from the transitive dimension to 
interrogate what is in the intransitive dimension. That is to say, they should find out what is 
not known about the world from what is already known.  
 
Epistemological relativism, in this study, is about building from the knowledge already 
available in literature in the form of theories or transitive knowledge to investigate UNIMA 
governance, while conceding the partial and fallible nature of the attempt to identify the 
intransitive mechanisms. In section 2.2 I present the methodological framework (analytical 
and explanatory frameworks – pre-existing knowledge) that guided data collection, data 
coding, data analysis and interpretation of the findings in this study. Groff (2004) agrees with 
this approach as she considers theories as analytical tools that help scientists to understand, 
explain and make sense of events in the world. It is from this premise that this study utilizes 
Social Realist Theory as both the analytical and explanatory framework.  
 
Critical Realism in this regard, illuminated the research methodology approach that I took in 
this study. As Archer states: ‘Ontology informs methodology – ontology without 
methodology is deaf and dumb; methodology without ontology is blind; only if the two go 
hand in hand can we avoid a discipline in which the deaf and the blind lead in different 
direction, both of which end in cul-de-sacs’ (Archer, 1995:28). This demands a movement 
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from the relativist realm of epistemology - what we know, towards the realm of ontology - 
what is it to be known.  
 
A problem emerges from the first two theses expounded in section 2.1.1 and section 2.1.2. If 
there is reality outside of human experience (ontological realism) but we are fallible and 
partial in our conception of this reality (epistemological relativism), then how do we ensure 
that what we have to say as researchers has any merit? This issue is addressed by the third 
thesis of Critical Realism which is judgmental rationality. 
 
2.1.3 Judgmental rationality 
According to Bhaskar (1998), the third thesis of Critical Realism is judgmental rationality. 
Bhaskar in his arguments regarding judgmental rationality, cautions us to be mindful that the 
choice of which theory to use should be based on or be in accordance with reason or logic, 
indicating that not all theories are useful when understanding a phenomenon. Some theories 
are better than others in their explanatory value in relation to the object under investigation. 
In this regard, Bhaskar (1998) urges social researchers to choose theories in their studies 
through a reasoned approach that must be determined by the logic of the research question. 
By this it is implied that there are several theories available to us. Our choice of which theory 
to use should be determined by the research question. In my view Archer (1995:27) drives 
this point home succinctly when she argues that: ‘different ontologies furnish different 
regulative principles about the methodology appropriate to do the explaining.’ 
 
In the context of this study, as indicated in section 2.1, I utilized Social Realist Theory 
particularly the morphogenetic framework as my analytical and explanatory framework. As 
indicated in Chapter One, my research question is: What are the emergent governance 
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practices in UNIMA arising from the implementation from 1997 to 2013 of governance 
reforms and what has enabled or constrained them?  The Critical Realist framework as 
explained in the preceding sections inspired me to navigate the theoretical landscape mindful 
of the above research question and led me to choose Social Realist Theory as my main 
analytical and explanatory theoretical framework to guide my study. In section 2.2 I 
introduce this theory and demonstrate why it was chosen. 
 
2.2 Social Realism 
As will be recalled from the discussions in the previous section, Critical Realism provided the 
ontological anchorage to this study. Critical Realism thus offers the Metatheory for the study. 
It is to Social Realism, which is entirely compatible with Critical Realism that I turn for the 
study’s analytical and explanatory framework. In this section, I present Margaret Archer’s 
(1995, 2003a; 2003b) Social Realist Theory from the perspective of the key concepts of 
morphogenesis, analytical dualism and institutional configuration and their situational logics 
as applied to my research topic. 
 
2.2.1 Morphogenetic perspectives 
The morphogenetic perspective is an explanatory programme which Archer developed aimed 
at linking the description (ontology) and explanation (practical theory) of social phenomena 
(Archer, 1995). Essentially, the morphogenetic perspective is premised on analytical dualism 
(discussed in section 2.2.3) and advances the notions that there are internal and necessary 
relationships within and between social structures; causal influences are brought to bear by 
social structures on social interactions. Furthermore, there are internal and necessary 
relationships within and between cultures; causal influences are brought to bear by culture on 
social interactions. Causal relationships between groups and individuals at the level of social 
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and cultural interaction elaborate upon the composition of social and cultural structures 
(Archer, 1995). Advancing from Bhaskar’s philosophy that objects of nature were stratified 
and multi-layered, Archer (1995) further argued that society was a composition of the 
components of structure, culture and agents.  
 
2.2.1.1 Structure 
Social Realists consider structures as the material resources that form a society. For Archer 
(1995), structures are the material resources such as wealth, sanctions and expertise that 
govern human relations in society. In this understanding, all human actions revolve around 
the relations agents have with material resources at their disposal. According to Archer 
(1995; 2003a), structures predate people (agents). Society involuntarily places agents into 
structures that pre-existed them. Mutch (2004) added that these resources are not provided in 
abundance; that is, to the level that they exceed their requirements. Because of this, material 
resources involuntaristically place some agents into privileged positions whereas others are 
placed in a disadvantaged position. The limited supply of material resources thus determines 
the positioning of people in society (Mutch, 2004).  
 
Giddens (1979) broadened the definition of structure by arguing that structures are the 
sanctioning aspects of a social system. This is the centrality of power - the capability agents 
possess to attain their will even at the expense of other agents (Giddens 1979:64). Giddens 
(1979) also defined structures as collective properties in society. Resources are thus ‘bases’ 
or ‘vehicles’ of power which comprise structures of domination, drawn upon by parties to 
interaction and reproduced through the duality of structure” (Giddens 1979:69). Structure 
also includes the existence of memory traces about how things are to be done (said or 
written) held by social actors – agents. They are social practices that agents organize through 
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the recursive mobilization of their memories as well as the capabilities agents possess that 
enable them to produce or reproduce social practices (Giddens (1979:64). Giddens in all the 
above definitions was however criticised for having failed to acknowledge that structures in 
the context of the morphogenetic theory involve relationships (Porpora, 2013). Furthermore, 
Archer (1995) criticised Giddens for having conflated the notion of structure, culture and 
agency. Archer (1995) had argued, as discussed in section 2.2.3 that there is need to analyse 
these separately to know the influence of each in the configurations of societies.  
 
In the context of the morphogenetic perspective therefore, structures are examined as 
contexts that influence human behaviour in relation to the material resources such as wealth 
and power at their disposal at a particular time in point. It is the limited supply of material 
resources that determines the positioning of people and the various roles they play in society 
(Archer, 1995; Mutch, 2004) and by extension the organization. That is why, according to 
Porpora (2013), in the morphogenetic theory we also examine structures as the relationships 
between social actors and social positions in a given time. It is for this reason that in the 
context of the morphogenetic theory the understanding is that for agency, depending on their 
placement in a society, structures enable and constrain their activities.  
 
In the context of this study the structures that were my concern were the governance 
relationships (sanctions and power distribution in UNIMA) before and after the MIM reform 
implementation at systems and institutional level on one hand and at institutional and 
disciplinary level on the other hand. (The categorisation of governance into systems, 
institutional and disciplinary levels is described in section 4.2 of Chapter Four). Specifically, 
I was interested in knowing how decision-making was arranged in UNIMA. That is how 
decisions that relate to administrative, financial and academic matters in UNIMA were 
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organised. I was equally interested in understanding the bases of power; that is, where such 
powers were derived from. These were important because of the perceived symmetrical and 
internal relationships they seem to possess in relations to governance in general.  
 
2.2.1.2  Culture 
According to Archer (1995), culture comprises theories and beliefs that a society holds at any 
particular given time. Porpora (2013), expounding on Archer’s (1995) definitions, argued that 
culture is what is collectively produced by agency but which guides individual actions of 
person or agents in society. Therefore, according to Porpora (2013), culture is the values 
people hold; the ideas people have about what is good or bad for them in a given society at a 
given point in time but collectively produced by the society.  
 
In this regard, according to the morphogenetic theory culture has an objective existence 
(Archer 1995); that is although it is collectively produced by agency, at some point it escapes 
its producers and acts back upon them. This is why culture is considered to have relative 
autonomy in the sense that it has emergent powers, independent of people. Its components 
exist autonomously and relate with one another to act back on the people. In the context of 
this study culture is examined in relation to the ideas, beliefs, principles and ways of doing 
things perceived to characterise governance in general.  
 
2.2.1.3   Structure and Culture 
According to Archer (1995) and Mutch (2004), both structure and culture are relatively 
enduring. According to Archer (2003a :262):  
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Structures and culture impinge upon us without our compliance, consent or complicity. The 
structures into which we are born and the cultures which we inherit mean that we are 
involuntarily situated beings. We have become English speakers before we can decide what 
language we would like to speak, and no other can then become our mother- tongue.  
 
It is this relative endurance of structure and culture and the fact that it creates the situation in 
which we are involuntaristically placed that gives the society its state of being (Archer, 
1995). Put simply, structures are the objective parts of the society whereas culture is the 
subjective part of the society (Porpora, 2013). Together Archer (1995) refers to them as the 
‘parts’ of the society in relations to the ‘people’. In Critical Realist’ terms structure and 
culture could be construed as the constitutive properties of the society. They are the essence 
of the society.  
 
Most fundamentally, because resources are not provided in abundance and not all people can 
also hold similar beliefs and ideas at a given point, the supply of material resources and the 
differences in opinion that people hold determines the positioning of people in society and 
mediates their social relationships. In turn, according to Archer (1995; 2003a; 2003b) and 
Mutch (2004) both structure and culture shape the society. But structures and culture do not 
act as hydraulics according to Archer (1995; 2003a). For structure and culture to be 
efficacious, that is to have the effect of shaping the society, they must stand in relation to 
agents’ actions or intentions. The question to ask here is how is this done? 
2.2.1.4   Agents 
Agents are people operating as social beings. In morphogenetic theory, people are stratified 
using analytical dualism into persons, agents and actors, on the basis of how they participate 
in the social interaction in society (Archer, 1995; 2003b; Mutch, 2004). As persons, people 
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can be construed as biological entities (humans) emergent from but not reducible to their 
material constitution (Archer, 1995). For example, I, Tarsizius, can be analysed as a 
biological being that can fall ill and hence require medical facilities in society to support my 
life. According to Archer (2003) however, in Social Realist terms a person is defined as the 
continuous self-conscious of an individual human being - the ‘I’.  Self-consciousness is the 
essence or the unique aspect of people.  
 
Persons acquire the identity of agents when their self-conscious enables them to relate with 
structure and culture not as individuals but as collectivities. Through involuntaristic 
placement, structures predispose persons to particular collectives, that is, for example, either 
as males or females, or middle class or the workers and sharing similar life chances in the 
form of privileges or lack of them. In this regard, persons as agency become social beings 
and they are always referred to in plural (Archer, 1995; 2003; Mutch, 2004). From the above 
example, the mere fact that I have embarked on this research study, Tarsizius as a researcher 
shares similar experiences with other social researchers pursuing PhD studies by research. 
Therefore, there are issues that affect research students as agents that inevitably will affect 
Tarsizius not as an individual but as a PhD research student.  
 
Furthermore, agents are also stratified into two sub-groups as corporate agents with power 
and influence, and primary agents who do not possess such powers and influence – basically 
as subjects (Mutch, 2004: 433). According to Archer (2003b) all agents are initially 
involuntaristically placed within primary agency. But, we are not primary agents in all our 
doings. In some of what we do we are not primary agents. It is therefore argued that through 
their reflexivity, a phenomenon described later in section 2.2.1.5, and situational placement, 
agents develop power and capacity to influence changes to their situations. Not all agents 
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develop these capacities, those that do as collectives, are considered as having corporate 
agency and those who do not possess or develop such capability have primary agency.  
 
These placements are not rigid. Similarly, through self-consciousness as individual human 
beings we also develop capacities as individual persons, which enable us to occupy certain 
roles in the society. In this regard, persons are considered as social actors. Extending the 
same example I used about myself as Tarsizius, when I complete my studies I can be 
employed as a supervisor of postgraduate students. In this regard I shall belong to a category 
of influential agents of supervisors for PhD programmes such as at Rhodes University. That 
is to say, I will form a category of agents known as corporate agency with a degree of 
influence and power over my postgraduate students. But, at the moment I am a PhD research 
student that means I am in a group of primary agents. Basically, as primary agents, we as 
research students are subject to the direction and guidance of our supervisors. The degree of 
agency as possible primary agents is enabled or constrained by status because even within 
this category there would be variability. As a doctoral student, for example, I have far more 
agency over my research than I did as an undergraduate student.  
 
Again as Tarsizius, where I am working at the moment in Malawi, I am a project coordinator 
of the Malawi University of Science and Technology (MUST). One may want to study the 
role of a project coordinator in a new University. She or he would not in this regard be 
interested in the role holder, but the role itself.   
 
In summary therefore, Tarsizius, depending on the interest of a particular researcher, can be 
analysed as a human being who can love and be loved (person) or as part of PhD students’ 
supervisors (corporate agency) or as part of PhD students subject to the direction of 
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supervisors and the rules of the University (primary agents) or as a project coordinator within 
the role he plays at the Malawi University of Science and Technology (actor). This is a 
simplified way of illustrating how a person can be analysed according to the concept of 
agency in the morphogenetic theory.   
 
The analysis of agents in this manner is important because it is understood in morphogenetic 
theory that persons, depending on how they are analysed, have an objective existence with 
emergent powers. That is to say, people will behave differently as persons (with biological 
needs), or as agents (either as collectives with power and influence or without power and 
influences) or as social actors (performing a particular role in society). In morphogenetic 
theory however, the concern is mainly on people as agency because it is only when they act 
as collectivities or as social agency that they become socially efficacious – that is they can 
engage in activities that will impact on the society and hence become an interest for social 
researchers (Archer, 1995). It is in the foregoing context that UNIMA stakeholders were 
examined in this study. However, it is important to elaborate my understanding of what I 
mean when I say it is only when agents act as collectivities or as social agents that they 
become efficacious. 
 
2.2.1.5   Structure, Culture and Agents 
According to Archer (1995) both structures and culture relate to agents. That is to say, there 
cannot be social systems without people (agents). For Archer, this does not entail that people 
create social structures, a research error that she characterises as upwards conflation (Archer, 
1995; 2003b), where power is accorded to agency without an acknowledgement of the 
constraining and enabling effects of structure and culture. Nor does it mean the reification of 
structures such that without them people will not exist, a research error that Archer 
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characterises as downwards conflation (Archer, 1995; 2003b) - where power is accorded to 
structures without an acknowledgement of the role of agency in reinforcing or changing such 
structures. It is rather to say that structures and culture predate agents and create the 
necessary material conditions for the sustenance of them.  
 
According to the morphogenetic theory building on Critical Realists’ persuasion, what is 
observed about society is part of the story. There are always generative mechanisms in the 
form of historical antecedents that shape society. Society as we experience it is thus an 
emergent product of generative mechanisms at the level of the real, which in social science 
has historical antecedents. Social researchers should therefore be interested to know about 
such histories since they account for events and what is experienced in a given society at a 
given point in time. This means that in UNIMA, before the initiation of the reforms there 
were structural and cultural properties that conditioned UNIMA governance, and which 
predated the governance reforms that were initiated in 1997. These historical antecedents in 
the structural and cultural domain of UNIMA governance context are an important concern 
within this study and I examine them in detail in Chapter Five.  
 
Secondly, according to Archer (1995; 2003a; 2003b), agents as actors are involuntarily 
introduced in a society that had already been predetermined by others that have been there 
before them. According to Archer (1995), this means that structure and culture offer agents 
the material and ideational resources for carrying out (or constraining) their individual 
freedoms/projects or group projects. In the context of my study, within the context of 
UNIMA governance prior to the reforms, these were the material and ideational mechanisms 
that enabled and constrained agents in UNIMA period before 1997, which I consider to have 
led the governance reforms to be initiated.  
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Thirdly, according to Archer (1995; 2003a), agents have a reflective mind, which gives them 
the power to condition structures and culture. It is pointed out that through reflexivity agents 
have reasons for their action. Furthermore, agents are endowed with the natural capability to 
‘explain’ their actions or behaviour and the reasons they attach to their conduct.  Having a 
reflective mind therefore implies that human beings can justify their actions or inactions or 
behaviours (Archer, 1995, 2003a). According to Giddens (1979:57), agents’ reflective minds 
enable them to discursively articulate or rationalize their actions or behaviours in the context 
of existing knowledge (known rules), which also incorporates unconscious elements of 
motivation or the unacknowledged conditions of actions.  
 
According to Archer (1995:283), reflexivity is fundamentally what makes persons conscious 
beings. They are the essence of agency. Without reflexivity we cannot talk of persons as 
social beings according to this understanding. In this perspective, reflexivity becomes a 
causal power because it has cause-effect in the sense that it influences the behaviour of agents 
in the social world. Actions of agency emerge from the ‘internal conversation’ (Elder-Vass, 
2007), which is a catalyst for the regeneration or elaboration of a given society. Through 
reflexivity, agents inhabit tendencies that have the potential to alter the context they inherit 
and within which they operate. This means that agents, through the process of internal 
conversation and as they relate with other agents as well as the parts of the society (structures 
and culture), would find reasons to alter their material and ideational resources, a process 
which is referred to as social conditioning (Archer, 2003a). It is this process, according to 
Archer (1995; 2003b), that brings about emergent properties of structure (structural emergent 
properties) and culture (cultural emergent properties) which eventually leads to 
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transformation known as elaboration or the perpetuation of a society’s given form known as 
regeneration.  
 
Fourthly, Archer (2003a) argues that the structural emergent properties and cultural emergent 
properties have the effect of transforming agents. What this means is that the effect of the 
structural emergent properties and cultural emergent properties predisposes agents to an 
altered situation to which they react differently through their reflexivity and self-
consciousness. Agents who view the altered situational context as providing them with some 
gains (enabling) have the tendency of wanting to perpetuate that situation whilst agents who 
find the changed context dissatisfying (constraining) tend to work towards altering the same.  
In this regard, ‘Frustration and gratiﬁcation are therefore the basic aﬀective responses to 
constraints and enablements’ (Archer, 2003a:264). This process also conditions agency or 
personal emergent properties and leads to either the elaboration of a given society, which is 
known as morphogenesis, or to regeneration of a given society, which is known as 
morphostasis. Furthermore, in a given society the emergent properties of structure and culture 
also act on agents thereby transforming them through a process Archer (1995) referred to as 
double morphogenesis.  
 
The above understanding helped me inquire into the situation that existed in UNIMA in 1995 
when reforms were being initiated. It also helped me to answer the following research 
question: What were the objectives of the reforms in the governance of UNIMA? In Chapter 
Five, I analyse the conditions at the point prior to the reforms, including the intentions of the 
agents. In the process I identify a disjuncture. It is this disjuncture that I thought can explain 
why UNIMA embarked on governance reforms of the nature it took and hence my ongoing 
curiosity during my undertaking of this study because this disjuncture was unknown to me at 
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the time I was embarking on this study. The point to stress here is that whatever the 
intentions the UNIMA agents had in 1995, it emerged from antecedent interactions the 
former had with the parts (structural and cultural properties). Thus some properties of the 
parts were enabling and some were constraining of the full realization of agents’ ‘projects’. 
Drawing on the Critical Realism under labouring this study, it was clear that there were some 
frustrations with the status quo and these acted as causal mechanisms that triggered the need 
for change. This culminated in what are known as governance reforms which are the concern 
of my study.  
 
The processes that took place, however, might not have produced the intended outcome as 
understood by the agents.  This is so because, according to Archer (2003a), unconscious 
motives operate outside the range of agents’ understanding that account for the unintended 
consequences. In most cases, according to Archer (1995), the unintended consequences result 
in contexts that are out of synchronicity with the intentions of agents, a phenomenon referred 
to as emergent. An elaboration of the notion of the emergent is necessary at this stage. 
 
2.2.2 Emergent properties 
Emergent properties are by definition changes or interruptions that occur in social settings 
with irreducible causal powers (Corning, 2002). By irreducible it is meant that emergent 
properties have features not previously observed in the system. It also means that while 
emergent properties can be traced to their originating components, they are irreducible to it. 
Emergent properties, according to Corning (2002), suit what Aristotle described as the whole 
which is over and above its parts and not just the sum of the total.  Elder-Vass (2007:28) 
elaborates this point when he explained that emergent ‘is the idea that a whole can have 
properties (or powers) that are not possessed by its parts’. Corning (2002) stressed that an 
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emergent phenomenon should not be confused with a resultant. A resultant can be traced 
from its component parts because a resultant is an outcome of a complex sequence of events, 
while an emergent is not.   
 
A good example of an emergent, given by Corning (2002), is that of water. When constituent 
atoms of hydrogen and oxygen are chemically combined, they produce a third substance 
known as water with its own properties different from and with separate properties to both 
hydrogen and oxygen. In this regard, water becomes an emergent phenomenon with its new 
levels of reality. Corning (2002) further elaborates on emergent by differentiating it from 
synergy. According to Corning, synergy arises from the interaction of two or more agents or 
forces whose combined effect is greater than the sum of their individual effects. An example 
of sand is given to clarify this point. If sand is combined, it will result in a sand pile. This 
means if one has seen sand, she/he can as well believe that one has seen the sand pile, which 
is not the case with an emergent property (Corning, 2002). 
 
According to the morphogenetic theory, while agents can condition structures and culture 
depending on their actions or intentions, the outcome does not always align with the initial 
intentions of agents as there are always variations or differentiations, which are explained as 
emergent properties. Interestingly, according to the morphogenetic theory by Archer (1995), 
it is these emergent properties that are responsible for the elaboration of social structures and 
culture.   
 
In the context of this study it is acknowledged that UNIMA agents may have had objectives 
that they intended to achieve when they were introducing the governance reforms in 1997. 
On the basis of the arguments being advanced now, it is possible that there were unintended 
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consequences of the governance reforms that were initiated in 1997 which are not easily 
accessible. That is why the focus in this study is on investigating these emergent governance 
practices in UNIMA. An understanding of these emergent governance practices in UNIMA 
and their enabling and constraining mechanisms helped me account for the form of the 
elaboration or regeneration of UNIMA governance in 2013.  
 
For the morphogenetic theory to serve as a reliable explanatory tool for social research, it 
must identify specific properties within a given time and context within structure, culture and 
agency that can plausibly account for the elaboration or regeneration of the phenomenon 
being studied in society (Archer, 1995). Stated simply, morphogenetic theory must provide 
answers to what led to morphogenesis or morphostasis experienced at any given point in 
time. Admittedly, because a social phenomenon exists in an open system, such answers 
would be in the form of tendencies. For this process to be possible, the morphogenetic theory 
advances the notion of analytical dualism. That is the separate analysis of properties of 
structure, culture and agents mindful that properties of each have relative autonomy. The 
section that follows (2.2.3) examines this notion in detail.  
 
2.2.3 Analytical dualism and morphogenetic cycle 
According to Archer (1995), morphogenetic theory’s analytical dualism approach stresses the 
point that the three emergent properties of structure, culture and agency must be analysed 
separately since each has its own properties and its cycles have relative autonomy and 
continuity and also because they operate in an open society. Secondly, structure, culture and 
agency must be analysed in phases as a cycle because they each can be out of synchronicity 
with one another and thus bring about different outcomes at different times, for example one 
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fostering elaboration whilst the other perpetuating regeneration at any given point in time 
(Archer, 1995: Mutch, 2004; Elder-Vass, 2007; Porpora, 2013).  
 
In this regard, to understand social elaboration or regeneration (morphogenesis or 
morphostasis) of society, there is a need to analyse first, the context of society at a particular 
point in time, known in the Social Realist literature by the shorthand of T1 – which is the 
structures and culture that pre-existed the agents active during the study period and therefore 
formed the historical context of society into which all agents were involuntarily placed. For it 
is the involuntaristic placement which exposes different groups of agents to different 
opportunities which in turn provide the directional guidance to different groups of agents to 
entertain action or intentions of either sustaining the pre-existent context or altering it or 
doing nothing about it. An understanding of the conditioning of such a context therefore is 
important in the analysis of changes that may occur in a society (Archer, 1995: Mutch, 2004) 
and, in the context of this study, in UNIMA governance. 
 
Equally important to analyse are the relationships that ensue with time as a result of the 
interactions between the parts on the one hand with agents on the other hand, as well as the 
internal and reciprocal relationships that emerge among structure, culture and agency as 
separate domains at the point of their intersection. This is the position referred to by Archer 
(1995) in morphogenetic cycle as T2 – T3. It is Archer’s (1995) submission that within this 
intersection, emergent properties are observed in the form of first level emergent properties. 
The first level emergent properties so generated, which are out of synchronicity and thus not 
reducible to the original structures and culture, impact on agency differently which in turn 
also alter the original composition of agency. 
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Crucial in this morphogenetic cycle is Archer’s assertion that at every cycle emergent 
properties of their own type (sui generis) are disposed in the register of society, and which 
either elaborate society’s given form (morphogenesis) or preserve it in its given form at a 
given point in time (morphostasis) (Archer, 1995). This ‘point in time’ is known as T4.  
 
It is through the separate analysis of the relative relations of structural, cultural and agential 
entities and their emergent properties over some specific space and time that enables social 
researchers to account for the changes that have occurred in a given society and at a 
particular point in time (T4) and attribute the change to either dynamics in the structural or 
cultural domain of a given social context. Ultimately, this is what I am aiming at achieving at 
the conclusion of this study to account for the emergent governance practices that shall have 
ensued in UNIMA after the governance reforms.  
 
Figure 2a to c graphically demonstrates the morphogenetic cycles as per Archer’s (1995) 
thesis.  
A. Society: 
Structure	  Conditioning	  
_______________________	  
T1	  
	   	   	   Social	  Interaction	  
	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	   	  	  	   	  	   	  	  	   	  	   	  	  	   	  	   	  	  	   	  	   	  	  	   	   _____________________________	  
	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	   	  	  	   	  	   	  	  	   	  	   	  	  	   	  	   	  	  	   	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   T2	  	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	   	  	  	   	  	   	  	  	   	  	   	  	  	   	  	   	  	  	   	  	   	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	   	  	  	   	  	   	  	  	   	  	   	  	  	   T3	  
	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	   	  	  	   	  	   	  	  	   	  	   	  	  	   	  	   	  	  	   	  	   	   	   	   	   Structural	  Elaboration	  
	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	   	  	  	   	  	   	  	  	   	  	   	  	  	   	  	   	  	  	   	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  T4	   	   	  
Figure 2-a: The morphogenetic cycle (Archer, 1995) depicting structural elaboration process 
 
 
 
                                                                 
	  43	  
	  
B. Society: 
Culture	  Conditioning	  
_____________________	  
T1	  
	   	   	   	  Socio-­‐Cultural	  Interaction	  
	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	   	  	  	   	  	   	  	  	   	  	   	  	  	   	  	   	  	  	   	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  _____________________________	  
	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	   	  	  	   	  	   	  	  	   	  	   	  	  	   	  	   	  	  	   	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	   T2	  	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	   	   	  	   	  	   	  	  	   	  	   	  	  	   	  	   	  	  	   	  	   	   	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	   	  	  	   	  	   	  	  	   	  	   	  	  	  T3	  
	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	   	  	  	   	  	   	  	  	   	  	   	  	  	   	  	   	  	  	   	  	   	   	   	   	   C ultural	  Elaboration	   	  
Figure 2-b: The morphogenetic cycle (Archer, 1995) depicting cultural elaboration process 
 
 
C. Society: 
Socio-­‐Cultural	  conditioning	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Figure 2-c: The morphogenetic cycle (Archer, 1995) depicting process for agency elaboration 
 
Figure 2d to 2f is my mind-mapping representation of how this theory is applied in the 
context of this study. Figure 2d depicts UNIMA governance situation as I visualised it in the 
period before 1997. This is the period before the governance reforms were initiated. Figure 
2e depicts the situation of UNIMA governance after the reforms were implemented – in the 
period between 1997 and 2013. The connecting points of the shapes represent the interaction 
of the governance reforms with the pre-existing structures, culture and agents. It depicts also 
the perceived view that the reforms might have had an influence on structures, cultures and 
agents in UNIMA, a view that would need to be investigated and detailed through the 
analysis. The pointed curves demonstrate the interactions of new structures, culture and 
agents with the old. It was assumed in this regard that the reforms were introduced to alter the 
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composition of the parts and the people in UNIMA with some intentions in mind. Therefore, 
the interaction hypothesized here is not restricted between the new and old structures, 
cultures and agents but it also involves internal interactions among new forms of structures, 
cultures and agents emergent from the above interaction, producing emergent practices in the 
form of governance practices unknown to me at this moment. It is this which forms the 
properties of UNIMA governance mind-mapped in Figure 2f. Figure 2f is what this study 
aims at revealing. This is either the elaborated or the regenerated situation of UNIMA 
governance context in the form of practices after the implementation of the MIM governance 
reforms. The process of revealing these emergent practices are discussed in Chapter Three 
and involve digging into the past, the antecedent historical events from 1995 (T1), through 
the implementation of reform between 1997 to 2013 (T2-T3) in order to make sense of the 
governance practices (T4) in 2013.  
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Figure 2-d: T1 UNIMA governance structures, culture and agents in 1995 
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Figure 2-f: T4 UNIMA governance structures, culture and agents in 2013 
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Figure 2-e: T2 – T3 (UNIMA governance period between 1995 to 2013) 
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In this study I am investigating the emergent governance practices in UNIMA, which is 
essentially the elaboration or the regeneration of UNIMA governance practices following the 
implementation of the governance reform measures. I was thus specifically interested to 
understand the conditioning governance practices in UNIMA because these are the ones that 
shaped the emergent UNIMA governance practices in 2013. I was also interested in analysing 
how structures and culture, both the pre-existing and the ensuing ones (emergent), have 
enabled or constrained agency to bring about the governance context at T4 namely the 
UNIMA governance context in 2013. The morphogenetic cycle therefore offered me the 
necessary investigative and explanatory tools in this research project. The concept of 
analytical dualism informed the approach I took as I examined UNIMA structures, culture 
and agents independent of each other and their relationship in the UNIMA period before and 
after the governance reforms. I also examined the deeper layers of historical antecedent 
events to make sense of what is experienced. The morphogenetic theory offered me useful 
tools to analyse and explain the emergent governance context that obtained in the UNIMA 
governance system of 2013. The theory furthermore enabled me to account for the 
morphogenesis/morphostasis that was observed in UNIMA governance system in 2013. 
There is thus a symmetrical necessary link between my research question and the Social 
Realist Theory.  
 
2.2.4 Archer’s Institutional Configuration and their situational logics 
I relied upon Archer’s institutional configuration model to explain the morphogenesis and 
morphostasis of structures and culture taking place in UNIMA. Archer (1995) theorized the 
various ‘situational logics’ that can predictably be anticipated to arise from the 
reconfiguration of institutional structures and cultural systems. It is argued that agents 
mediate the process of change due to the context in which they find themselves in the 
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institution, their vested interests and the degree of interpretive freedom they enjoy which 
enables them to weigh costs and benefits (through internal conversation) and find 
justification for any course of action they are to undertake (Archer, 1995, 2003a). 
Furthermore, existing institutional structural and cultural emergent properties provide the 
context within which agents’ intentions and actions are realised. This context either enables 
or constrains agents’ intentions and actions.  
 
However, the context then gets shaped and reshaped by agents’ intentions and actions is a 
continuous and a recycling process which, according to Archer (1995, 2003a); Mutch (2004); 
and Elder-Vass (2007), leads agents to manifest different behaviours at different times and 
contexts. These behaviours have been theorized by Archer (1995) to manifest different 
situational logics depending upon whether the emergent ideas or structures are construed as 
necessary complementarities or contingent complementarities or necessary incompatibilities 
or contingent incompatibilities to the vested interests of agents.  
 
Table 2.2 summarizes Archer’s hypothesis regarding how the process of institutional 
configuration and their situational logics works. I return to elaborate on this table in Chapter 
Three when I discuss its use as an interpretive/explanatory framework in this study.   
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Institutional/Ideational 
configurations determining 
morphostasis/morphogenesis  
Conditioning processes Logical 
consequence 
Necessary complementarities  Mutually co-existing institutions or cultures 
are sustained despite incursion of new 
ideas/structures as a result of necessary 
institutional or cultural linkages that 
complement each other. 
Protection 
Necessary incompatibilities.  New ideas/structures create tension as 
constitutions of mutually co-existing 
institutions or cultures are not compatible to 
them.  
Compromise  
Contingent incompatibilities  Incursions (institutional or ideational) lead to 
configurations of society as they are at 
variance with the existing structures or culture 
of the organization  
Elimination  
Contingent compatibilities  Incursions (institutional or ideational) lead to 
configurations of society as they are 
compatible to the existing 
dominant/influential structures or culture of 
the society.  
Opportunity  
 
Table 2.2: Situational logic of social conditioning (Archer, 1995:218-245). 
 
In this way, as new ideas and structures are introduced, they either reinforce or conflict with 
existing structures and cultures. This then generates a logical consequence on the part of 
agents. From the foregoing perspective, it can be inferred that what would provide generative 
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guidance for any course of action by agents would depend on whether the emergent 
governance context has been understood by agents to have provided the necessary 
complementarities or contingent complementarities or necessary incompatibilities or 
contingent incompatibilities to the situations agents find themselves in at different context 
and moment in time. In the context of this study, the above institutional configuration 
framework gave me the explanatory tools with which I interpreted the behaviour of the 
UNIMA agents in the evolving governance context as governance reforms were being 
implemented. The actual use of this framework as an analytical tool is discussed in Chapter 
Three. 
2.3 Conclusion 
This Chapter has introduced Critical Realism as the overarching theoretical framework 
underpinning the scientific assumptions and research practice in this study. It has 
demonstrated how the Critical Realism perspectives of ontological realism, epistemological 
relativism and judgmental rationality (Groff, 2004) have framed this study, including the 
choice of the methodological framework used. The chapter has also presented Social Realism 
both as the analytical and explanatory framework of the study and demonstrated its alignment 
to the Critical Realist position. The ways the above theories have been used in the 
implementation of this study is what is known as the methodology, which is the focus of 
Chapter Three to which I now turn.  
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Chapter 3  
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
3.0 Introduction 
In Chapter Two I introduced the theoretical framework of this study by explaining that the 
researcher’s view of social reality is fundamental in formulating assumptions about 
knowledge and how such knowledge can be accessed. I introduced Critical Realism as central 
to the assumptions made in this study and as a precondition for the knowledge to be 
generated in this study. Critical Realism was thus introduced as a Metatheory. As already 
stated, this study is premised on the firm belief that we live in an open society which is 
stratified. Science is about accessing knowledge of what is observed and identifying the 
structures and mechanisms that generate that which is observed or experienced. In this 
context, reality is embedded in the domain of the empirical, the actual and the real (that is, 
the generative properties).  
 
This chapter builds from this premise to introduce the methodology I utilise to move from the 
transitive knowledge to accessing the intransitive knowledge about higher education 
governance in general and UNIMA governance in particular.  It is important to clarify here 
that there is a distinction between research methodology and research methods. As described 
by Henning et al (2004:36), a research method is how in a study one goes about doing one 
thing, for example, how one goes about collecting data. A methodology on the other hand, is 
when several methods are employed together to complement one another to answer a 
research question guided by a philosophical perspective; that is how one went about the 
whole process of investigation to answer the research question. This chapter is described as a 
research methodology chapter because it is aimed at outlining the various methods that were 
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employed in order to answer the research question posed. Put simply, this chapter explains 
how I went about accessing knowledge both in the transitive and intransitive domains.  
 
My research question is: What are the emergent governance practices in UNIMA arising 
from the implementation from 2006 to 2013 of the governance reforms and what has enabled 
or constrained them? In this regard I intend to investigate the new governance practices that 
have emerged in the University of Malawi as the outcome of the governance reforms that 
were initiated in 1997. But I do not tease out the new governance practices that have emerged 
in UNIMA and stop there. From my research question, I also interrogate the context of 
UNIMA governance both before and during the period I have indicated I am interested to 
investigate (i.e. 1997 to 2013) in order to identify the possible mechanisms that have enabled 
and or constrained the governance practices in UNIMA whether from within the institution or 
from outside. By context, from Chapter Two, I mean the role the governance structure and 
culture have played in the emergent governance context. Because of this, it was thus 
imperative to me to begin my study by delving first into the domain of the empirical.  
 
In order to probe into the domain of the empirical I also needed to understand the meaning 
that is attached to the term higher education governance. In Critical Realism these are the 
constitutive components that give higher education governance its objective existence.  This 
was necessary because according to Collier (1994) and Danermark et.al. (2002), science in 
Critical Realism must emerge from the known to the unknown. I cannot therefore claim to 
state that I would like to study UNIMA governance before I describe what higher education 
governance is all about. In social sciences just as it is in the natural sciences one must have an 
ontological base; that is a concrete understanding of an object one is investigating. More 
importantly, science aimed at establishing transfactual conditions must develop from the 
	  52	  
	  
concrete to the abstract and back to the concrete3. The first part of this chapter that is in 
section 3.1 is dedicated to describing the methodology I took to access the concrete in the 
transitive dimension; that is to conceptualise higher education as a social phenomenon.  
 
In the second part of this Chapter, that is section 3.2 to 3.5, I demonstrate how I accessed 
transitive knowledge both in the domain of the empirical and the domain of the actual on 
UNIMA governance using Social Realist Theory; that is having understood what higher 
education governance as a social phenomenon was all about from the premise of what others 
have described it to be (the domain of the empirical), it was necessary to inquire from the 
premise of the actual what properties constituted higher education governance practices at 
UNIMA. I had to utilise the Social Realist Theory in this respect, which I have described in 
detail in Chapter Two, because according to the Critical Realist Theory ‘under-labouring’ 
(Archer, 1995) this study, knowledge creation does not have to come from scratch. 
According to Danermark et.al. (2002), for scientists most of this knowledge is in the form of 
theories. Consistent with the foregoing view, in the second part of this chapter I explain the 
research methods that I used guided by the Social Realist Theory in data collection, data 
coding, data analysis and interpretation. In this section, I also go on to describe the method I 
used to extract fundamental constitutive particles of UNIMA governance that enabled me to 
later on concretise the emergent governance practice forming the social phenomenon known 
as UNIMA governance in 2013 - which is the main objective of this study. I conclude this 
chapter in section 3.6 by acknowledging how fallible knowledge production can be. I do this 
by reflecting on some practical measures that I undertook when collecting, analysing and 
interpreting my data to ensure that the results of this investigation are credible. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	  Concrete refers to the objective existence of a social phenomenon and the abstract the constitutive particles 
composing such phenomenon (Collier, 1994; Danermark et. al. (2002). 
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3.1 Conceptualization of higher education governance as a social phenomenon 
 
In the context of this study, the first thing that exercised my mind when I embarked on my 
research was how to interpret what Bhaskar (2008:13) had meant when he asked: ‘What must 
the structure of the world be like for scientific knowledge to be possible?’ If science had to 
start from this premise in this study, it was imperative that I also begin my study from the 
same premise. In order to operate in the same mind frame as Bhaskar I rephrased the same 
question in my mind to read: ‘What must the structure of higher education governance be like 
for scientific knowledge to be possible?’ From this premise, and guided by Critical Realists’ 
assertion that the social world is stratified (Bhaskar, 2008), I started my investigation by 
attempting to find out what is known about higher education governance for it to acquire its 
objective existence. This meant I needed to start from the known. I therefore began my 
investigation with a literature search. I examined literature on higher education governance. 
My literature search was broad yet specific. It was broad, in the sense that my literature 
search led me to study what has been written about higher education governance in America, 
Europe, Asia and the continent of Africa. Broadly as well in the sense that initially I read 
widely on the subject matter without specific focus. Later it was specific in the sense that, 
much as my literature search led me to explore the diversity of higher education governance 
practices, my focus narrowed down to gaining knowledge of exact constitutive properties that 
characterize governance practices based on the frequency with which they appeared in the 
literature. I also thereafter narrowed my reading to literature by authors who were frequently 
quoted by other authors.  
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I therefore examined the definitions of higher education governance contained in the 
literature I consulted particularly from the authors who were appealing to me as the main 
authorities in higher education governance going by the frequency they were quoted by other 
authors, in order to understand what higher education governance meant. This was followed 
by identification of concepts that inform higher education governance models, as they had 
been understood in the same literature. I followed this by sieving this data to isolate those 
concepts that I thought described practices which can be considered to have a symmetrical 
relationship with higher education governance; that is practices which from my literature 
search featured dominantly in almost all the literature irrespective of which continent, region 
or country the authors were writing about.   
 
I also examined different governance models found in literature and again isolated the 
dominant models in literature. These enabled me to understand characteristics of higher 
education governance structures and mechanisms. Through the models I was able to discern 
the generative mechanisms for particular types of governance practices that I observed. The 
process was to a great extent what would be expected from any literature review informing a 
doctoral study. The distinction perhaps is that I was seeking, through the literature review, to 
identify possible generative mechanisms identified by other researchers in other contexts 
such that I could look for them in the study data. 
 
The major challenge I experienced at this stage was that there is relatively limited literature 
specific to higher education governance reforms from an African perspective, which would 
have been more attuned to my study objective. If perhaps there is, it is not readily available in 
the libraries in the form of print or digital materials the way other continents’ literature on 
higher education governance is. I was inclined to believe through my literature search that 
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there is a dearth of research work on higher education governance in Africa, particularly in 
the context of higher education governance reforms. This is why this particular study is 
relevant as it attempts to fill this observed gap. From the research data I gathered I was able 
to isolate properties which in my mind were able to answer the question: what must exist for 
higher education governance to be possible? I thereafter developed a framework from this 
review, which I used to examine UNIMA governance context. The results of my findings in 
this respect are presented in Chapter Four.  
 
3.2 Accessing the context of UNIMA governance at T1  
Having examined the properties that characterize higher education governance in general as 
they have been understood in the literature, the second step was to understand the context of 
UNIMA governance as conditioned prior to the reforms. Here again I used the 
morphogenetic framework.  This led me to explore constitutive properties of structure and 
culture (the parts) of UNIMA governance period prior to the reforms of 1997. This was done 
because as Archer (1995) has argued, society is a product of past activities of agency as they 
interact with their structures and culture. Agents are born into a society that existed before 
them. Using the same argument, I worked from the premise that UNIMA governance reforms 
were at least partially context specific. The reforms emerged out of a given situation in time 
(T1), which perhaps was found constraining to some and enabling to others depending on the 
relative positioning of agents and on their personal and professional roles.  
 
UNIMA corporate agency at T1 in this regard was positioned within this context, which was 
not of their making, known by the term ‘involuntaristic placement’ by Archer (1995). It is 
important to observe that Archer (1995) used the term involuntaristic placement as a 
presumption that people are born in a society not of their choice or making. However, in the 
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context of this study one might ask how this could apply as people choose to join an 
organization out of their volition. I would like to insist that involuntaristic placement as 
understood by Archer also applied in the context of this study because agents join an 
organization with limited knowledge about its structure and culture. Furthermore, the context 
of an organization is in a state of constant flux. Agents can only know a little about their 
organization from the domain of the empirical, but for them to know more about their 
organization, they need to delve into the domain of the actual. The domain of the ‘real’ is in 
fact beyond their reach. It is for this reason that the term involuntaristic placement in the 
context as understood by Archer (1995) is also applied in the context of this study.  
 
Equally important to understand at this stage was the composition of agents in UNIMA at T1 
and who initiated the reforms. It was imperative to know whose project the MIM reforms was 
and why the reforms were introduced because, according to Social Realism, any society 
always has an assertive group who develop, propagate and legitimize its ideology as 
beneficial to all (Archer, 1995). Similarly, according to the morphogenetic theory by Archer 
(2003a) for any change to occur it must be conditioned by agency. In this connection, I was 
interested to know the composition of corporate agency in UNIMA in the period prior to the 
reforms and their possible vested interests. In this respect, my interest shifted to answer the 
following question: what must have provoked the self-consciousness of Agency at T1 to opt 
for governance reforms? I relied mainly on document searches to access this data. In section 
3.3.2 I describe this method in detail and how I utilised it. The findings at this stage, T1, were 
analysed and are presented in Chapter Five.  
3.3. The context of UNIMA governance at T2 – T3  
Having analysed the historical context conditioning the initiation of governance reforms in 
UNIMA, my focus then shifted to the investigation of the governance practices that were 
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proposed. This was done in two ways. First I carried out document searches by studying 
relevant documents and files I accessed at Central Office on governance. The way I carried 
this out and some of the documents I consulted are described in section 3.3.2. I also 
conducted an in-depth interview with eight sampled members of UNIMA. The way this was 
done and how the members of staff who were interviewed was sampled is described in 
section 3.3.3 and section 3.3.4. My aim here was to investigate what was experienced and 
what had occurred; that is to access data from the domains of both the empirical and the 
actual in UNIMA governance. My intention was therefore to access whatever useful data 
relevant to this study was embedded in these documents as well as from what people were 
able to tell me. I was able to gather materials and ideational resources that contextualised 
UNIMA governance from 1997 to 2013 to form the basis of my analysis. Before I explain 
how I collected data through document searches and interviews, it is important that I 
explicate the research framework that guided me in this processes. 
 
3.3.1 Methodology used: Quantitative versus Qualitative research methodology 
There are two commonly used methodological frameworks in research depending on one’s 
research design: the quantitative and the qualitative frameworks. Quantitative research 
methodological framework most often emphasizes measurement and analysis of causal 
relationships between variables but places less emphasis on the process of inquiry (Denzin  & 
Lincoln, 2005). This method usually concerns itself with data collection techniques that are 
distanced from the researcher. Unlike a quantitative research methodological framework, a 
qualitative research methodological framework is mainly preoccupied with understanding 
human behaviour from the perspective of social actors themselves with the aim of describing 
and understanding rather than trying to explain human behaviour (Denzin & Lincoln, 2005).  
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There is also another methodological framework that combines both frameworks above in 
one study known as the mixed research methodology.  
 
From the insights offered by Danermark et.al. (2002), what should influence the choice of a 
research methodological framework should be the correspondence between the object of 
study, the assumptions about reality and how knowledge can be achieved. In the context of 
my study therefore qualitative research methodological framework was found to be the best 
suited to the investigation I was carrying out because I was studying an open society and I 
was interested in understanding UNIMA governance practices from the perspective of the 
social actors themselves. Some of the appropriate data collection methods used in a 
qualitative methodological framework are document searches and interviews which I 
describe in the two sub-sections that follow.  
 
3.3.2 Documents search 
My drive to embark on a document search was motivated by the strength of the arguments 
advanced by Stark & Torrance (2005), Bowen (2009) and Meyer (2001). Stark & Torrance 
(2005:35) argued that ‘Documents can be examined for immediate content, changing content 
over time and the values that such changing content manifests’. Bowen (2009) argues that 
documents can be utilized in qualitative research to serve several purposes: they can be used 
to access data on the context of the phenomena under investigation; they can provide 
guidance to a researcher on the questions to be asked to participants; they can provide 
valuable supplementary information needed to gain more knowledge of the phenomena; and 
they can be a means of tracking chronological changes or developments to phenomena 
particularly where there are good records available (Bowen, 2009). According to Meyer 
(2001), documents can shed light into the historical roots of phenomena and illuminate the 
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constraints and enablements of a current phenomenon. They can also contain historical 
statements made by key people in the organization. Documents can save time during 
interviews because documents can provide ready facts that are needed in the study. Finally, 
Bowen (2009) observed that documents can also be an effective alternative to gathering 
information in circumstances where participants or the researcher have forgotten some details 
or in circumstances where it is very difficult to observe events. In the context of this study, 
which was examining a phenomenon that had taken place over time, it was necessary that a 
document search be considered as a data collection tool.  
 
My document search began as follows: Firstly, I reviewed the Minutes of University Council 
meetings in the period before the governance reforms were introduced, down to 2000 because 
my focus here was mainly on interrogating the context of UNIMA governance period before 
the reforms were introduced and implemented in earnest.  I was mainly interested in those 
minutes that discussed the University reforms. In this regard, I studied the following Minutes: 
Minutes of the 59th Council Meeting of held on 31st May, 1995 which considered the 1995/96  
Financial Year’s University budget. This is the meeting that mooted the idea of reforms in 
UNIMA. It is at this meeting that a subcommittee was established and mandated to come up 
with comprehensive recommendations on how the University was to overcome the 
anticipated challenges that had arisen from the event that had occurred in 1995 which I 
discuss in Chapter Five. I also examined Minutes of the 60th Council Meeting held in 
September, 1995. This is the meeting that received the recommendations from the sub-
committee and mooted the idea to engage a consultant.  
 
I also examined Minutes of the 63rd meeting of the University Council held on 19th 
December, 1997 where a Final Report was presented to Council by the Malawi Institute of 
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Management, which is the consultant that had been identified to carry out the functional 
review. During this meeting I noted that a Task force was set up to scrutinize the Report and 
guide Council on which reforms to adopt, the approach to be taken and the time frame for 
each phase of implementation.  Furthermore, I studied subsequent Minutes of the 64th 
meeting of the University Council held on 6th February, 1998 which received, considered and 
adopted the final MIM governance reform measures the Task Force had finally settled on. It 
is at this meeting where the Council adopted the governance reform measures to implement.  
Finally, I examined the Minutes of the 66th meeting of Council held on 22nd January, 1999; 
the 67th meeting of Council held on 14th May, 1999; the 68th Meeting of Council held on 4th 
February, 2000 and those of the 70th Meeting of Council held on 7th April, 2000. I also 
reviewed Minutes of the Council’s statutory subcommittees: Minutes of the University 
Senate, Minutes of the Finance Committee and Minutes of the Appointments and Staff 
Development Committee. 
   
Furthermore, I examined memos from files particularly those that originated from the Chief 
Secretary to Government, the Secretary for Education and the Comptroller of Statutory 
Corporations. These three sources were very active in communicating the Government 
position on various aspects of public sector organizations’ governance. I also examined files 
containing internal correspondences of Council to appreciate the exchange of ideas regarding 
UNIMA governance between senior management and the Chairperson of Council.  
 
It is important to note that all these documents provided me with insights into the governance 
experiences and events in UNIMA prior to the implementation of the governance reforms in 
1997. I was also able to gain insights into the extenuating events that preceded the reforms. 
This directed me to interrogate possible mechanisms at play that accounted for the decision to 
	  61	  
	  
embark on reforms. The Minutes gave me insights into the governance experiences and 
events in UNIMA prior to governance reforms in 1997. The files highlighted the motives 
agents had when introducing the reforms as well as their vested interests. Data collected also 
revealed who were the corporate and primary agents in UNIMA in 1995 and the practical 
measures they undertook to extricate themselves from the financial crisis that they were 
facing by 1995 (at T1, discussed in Chapter Five).  
 
Secondly, I reviewed the MIM Report together with the Task Force Report, which came out 
in 1997 as the outcome of the consultants’ work. The Report provided the directional 
guidance that formed the basis for governance reforms in UNIMA as it specified the 
structural defects that were impeding UNIMA’s progress. The Report made 
recommendations on how UNIMA Council could resolve these. In this regard, the MIM 
Report assisted me to establish the governance context in UNIMA before the reforms were 
initiated. I noted that the Report was an outcome of the consultations that took place between 
the MIM consultants and UNIMA stakeholders because prior to this Report, the consultants 
had visited all the five campuses of UNIMA from where they interviewed UNIMA 
stakeholders including Council members themselves, selected members of senior 
management, academic and administrative members of staff and the representatives of 
support staff. The Report was compiled after this consultative process. The Report therefore 
reflected quite significantly the governance context of UNIMA by 1997 because it was 
preceded by a wide consultation process. The Report contained information about how 
UNIMA governance structures and culture were organised in the period before 1997 and how 
they were construed as failing the institution. The Report also gave me a good platform for 
identifying what other mechanisms could have been responsible for the initiation and 
adoption of governance reforms in UNIMA. From the document search I was able to relate 
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the context of UNIMA governance based on the findings with events that were occurring in 
the global context of the higher education governance setting from that data gathered during 
my literature search.  
 
It is worth noting that apparently there were major policy shifts in higher education 
governance on the global macro-level at the time the governance reforms in UNIMA were 
being initiated such as Globalization and its antecedent theories and beliefs. It was important 
to reflect upon these as it was possible that these trends might have influenced the reform 
measures that were proposed in UNIMA. The trends that were happening in the global arena 
of higher education governance are discussed in detail in Chapter Four and are taken into 
account in this analysis of documents at T1, discussed in Chapter Five.  This is central to a 
Social Realist analysis because, as Archer (1995) states, societies (organizations) are open 
systems and therefore what transforms or regenerates them could be cultural powers beyond 
what is locally experienced. I was therefore able from the MIM Report to discern the cultural 
underpinnings that influenced the MIM reform recommendations. It is important to indicate 
that from the Minutes of the 64th meeting of the University Council, the MIM Report 
contained all the recommendations that the Task Force had recommended which the Council 
finally adopted. However, as I later on discovered (and I discuss these findings in Chapter 
Six) not all these recommendations were implemented. 
 
Thirdly, I examined the UNIMA Act of 1998 (the revised version of the law that created 
UNIMA and informed governance practices in UNIMA). This is the overarching structure 
that gave overt autonomy to UNIMA. It contains the sanctioning powers in UNIMA or 
legitimating governance mechanism. I noted that the 1998 Act was an Amended Act of the 
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1974 UNIMA Act and that it was the second amendment to the UNIMA Act after the 
provisional one of 1965.  
 
Fourthly, I reviewed various documents and correspondences relevant to governance in 
UNIMA. I went through a Report produced by Chancellor College, which contained 
Academic Restructuring plans for the college which complemented what the MIM Report 
had recommended. The document contained the ideas of Chancellor College’s corporate 
agents on their plans regarding how the college structures should be re-organised in response 
to the reforms measures Council had adopted from the MIM Report. In fact, this restructuring 
Report revealed the outcome of the college agents’ internal conversations as they reflected on 
the impact of governance reform measures on the college governance.  
 
The interest in all these documents reviewed was to access both data at T1 as well as the 
implementation experience of UNIMA governance reforms at T2-T3. Table 3.1 is a summary 
of the documents that I examined. This table does not contain all the files and documents I 
read; it only lists selected documents and files that pertained to the analysis and that are 
referred to in the thesis.  
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 Document Description Code 
1 Minutes of 59th Council Meeting of held on 31st May 1995 RD41 
2 Minutes of the 60th Council Meeting held in September 1995 RD2 
3 63rd meeting of the University Council held on 19th December, 1997 RD3 
4 64th meeting of the University Council held on 6th February 1998 RD4 
5 66th meeting of Council held On 22 January 1999 RD5 
6 67th meeting of Council held on 14th May 1999 RD6 
7 Minutes of the 68th Meeting of Council held on 4th February 2000  RD7 
8 Minutes of the 70th Meeting of Council held on 7th April 2000. RD8 
9 Minutes of the 158th Meeting of Senate held on 28th July, 2006 RD9 
10 Minutes of the 163rd Meeting of Senate held on 18th April, 2008 RD10 
11 Minutes of the 165th Meeting of Senate held on 12th August, 2009 RD11 
12 Minutes of the 168th Meeting of Senate held on 13th January, 2010 RD12 
13 UNIMA Acts of 1998 RD13 
14 Preliminary Report on Academic Restructuring at Chancellor College 
(2008) 
RD14 
15 Publications Malawi Government Circulars Vol. I (January 1976 to 
February 1994) 
RD15 
16 Publications Malawi Government Circulars Vol. III (April 2000 to August 
2002) 
RD16 
17 Publications Malawi Government Circulars Vol. V (January 2006 to May, 
2008) 
RD17 
18 Publications Malawi Government Circulars Vol.VI (January 2007 to 
October, 2010) 
RD18 
19 Minutes of the 119th Finance Committee of Council held on 21st March, RD19 
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  RD	  is	  an	  abbreviation	  for	  Research	  Documents	  and	  refers	  to	  the	  documents	  from	  Central	  Office	  searched	  and	  
referred	  to	  in	  the	  thesis.	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1995 
20 Minutes of the 124th Finance Committee of Council held on 16th May, 1997 RD20 
21 Minutes of the 126th Finance Committee of Council held 23rd January, 1998  RD21 
22 Minutes of the 143rd Finance Committee of Council held 21st October, 2009  RD22 
23 Minutes of the 149th Finance Committee of Council held on 29th February, 
2012 
RD23 
24 Minutes of the 362nd Meeting of the Appointments Disciplinary Committee 
of Council held on 20th August, 1995 
RD24 
25 Minutes of the 374nd Meeting of the Appointments Disciplinary Committee 
of Council held on 11th September, 1998 
RD25 
26 Council Correspondence Vol. II (October 1976 to February 1984) RD26 
27 Council Correspondence Vol. IV (December 2003 to August 2006) RD27 
28 Council Correspondence Vol. IX (April, 2005 to February 2009) RD28 
 
Table 3.1: Some of the document reviewed and their coded names. 
 
As shall be seen in section 3.6, it was easy for me to access the documents listed in Table 3.1 
because at the time I was doing the document search, I was working with the University of 
Malawi’s Central Office as the Deputy Registrar where most of these records are kept. 
Because of the nature of my work in the Registry, it meant that most of these documents were 
within reach, for example, the Minutes of Council and files that contained various 
governance correspondences. There was only one document, from Chancellor College, on 
Academic Restructuring that I had to obtain through an e-mail following a request to the 
College. Besides, because of the agency I carried as a Deputy Registrar it was also easy for 
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me to access all archived files I needed something that a researcher from outside UNIMA 
Central Office would not be able to do5.  
 
Due to the time lag that had elapsed between the periods the Malawi Institute of Management 
Reform Study was carried out (1995 to 1997) and the time the recommendations were 
adopted for implementation (from 1997 to 2013), it later proved useful that I reviewed these 
documents because they supplemented the data I collected through interviews. I observed that 
when I asked my respondents to recall the reforms they knew were introduced as a result of 
the UNIMA governance reforms, all of them were not able to exhaustively mention them. 
The document search thus added the information I would have lost if I had relied only on 
interviews. Furthermore, through the document search I gained perspective of the structural, 
cultural and agential properties that constitute higher education governance in UNIMA in 
ways that were not always forthcoming from the interviews alone. Document search also 
assisted in focussing when I was developing the interview schedule as I was able to design 
my questions in such a way that the interviews could serve to confirm or question what I had 
observed regarding UNIMA governance as well as to fill in any gaps arising from the 
documents search. I took notes of all the important data I collected in my document search 
and later kept a typed version for ease of analysis. 
 
I also interviewed selected research participants. In section 3.3.3 that follows I explain how I 
designed the interview, as a data collection method and how the actual interviews were done.  
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  The	  issue	  of	  my	  position	  as	  Deputy	  Registrar	  and	  the	  implications	  of	  this	  for	  the	  research	  process	  is	  discussed	  
in	  detail	  in	  section	  3.6	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3.3.3 Interviews 
 
I designed my interview schedule based on the information I collected during the literature 
search and prior data I had gathered through the document search. I mention prior data 
because the document search was not time specific. I carried on with this throughout the 
study mainly to confirm what I heard as well as to fill in the gaps I noted.  There are different 
types of interviews. Cohen, Manion, & Morrison (2007) have categorized interviews into 
structured and unstructured interviews. Other authors have divided interview types into open-
ended and closed or structured and semi-structured (Titchen & Hobson, 2005). According to 
Cohen, et.al (2007), all interviews are designed on the premise that there is something about 
the phenomena that researchers do not know which they want to know. The main difference 
between structured interviews and unstructured interviews, according to Cohen, et.al. (2007), 
is that in the former researchers are aware of what they do not know and therefore design 
their questions in such a manner that they target to find out what they do not know. In the 
latter, the researchers are not even aware what they do not know and hence enter the field 
with an open mind to learn from it. In this study, I opted for the middle approach, which is 
the semi-structured interview. This was the case because I had partial information about the 
phenomenon under investigation but lacked a deeper knowledge of it. A semi-structured 
interview schedule was therefore most appropriate because it was flexible and therefore 
allowed me to gain an in-depth knowledge of the phenomena from the premise of partial 
knowledge. In this regard, I developed a few questions, which were open ended but based on 
the themes I was exploring as a guide, and I allowed the interview to shift from this guide as 
necessary.  
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During the interview, I inquired from my research participants to explain whatever they could 
recall about the MIM governance reforms; their views regarding the reasons why some 
reform measures were implemented and why others were not; what their experiences were 
with governance practice in UNIMA and finally, their general views about UNIMA 
governance as well as what they think should be the way forward for governance practice in 
UNIMA. The objective at this stage was to gather broad-ranging data from the domain of the 
empirical as well as the domain of the actual in line with the Critical Realism theory ‘under-
labouring’ this study. The interview schedule is attached as an Appendix.  
 
The motive behind interviews was to gain in-depth insight into governance practices in the 
UNMA from the perspective of UNIMA agents themselves. Since the focus at this stage was 
to access information about T2 – T3, I designed my interview schedule in such a way that the 
information gathered should move me from the level of the empirical, to the level of the 
actual. My research objective was to understand the emergent governance practices at the 
level of the ‘real’ and their enabling and constraining mechanisms. Interviewing selected 
UNIMA stakeholders using a semi-structured interview schedule provided me with dense 
data which moved me from the domain of the empirical to the domain of the actual and 
finally to the domain of the ‘real.’ To move from the domain of the actual to the domain of 
the ‘real’ I had however to use a process known as retroduction which I discuss in section 
3.5.  In section 3.3.4 that follows I describe how the participants in the study were sampled.  
 
3.3.4 Sampling 
It is believed that the quality of research is not only based on the appropriateness of a 
methodology applied to the research question but also the suitability of the sampling strategy 
(Morrison, 1993 in Cohen, et.al, 2007). Social research should aim at gaining an insight into 
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the standpoint that closely represents the views of the majority of the population. Ideally, 
such can be gained by interviewing or observing the entire population. But it is often 
practically impossible to attain this in social science. This is why social scientists rely on a 
small sample of the population to gain insight into the population. How this sample is 
identified is therefore central to the quality of the research (Cohen, et.al., 2007).  
 
Meyer (2001), writing about sampling in qualitative research design, pointed out that 
sampling of cases to be studied ought to be guided by the desire for information richness. 
From literature, there are different sampling strategies that are used in selecting a sample in 
qualitative research study (Cohen, et.al., 2007). In the context of this study however, I used 
purposeful sampling. In this technique the sample is hand-picked by the researcher based on 
his or her judgment in relation to the research question. Often purposeful sampling is used to 
gain access to those that have special knowledge about a particular phenomenon under 
investigation (Cohen, et.al., 2007) and this is what I aimed at.   
 
The sampling in this study looked at the length of time the respondents had been associated 
with UNIMA governance either as policy makers or as senior managers. These are the people 
who had more exposure (thorough enculturation) to what had gone on in UNIMA’s 
governance and therefore were able to provide me with useful, rich and insightful views of 
UNIMA governance. The sampled participants were divided into two groups; the policy 
makers (Category A of the research participants) and policy implementers (Category B of the 
research participants). Category A people were serving or had served as senior administrative 
managers in UNIMA. These were people who through their experience could explain the 
course of action taken as they easily identify themselves with governance policies and what 
the governance reforms were all about.  There were three participants that were selected in 
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this category because those who had met the criteria above were equally few.  Again since I 
was going to engage them in deep and intense inquiry, the sampled size had to be limited. 
The sampled group and the positions they hold or held in UNIMA are contained in Table 3.2. 
 
Category B comprised academic managers who were responsible for implementing policy. 
Those identified were mainly deans and heads of department. Also included in this category 
was one college registrar because college registrars by virtue of their roles in colleges are 
policy implementers. Category B participants were those who had experienced the reforms as 
policy implementers. They were in a position to hold a critical view about the reforms from a 
practical position.   These were five in number and the positions they hold or held in UNIMA 
are contained in Table 3.3. To identify policy implementers, I reviewed the list of deans and 
heads of academic department in UNIMA from 1997 to 2013. In UNIMA deans and heads of 
academic departments are treated as senior managers as they are the ones responsible for 
implementing governance policy. From this list, I identified the longest serving deans and 
heads of department. These were people who I considered to have institutional memory to 
assist in providing information useful in this study. Kekale (1999) established that academic 
disciplines have a bearing on the perception of leadership and management roles in higher 
education. To make sure that those finally selected did not all come from the same 
disciplines, the selection also considered the academic disciplines in which the participants 
came from as shown in Table 3.3.  
   
For both categories, I was able to select a total of ten research participants. I however finally 
interviewed eight of them as listed in Tables 3.2 and Table 3.3 because the other two were 
not available. One was out in the field for an extended period and the other one felt he could 
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not remember much about UNIMA governance reforms much as it was initiated and 
implemented during the period when he was serving in a senior management position. 
 Description of the Research Participant (Role played in UNIMA) 
A. Had been in this position for twelve years by the time of the interviews. Was a member of 
the Steering Committee that interfaced with the MIM consultants during the preparation of 
governance reforms. 
B. Was a member of Council at the time MIM reforms were being initiated.  
C. Had served UNIMA in his current position for ten years by the time I was interviewing him.  
 
Table 3.2: Profile of Research participants – Category A (Senior Administrative Managers) 
  
 
 Description of the Research Participant (Role played in UNIMA) 
A. Served as Principal of a College and previously served as a head of department.  
B. Served as dean of a faculty and had served in this position for four years during the reform 
implementation period. Prior to this had served as a head of department on two occasions, 
each of two year duration.  
C. Had served in current position for 12 years at the time of the interview. Also actively 
involved in the implementation of the governance reforms from 1997 to 2013. 
D. Serving head of department for four years, served this position twice before.   
E. Serving as head of department. Prior to this, had served as dean of faculty for four years. 
Had also previously served as head of department for four years before became dean.  
 
Table 3.3: Profile of Research participants – Category B (Senior Academic Managers) 
 
In order to hide their identity when making reference to what they said, I have randomly 
allocated code numbers ranging from RP16 to RP8 to each research participant. Furthermore, 
I listed research participants randomly in Table 3.2 and 3.3 as they are not listed based on the 
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  is	  an	  abbreviation	  for	  Research	  Participant.	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order of interviews and I avoided pronouns, which would reveal the gender of the 
respondents. I must stress that it is only the researcher and supervisors who can match the 
codes to actual interviewees. This I have done for ethical consideration. Due to the nature of 
this research, anonymity was necessary to encourage unrestrained disclosure of information 
by the interviewees. I must emphasise that these research participants are referred to in the 
rest of the Chapters that follows using the code number known to the researcher only and the 
use of gendered pronouns is randomly used.  
 
When conducting the actual interviews I first phoned all potential research participants and 
briefed them on the objective of my study and the process I had followed to identify them to 
be my respondents. All those I contacted agreed to be interviewed. I followed this with an e-
mail in which I confirmed our telephone discussion and the agreed date, time and venue for 
our interviews. In the e-mail I also attached a letter of introduction and a letter from my 
supervisor attesting to my studentship.  
 
 
My interaction with the research participants was very fruitful. I managed to interview all my 
research participants on the given date, time and venue. All the interviews went on well and 
they took on average 50 minutes. Our discussions were engaging and I managed to penetrate 
in-depth into the subject as it was easy for me to negotiate my way into the intricacies of the 
subject under inquiry having worked for UNIMA before7.  This in a way was a privilege in 
the sense that I understood meaning in the language being used which was helpful during the 
data analysis, interpretation and presentation of my findings. Each interview was tape-
recorded on prior permission of the interviewees. The data collected during these interviews 
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  At	  the	  time	  of	  the	  interviews,	  I	  was	  no	  longer	  working	  for	  UNIMA.	  My	  position	  and	  its	  relation	  to	  the	  research	  
process	  are	  discussed	  in	  3.6.	  
	  73	  
	  
as well as through the document search was analysed through the methods I describe in 
section 3.3.5 which I now turn to.  
 
3.3.5 Data analysis  
To begin with, the data collected was transcribed and coded. I used the morphogenetic theory 
to organise the data collected based on historicity of the events and experiences being 
described and using analytical dualism to identify the structural, cultural and agential 
properties of the events and experiences.  
 
First to be analysed was data collected from the document search. Using analytical dualism I 
identified the social structures and cultural systems that prevailed in UNIMA. The data was 
thereafter arranged chronologically according to which data was relevant for T1 and T2 to 
T3, which is the period before and during the implementation of the governance reforms.  
 
The focus on data analysis of structure was the identification of power relations in UNIMA 
and how decisions were made bearing in mind the framework of higher education governance 
developed in Chapter Four. These were decisions contained in some of the correspondences 
regarding material acquisition, management and distribution (including human resources and 
finances). I then analysed the data to assess the cultural systems that prevailed by examining 
the governance principles that were adhered to from the communications I analysed both 
prior to and after the governance reforms, that is, the key ideologies or beliefs which 
underpinned the observed governance practices based on the framework developed during 
literature review. I also analysed the data to assess how agents organized themselves and the 
composition of groups responsible for taking decisions and recipients of decisions regarding 
distribution of material resources in UNIMA period before and after the implementation of 
	  74	  
	  
the governance reforms. Danermark, et.al. (2002) have pointed out that it is social and 
cultural relations that matter in making a social object what it is. So, the social and cultural 
properties I focused on in the document search were those relations that were deemed 
necessary and internally related to the framework of governance developed in Chapter Four.  
 
I then turned to an analysis of the data collected from the interviews. The premise of the 
analysis done here was Archer’s (1995) morphogenetic cycle. It was assumed that existing 
structure and, culture in UNIMA before the reforms were introduced provided the context of 
UNIMA governance at T1. Introduction of the governance reforms was therefore treated as 
the infusion of new practices, and ideas into the existing UNIMA governance context perhaps 
to address constraints identified in UNIMA governance at T1. First to be analysed at this 
stage was therefore the MIM Report itself. I used analytical dualism again to identify 
properties of structure and culture, which were embedded in the reform measures. The 
governance reform measures were thus categorised into structural and cultural reforms. The 
focus on data analysis of structure was the identification of reform measures intended to 
influence power relations in UNIMA in terms of what and how decisions should be made and 
by whom. These were decisions regarding material acquisition, management and distribution 
(including human resources and finances). The focus on data analysis of culture was the 
identification of new ways of thinking and behaviours introduced into UNIMA through the 
reform measures intended to address the perceived cultural incompatibilities. Furthermore, 
for UNIMA governance reforms to be effective, it was assumed that they must have affected 
agents’ intentions and actions in one way or the other (Archer, 2003a/b). In this connection, 
the reform measures were further analysed to assess the reform measures that impacted on 
UNIMA agents and particularly the various roles they played in UNIMA prior and after the 
MIM governance reform implementations. 
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The results of the analysis of the data related to the period prior to the implementation of the 
governance reforms were treated as the UNIMA context of 1995. Results obtained at this 
stage of analysis form the findings at T1, which are discussed in Chapter Five. Similarly, the 
results of the analysis of the data related to period after the implementation of the governance 
reforms in 1997 to 2013 were treated as UNIMA context at T2 – T3 of the morphogenetic 
cycle. Results obtained at this stage of analysis form the findings, which are discussed in 
Chapters Six and Seven.   
3.4 Emergent governance context of UNIMA at T2 to T3  
The data obtained from the analysis described in the foregoing section 3.3.5 was subjected to 
further analysis using the process known as abstraction. According to Danermark et.al. 
(2002), abstraction is the process whereby a researcher places and interprets original ideas 
about the phenomenon in the frame of a new set of ideas – theories. The researcher picks out 
from the many features that characterize a social phenomenon those few things that could be 
considered as accounting for a phenomenon’s state of being.  The researcher in a way hunts 
from the many properties identified, the distinctive ones that best account for how a 
phenomenon behaves (Collier, 1994; Danermark et.al., 2002). What I did here then was to 
examine the findings in light of Archer’s (1995) institutional configuration model shown in 
Table 3.4  
 
 
Emergent properties Situation logic (Consequences) 
Necessary complementarities Protection/integration 
Necessary incompatibilities Compromise/syncretism 
Contingent incompatibilities Elimination/competition 
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Contingent compatibilities Opportunities/differentiation 
 
Table 3.4: First order emergent properties (Structure/Culture) Archer (1995:218 and 303) 
 
Under institutional configurations, Archer (1995) has philosophised how institutions would 
be organised when exposed to different circumstances she has referred to as 
complementarities and incompatibilities. Working out of these situational logics is part of 
sociocultural interaction where understanding the logics indicates the likely responses. The 
relations of incompatibility are when the logics are not harmoniously aligned, and can either 
be necessary or contingent. The relations of complementarity are where the logics are 
harmoniously aligned and these too can also be either necessary or contingent. ‘Necessary’ 
indicates the co-existence of internal forces, while ‘contingent’ is the introduction of systemic 
external forces potentially affecting the ongoing existence of structures and cultures. 
 
According to Archer (1995), ‘necessary complementarities’ refer to the existence of internal 
and necessary structures that tend to reinforce one another in a given society and form the 
context (the parts) of the society. Necessary complementarities enhance stability in an 
institution or society as structures at different levels of society work towards serving one 
another. Archer (1995) gave an example of ancient Indian societies to illustrate this point. 
She argued that in ancient India, the caste system, religion, economy, education and kinship 
systems complemented each other thereby reinforced social cohesion in the society. In such a 
system, according to Archer (1995), although there was negative feedback from the section of 
the society that were dissatisfied with the status quo, and who were being discriminated 
against, the kinship systems constrained any actions to alter the societal context. Institutions 
in this regard experienced morphostasis. The identification of the necessary 
complementarities helps to explain the causal mechanisms that promote the status quo in a 
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given society. In the context of this study, governance practices in the period before the 
governance reforms were analysed to identify if there were any internal ideologies or 
structures that held the UNIMA governance context together and ensured its continuation. 
According to this thesis by Archer (1995), necessary complementarities create a situational 
logic of protection as the complementary structures shield the society from disruptive 
contingencies.  
 
The same was done to identify any possible necessary incompatibilities. The UNIMA 
governance context at T1 was appraised with a view to identifying the internal and necessary 
structures which contradicted one another in UNIMA governance. According to Archer 
(1995), the effect of necessary incompatibilities is that social systems contradict each other 
and the advancement of a particular order threatens the endurance of the institution as it 
previously existed. To illustrate this point Archer (1995) uses the existence of bureaucracy 
and the taxation system. For bureaucracy to be sustainable it needs resources obtained 
through the tax systems. Yet, taxation is often resisted by societies because it extracts 
resources from the poor members of the society in order to advance the vested interests of the 
wealthy members of the society. However, bureaucracy and taxation are mutually reinforcing 
(i.e. necessary) because there cannot be the former without the latter. What is emergent in 
such institutions or society according to Archer (1995), is a situational logic of compromise 
or syncretism. Some members belonging to the under-resourced in the society are enticed 
with some privileges, which enable them to cooperate with the well-endowed members of the 
society. Coercive powers are used on members of their society to extract what their sponsors 
require from them. Archer (1995) predicted that in such situations compromise is held in 
balance by countervailing structural constraints. Morphogenesis takes place but not to the 
extent of disrupting the entire social systems. According to Archer (1995), there is systems 
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integration in societies that experience necessary incompatibilities. The UNIMA governance 
context at T1 was therefore analysed and interpreted in the light of this possible perspective 
as well.     
 
Furthermore, Archer (1995) has philosophised how institutions would respond when exposed 
to contingencies that are either incompatible or compatible with the internal and necessary 
social systems. It must be recalled that the governance reform measures researched in this 
study emerged from the external forces. The UNIMA governance reforms were taken from a 
Report prepared by an external consultancy firm, the Malawi Institute of Management 
(MIM). The new structures and ideas the Report proposed were therefore analysed in the 
light of either being contingent incompatibilities or contingent compatibilities.  
 
Contingent incompatibilities emerge when the society is infiltrated with new structures which 
are in conflict with the existing ones. This is the scenario where the existing structures and 
ideas in an organization which work towards promoting stability (morphostasis) in the social 
systems are challenged by the intervening structures or cultures meant to disrupt such stable 
social systems. In the light of this study, governance reforms which were adopted from the 
MIM Report were scrutinised to identify the measures that met the above description. Those 
identified were further analysed to observe their impact on UNIMA governance structure 
which was interpreted in light of the situational logic that Archer (1995) philosophized in the 
case of contingent incompatibility – that of elimination. It was my considered view in this 
perspective that the reform measures that were rejected would fall in this category and I 
sought to test this perspective in the analysis of the data. 
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Similarly, the appearance of contingent compatibilities could have been in the form of new 
ideas emerging from the MIM Report. Whether intended or unintended, it is Archer’s (1995) 
understanding that the society can be confronted with new ideas in the socio-cultural context 
which tend to compete with the existing ones. This is where in the social-environment of an 
organisation there emerge new ideas that offer alternative ways of doing things which are 
construed as harmonious with or even better than what is prevailing. This I believed might 
have been the case in UNIMA with the proposed governance reform measures which were 
adopted, particularly those that were eventually implemented.  In this case of compatibility, 
what ensues, according to Archer (1995), is the situational logic of opportunism. I therefore 
worked on the premise that some of the new ideas that originated from the MIM Report were 
viewed as opportunities to progress and were thus embraced by UNIMA stakeholders. My 
aim therefore was to identify such practices and interpret the governance context so created 
in the light of this situational logic emergent from contingent compatibilities  
 
The results of my interpretations above permeate throughout Chapters Five to Seven and are 
reflected as the context of UNIMA governance at each phase of the morphogenetic cycle 
from T1 (UNIMA governance context by 1995) to T2 – T3 (UNIMA governance context 
period 1997 to 2013).  
 
3.5 Interpretation of the findings: UNIMA governance context at T4 
At this point it is important to remind readers that this study was undertaken to address the 
following research question: What are the emergent governance practices in UNIMA arising 
from the implementation from 1997 to 2013 of the governance reforms and what has enabled 
or constrained them? I have explained in section 3.3 how I went about identifying the 
emergent governance practices in UNIMA. I have also described in section 3.4 the process I 
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used to identify the enabling and constraining mechanisms in the UNIMA governance 
context. Having identified the emergent governance practices and their possible enablements 
and constraints, it was imperative to offer possible explanations that could account for the 
mechanisms so identified. In section 3.0 I stated that Critical Realism argues that science 
must move from the concrete to the abstract and back to the concrete. This is what I aimed at 
finally. In order to achieve this, throughout the analysis, I used the process known as 
retroduction.  
 
Retroduction is a thought process whereby researchers after identifying the possible 
mechanism that is closely related with the emergence of a particular social phenomenon 
through abstraction engage in a thought process by going beyond their disciplines to seek any 
possible explanations that could account for the mechanism. After establishing the contingent 
connections, the researcher identifies from the many possible explanations the most plausible 
one which correctly describes the mechanisms by means of which, upon occurring or 
obtaining the phenomena in question is produced (Collier, 1994; Danermark et.al., 2002; 
Bhaskar, 2008). Having established the situational logics of UNIMA governance after the 
process described in section 3.4, I went further to seek the most plausible explanation for the 
phenomenon observed. I therefore went back to the literature to seek the most plausible 
account to explain the UNIMA governance context in 2013 at T4; that is to arrive at the 
concrete once again. This is what I present in Chapter Seven.  
 
However, as researchers we are fallible and partial in our conception of the ‘Reality’ (see 
epistemological relativism in section 2.1.2). In section 3.6 I interrogate how I dealt with 
issues of epistemological relativism in this study. It is important to note that as a social actor 
(in Archer’s terms) it was inevitable that I would bring my own experiences and perceptions 
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into this study. More so, because in this study I was investigating an organization in which I 
was initially a member of staff. In this regard, I may well have agency which could have 
affected the methodology used mainly in the way the data was presented to me during the 
interviews. This is why in section 3.6 I am compelled to present the ethical considerations I 
employed to avoid the most obvious biases that could have affected the credibility of the 
study.  
 
3.6 Ethical Considerations 
This study was conducted at UNIMA where I worked as one of the senior managers.  This 
obviously meant that as a researcher I was studying my own organization and a familiar 
environment. Researchers that study their own organizations are referred to in literature as 
insiders (see, for example, Chavez, 2008; Baree, 2002: Labaree, 2002; Mercer, 2007). Insider 
status can bring great advantages, such as easier access (as discussed in sections 3.3.2 and 
3.3.3), but it can also have drawbacks as well. Baree (2002) has observed that ‘insiderness’ 
must be examined from four premises: the process of entering the field; the positioning of the 
researcher as an object and subject of the study; the shared and significant relationships 
between the researcher and the researched; and disengagement from the study. These are 
important ethical considerations that I had to address in my study in order to ensure the 
credibility of my findings and each of these four premises is discussed below. 
 
According to Chavez (2008), researching one’s organization has an advantage that one has 
quick and easy access to the community one is researching. This, according to Baree (2002), 
gives the researcher considerable pre-constructed knowledge about the community and 
facilitates data collection. Chavez (2008) for example, who had studied her own family, 
reported that her membership in the family made it possible for her to approach almost any 
	  82	  
	  
member of the family and even extended family relations about the study and this required 
little or no rapport building.  
 
In my case the document search was done while I was still working at the UNIMA Central 
Office as the Deputy Registrar. In this role I had easy access to all the information that I 
needed in this study. Furthermore, I interviewed people who already knew me. I noted also 
that I was interviewing people on a subject they were all interested in. I observed this through 
the passion they had to support a project that was seeking at making sense of the governance 
processes in UNIMA and in particular at understanding the implementation of governance 
reforms in UNIMA. On this note, I am therefore confident that I had unprecedented leverage 
in my data collection of gaining in-depth input needed to carry out a study of significant 
value in its findings.  
 
According to Baree (2002), building rapport in qualitative research is of utmost importance 
particularly when one examines this in relation to the positioning of the researcher as an 
object and subject of the study. Researching one’s organization has an ethical dimension of 
positionality when the researcher is viewed against the researched. For example, the success 
of interviews as a data collection tool depends on the trust between the researcher and the 
researched. Where there is trust between the researcher and the researched there is an easy 
flow of information and data collected is of value. However, building trust is a process which 
I carefully managed. The process of interviews with my research participants was done at the 
time I had left UNIMA for the Malawi University of Science and Technology which is a 
newly established public university. When I commenced my PhD studies I had not realised 
that I would leave the institution prior to the data collection exercise. This ended up being 
advantageous. It meant that I was entering the interview data collection stage in some senses 
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as an outsider because I no longer had institutional power in the form of a management 
position, an agency which could potentially have compromised data collection and analysis.  
   
Furthermore, I also mitigated my familiarity with the organization by carefully selecting my 
research participants. In this regard my choice of who to interview was based on a scientific 
model. I therefore used Spradley’s (1979) framework sourced in Babbie & Mouton (1998) to 
select the participants to be interviewed in this study namely: thorough enculturation of the 
respondents to the context under investigation; current involvement of the respondents to the 
issues that are a subject of the study and availability of the respondents. I observed that by 
following this framework, my attention was focussed on information gathering rather than 
who I could easily approach.  
 
Much as the easy access presented above is an advantage in the data collection, it might 
equally pose as a challenge in reporting one’s findings. According to Chavez (2008) and 
Williams (2009), researching one’s organization can pose a challenge particularly when 
trying to hide the identity of research participants who readers may easily identify when 
reporting. In my case I maintained the confidentiality of my research participants by avoiding 
revealing their identity too much in Table 3b and 3c as well as by giving the respondents 
random code names. Besides, I have not during the course of carrying out my research 
revealed to anyone in UNIMA the people I have interviewed. To the research participants, I 
did not also reveal to them who else I had interviewed or was going to interview. Thus, my 
reporting of my findings has been made knowing that I was not jeopardising the identity of 
any one of my research participants.  
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I also used reflexivity in the reporting stage to avoid my own partial understandings of the 
UNIMA context from encroaching into my data interpretation. According to Mercer (2001), 
the more familiar one is with the community the easier it is for one to lose objectivity. It is 
possible for one to filter what one sees and observes through one’s own biased position and 
to inadvertently suppress the participants’ voices.  I overcame this by adhering to my research 
frameworks of Critical Realism and the morphogenesis. I let these frameworks guide each 
and every step during data collection, data analysis and reporting. Most importantly, I 
adopted a careful self-reflexivity at every stage of my interaction with my participants as well 
as during the data analysis and interpretation by always reminding myself that I was studying 
social actions and social relations and not myself or my views of what transpired in UNIMA. 
3.7 Conclusion 
In this Chapter I have demonstrated how my research was designed. I have also presented the 
research methods and the data collection tools I have used in this study guided by Social 
Realist Theory. I have also discussed how data was coded, analysed and interpreted using 
Social Realist Theory as well as how causal mechanisms were identified using the method of 
retroduction. I ended this Chapter by reflecting on some ethical issues that I took into 
consideration when collecting, analysing and interpreting my data. In Chapter Four that 
follows, I present my findings regarding the concept of higher education governance as 
understood from the literature search and used in this study. As emphasised in Chapter Two, 
Bhaskar (2008) argued that the search for knowledge must begin from an understanding of 
the constitutive structures that give a social phenomenon its state of being. This is what I 
intend to achieve in Chapter Four.   
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Chapter 4  
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK  
4.0 Introduction 
Collier (1994) interpreted Bhaskar’s fundamental question, ‘What must the structure of the 
world be like for scientific knowledge to be possible?’ to mean that we cannot investigate 
what we do not know. Consistent to this, in Chapter Three I argued that in the context of this 
study it will be important to begin my investigation by addressing the following question: 
‘What must the structure of higher education governance be like for scientific knowledge to 
be possible?’ In this chapter I attempt to answer this question. The aim of this chapter 
fundamentally is to find out what is known about higher education governance from the 
literature. The chapter is divided into five sections. I begin by examining definitions of higher 
education governance in section 4.1 based on literature search. This is followed by 
identification of concepts that inform higher education governance practice. In section 4.2 I 
examine in brief the governance structures that seem to characterise University governance 
through which autonomy and accountability is manifested in higher education governance 
practice. In section 4.3 I interrogate models that have been developed as theoretical 
underpinnings for higher education governance practices. These governance models, which 
seem to emerge from global trends in the economic and political spheres, are taken to be 
amongst the conditioning mechanisms for higher education governance practices. The global 
trends are discussed in detail in section 4.4. In section 4.5 I continue my examination of the 
trends shaping higher education governance practices but now specific to Africa according to 
the literature. Section 4.6 concludes the discussion of the literature. 
4.1 Higher Education Governance defined 
There are various definitions of governance that have been offered in literature. Neave & van 
Vught (1994) for example, defined governance as matters concerning how organizations are 
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directed, controlled and held to account. These authors were mainly concerned with the loci 
of power between the State (Government machinery or agencies) and institutions of higher 
learning in regard to agency that makes critical policy decisions on important matters 
affecting the higher education sector. In Social Realist terms we would refer to as the 
corporate agency in the higher education sector. Neave & van Vught (1994)’s construction of 
governance therefore presupposed that governance was about issues of control in the higher 
education sector.  
 
Harman & Treadgold (2007) defined governance as ways in which higher education systems 
and institutions are organized and managed. In their definition it would appear that the 
authors were looking at first, the institutional structures within which important policy 
decisions are made. Second, the authors were developing a definition that captures the 
implications of decision-making structures and processes on the existing relationships among 
various stakeholders in institutions of higher learning. In a way, one can discern an 
orientation in this definition towards looking at governance in higher education from the 
perspective of control and decision-making.   
 
Vidovicha & Currieb (2011) defined higher education governance as dealing with issues of 
relationships and matters of trust. Their definition in my view underscores what should be the 
ultimate aim of governance which is to ensure that there is an organizational culture in an 
institution of higher learning that promotes syncretism, that is, the sinking of the vested 
personal and disciplinary objectives so that there is harmony of purpose in an organization. 
This can be attained if matters of autonomy (which are at the heart of academe as I shall 
discuss later) and accountability are properly balanced in a higher education system.  
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From the foregoing definitions and the literature on higher education governance more 
broadly, it is clear that definitions and concerns about higher education governance converge 
around issues of autonomy and accountability. Autonomy and accountability are however 
contested terms as they either complement each other or are in tension with one another as is 
observed in the proceeding sections.  
 
4.1.1 Autonomy 
According to Saint (2009:6) ‘Autonomy is the power to govern without outside controls.’  In 
higher education, autonomy is viewed from three levels: individual freedom of academics; 
institutional freedom or self-governance of academics, and institutional autonomy (Neave & 
van Vught, 1994; Saint, 2009).   
 
4.1.1.1 Academic freedom 
Academic freedom, which is also referred to as intellectual freedom (Tapper & Palfreyman, 
2002), is the liberty accorded to scholars in Universities to carry out their core business 
without interference (Taiwo, 2011; du Toit, 2007). It is pointed out that ideas regarding 
individual academic freedom have their origin from the German Humboldtian reforms of 
higher education in the 19th century. During these reforms, freedom of teaching (Lehrfreiheit) 
and freedom of learning (Lernfreiheit) were advanced as the constitutive principles of 
academic freedom for modern research universities (du Toit, 2007; Graham, 2013; 
McLendon, 2003). It is reported by du Toit (2007) that when the principles of individual 
academic freedom were exported to American and European Universities from Germany, 
emphasis was placed primarily on freedom of teaching and extended to include freedom of 
academics to comment on secular matters in the secular world which were even outside one’s 
area of expertise. It would appear that these same ideas have been exported to African 
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universities through colonialism. Teferra and Altbach (2004) argued that most African 
universities were designed in structure and ideology (culture) along the lines of their colonial 
masters. UNIMA is one such example.  
 
It would appear however that ideas underlying academic freedom may have their origin in 
religion much earlier than the German Humboldtian reforms of higher education of 19th 
century. Graham (2005) has argued that medieval universities were associated with Monks 
who perceived universities as places for the development of the minds of youths to prepare 
them for salvation. Liberal arts in this regard were emphasised (Maton, 2005; Graham, 2005) 
and this included a focus on critical thinking and freedom to deliberate. 
  
Important ingredients of academic freedom have therefore been concerns regarding how key 
institutional goals related to teaching and research are developed (Hellawell & Hancock, 
2001; Tapper & Palfreyman, 2002; du Toit, 2007); that is to what extent University structures 
and cultures act as enablements for the involvement of academics in decisions affecting 
teaching and research. In teaching, emphasis has been placed on the need to have structures 
that promote coherence of intellectual identity where inputs of an individual tutor have to be 
balanced with methods of pedagogical delivery such as tutorials, seminars or lectures. In 
research, this has emphasised the need to ensure that there are structures that facilitate 
synergy in research efforts. Research activities have therefore involved organising agents in 
small groups under the leadership of a senior academic (Hellawell & Hancock, 2001; Tapper 
& Salter, 2004).   
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4.1.1.2 Self-governance 
Self-governance is defined as the belief that in institutions of higher learning such as 
universities, there are important decisions that can only be competently taken by academics 
alone or under mandatory advice of them because of their expertise and commitments (du 
Toit, 2007; Taiwo, 2011). The collegial system of University governance is a good example 
of self-governance. According to Tapper & Salter (2004), the essence of collegiality is in the 
self-contained character of the colleges in which academics admit their own members; create 
the context within which their members fulfil their academic, social and cultural needs; and 
self-govern as independent corporate bodies with access to financial resources.  
 
According to du Toit (2007) and Taiwo (2011), it has also entailed that structures for 
decision-making that relate to the work of academics such as the syllabus of a course, 
individual staff appointments, the admission or graduation of individual students, standards 
of academic performance, and the detailed allocation of resources between competing usages 
within a department or faculty are designed in such a manner that enhances the role of 
academics as corporate agency. From a Social Realist perspective, self-governance suggests a 
situational logic of protection or integration where social systems that support teaching and 
learning complement, rather than compete or contradict each other (Archer, 1995). 
Admittedly, these ideas have in the 1990s been a source of conflict in University governance 
and so are of interest in this study. 
  
To begin with, the challenge to self-governance in modern public universities has been that 
most universities do not enjoy financial independence. The majority of them rely on their 
Government subsidies for funding. That is to say, there are contingencies that exert pressure 
on the social cohesion in universities emergent from reliance of universities on external 
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sources of funding. Furthermore, even when they wish to raise financial resources on their 
own through tuition fees, universities have to do so through governance councils that are 
typically not dominated by academics (Tapper & Salter, 2004); that is, the governance 
structures that prevail are characterised by weak positional autonomy (I discuss this 
phenomenon in detail in section 5.2 of Chapter Five). It is for this reason that Saint (2009) 
argued that in assessing higher education’s institutional autonomy, it is imperative that 
cognizance of issues of the size and composition of higher education governing bodies 
(particularly how different stakeholders are represented) is not overlooked. Equally important 
is the need to assess how key decision makers are appointed in institutions of higher learning 
and who they are (that is the compositions of corporate agency) as well as the decision- 
making structures in the organization.  
 
Another contradiction that has been observed regarding self-governance is where it has been 
construed to mean that academics should be the only group to undertake all the key 
operations including management of all finances, audit, estates in addition to taking all the 
academic decisions in Universities (Graham, 2005; du Toit, 2007). The dynamics of modern 
Universities, particularly emergent from economic imperatives of the time, as shall be 
discussed later in this chapter, have demanded that in addition to teaching and learning, 
modern universities also have to be concerned with the professional manner in which issues 
of finance, audit, estates, etc. are managed. Self-governance in this regard has in some 
instances meant that in addition to the Vice-Chancellor, other senior managers who are not 
academics, or not primarily so, are incorporated into University management, a process that 
has changed the structure of University management of modern times. This has brought about 
emergent properties in higher education governance as managers other than academics are 
making important decisions affecting universities (Weinberg & Kistner, 2007; Shore, 2010).  
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Self-governance increasingly means matters that are important to academic functions remain 
the preserve of bodies such as Senate with the rest of University functions taken on by non-
academic structures. In a way, this would also release University leadership to concentrate on 
the core academic business of the University rather than spread out their efforts, although 
ultimately the Vice-Chancellor retains the overall responsibility of all the functions. 
 
Further to this, du Toit (2007) has pointed out that self-governance does not necessarily 
guarantee individual academic freedom, having observed that there are possibilities in self-
governance where some powerful academics can stifle, discriminate, exploit, abuse or 
exclude other academics in their scholarly work. This is why du Toit (2007) argued that when 
it comes to self-governance, it is safer to look at it in respect of academic professionalism 
within a discipline. Implying that self-governance should be seen from the perspective of 
how one joins the academic profession and gradually progresses to the higher ranks of 
professor; it should also deal with concerns for professional conduct; academic peer review 
of colleagues’ academic work, and defined as the amount of control peers have on each other 
as regards the core business of the University of teaching and learning, research and outreach 
(Dobbins, Knill& Vögtle, 2011). Power distribution amongst academics should therefore not 
only be about taking control of management functions in an institution (Tapper & Salter, 
2004; Hellawell & Hancock, 2001). Related to this issue of self-governance is the issue of 
institutional autonomy.  
4.1.1.3 Institutional autonomy  
Institutional autonomy in higher education has traditionally meant the treatment of higher 
education institutions in society as a separate establishment, distinct from other sectors of 
society in the way they are governed and managed (du Toit, 2007; Hellawell & Hancock, 
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2001; Tapper & Salter, 2004).  If there is an issue in higher education governance that has 
preoccupied many analysts of higher education governance judging from the literature (for 
example, Clark, 1983; Neave & van Vught, 1994; Graham, 2013; Teferra & Altbach, 2004), 
it is the relationship between institutional autonomy and what has been described as 
Government or State interference.  
 
Saint (2009) has defined institutional autonomy by subdividing it into two parts: overt 
autonomy and latent autonomy. According to this author, overt autonomy refers to 
governance structures such as the legal frameworks that influence the institution’s capacity to 
manage itself. For example, almost all public universities in Africa have structures in the 
form of laws or national policy documents that govern their operations. Of course, overt 
autonomy is considered to be positive autonomy because it provides legitimacy to decision 
makers but this again also depends on how overt autonomy is practiced.  Overt autonomy in 
institutions of higher learning are such governing structures as charters or Acts of Parliament 
that provide the legal structures within which higher education institutions function. They are 
also the legal frameworks within which important decisions are taken. These are the 
governance structures that enable or constrain universities to realise their full potential and 
these can impact significantly on the core values of higher education such as academic 
freedom or self-governance. 
 
Latent autonomy, according to Saint (2009), refers to structures that are not written explicitly 
into legal documents but have the same effect of influencing the institution’s capacity to 
govern itself. Unlike overt autonomy, which can be both an enablement and a constraint on 
the institution’s core values, latent autonomy influences governance in negative ways in the 
form of interference. Here, interference in governance may originate from outside, for 
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example, the State, through Government circulars or from powerful agents in industry or 
politicians. It may also emanate from within the institution such as from intimidating 
management, powerful academic staff unions, and militantly strong student bodies or from a 
particular source of international assistance that a given University depends on. These 
agential constraints can stifle innovation, promote rent-seeking behaviours (systems of 
obtaining economic gains at the expense of the institution) that politicize the functioning of 
institutions in negative ways, and act as mechanisms that constrain its ability to fulfil its 
academic project. Equally, latent autonomy is crucial particularly when it comes to mediating 
change in higher education as shall be seen in this study. My concern in this study is how 
both overt and latent autonomy have featured in the governance context of UNIMA in the 
period before and after the governance reform implementation.  
4.1.2 Accountability 
According to Saint (2009:7), accountability is the ‘clear assignment of responsibility for 
efficient use of resources to produce results and mechanisms whereby this performance can 
be monitored.’ Accountability is manifested, for example, through stakeholder representation 
in governing boards, audit reports, external examiner systems and various reporting 
mechanisms instituted by overseeing bodies of higher education institutions to monitor 
compliance. Kai (2009:40) has defined accountability as meaning ‘justification of an 
activity.’ According to the same author, ‘accountability in higher education is a concept 
related to efficiency, effectiveness and performance evaluation. It demands that institutions 
prove by effective means that their institutions have attained the predetermined results and 
performance’ (Kai, 2009:40). 
 
Saint (2009) further suggests that accountability can be sub-categorized into external and 
internal accountability where the former refers to monitoring measures put into place by 
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outside agencies such as the State and the latter monitoring measures put in place by agencies 
within the institution such as governing councils or boards or internal quality assurance 
structures. Accountability can also be by function. This is when activities such as teaching, 
research or administration in higher education institutions are given formal structures of 
reporting on how they should be carried out and even funded accordingly, such as 
performance monitoring mechanisms in research whereby an institutions’ research funding is 
linked to the number of publications coming out each year. 
 
According to the literature (for example, Ferlie, Musselin & Andresani, 2008; Shore, 2010; 
Tapper & Salter, 2004; Clark, 1998; Neave & van Vught, 1994; Teferra & Altbach, 2004), 
demand from the State for accountability in public higher institutions has increased in the 21st 
century. In the years before this and particularly in the medieval period universities are 
believed to have enjoyed greater institutional autonomy because the secular State had not yet 
emerged and authority was relatively dispersed among the main social actors in the society 
such as the Church, Civil Society and the University (McLendon, 2003). It is believed that 
the emergence of the State replaced the medieval informal social organization of the 
thirteenth and fourteenth century. Secular authority emerged which pitted the balance of 
power between the Church and the State in favour of the latter (McLendon, 2003; Graham, 
2005). Universities started losing their supranational quality and were increasingly viewed as 
being in service to the provincial and political interests. Issues of autonomy and self-
governance started receiving serious redefinitions (McLendon, 2003; Graham, 2005). The 
role of universities as self-regulated institutions underwent significant reforms to reflect the 
social demands of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries (McLendon, 2003; Viara, 2004; 
Graham, 2005). 
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In the nineteenth century the modern State began to mediate the interests of the society. In 
this connection, higher education institutions have been seen as playing an important role in 
the social development of the country. The State has in this regard increased its oversight role 
over universities (Ferlie, et.al., 2008). Accountability from the foregoing premise has in some 
countries taken the form of total control (Neave & van Vught, 1994; Teferra & Altbach, 
2004) to the extent that some Governments have exercised their countervailing powers to 
ensure that higher education institutions serve the public in the most effective and efficient 
manner (Ferlie et.al., 2008). Accountability has also been in the form of ‘steering from a 
distance’ (Ferlie et.al., 2008; Shore, 2010) where the State has created structures of control 
such as financing mechanisms that have linked Government funding to the attainment by 
universities of certain set goals of the State (Tapper & Salter, 2004).  
 
The rapid increase of State demand for accountability in public higher institutions in the 
twenty-first century has also been because the higher education subsystem has grown so big 
and become too expensive to maintain using public resources. In this connection, the State 
has in some countries designed measures that have forced higher education institutions to 
adopt in order to be guaranteed public funding such as the need to balance applied research 
with basic research (Ferlie et. al., 2008). In addition, the growth in the size of universities has 
made them politically visible and economically strategic which inevitably has demanded that 
Government’s oversight role be enhanced (Ferlie et. al., 2008).  
 
Additionally, as shall be discussed in section 4.4.1, as a result of the mechanism of 
Globalization, teaching and research have evolved into commodities rather than being 
understood as public goods such that traditional notions of academic freedom, self-
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governance and institutional autonomy have had to undergo serious redefinition (Ferlie et. al., 
2008; Badat, 2009; Shore, 2010).  
 
Matters of accountability in this regard have had an important bearing on higher education 
governance because they have impacted on the institutional autonomy of universities. For 
example, it has been found that the emergence of Higher Education Councils, to oversee 
higher education institutions in place of direct State control, has enabled higher education 
institutions to exercise a great deal of autonomy in their governance, particularly where such 
Councils have been composed by individuals with vast experience in higher education 
institutions (Ferlie et. al., 2008). On the other hand, ‘audit regimes’ established as 
accountability mechanisms have on occasion been accused of working towards transforming 
higher education institutions to be subordinate to the State through mechanisms of 
surveillance (Welsh, Ross & Vinson, 2010). Performance indicators introduced as 
accountability mechanisms have also been accused of serving as monitoring mechanisms 
(surveillance) for aligning higher education institutions’ cultures and structures to those of 
the State and in the process undermining the role of the University and the autonomy of the 
agents within it (Maistry, 2014).  
 
My conclusion from the foregoing discussion is that there has been an internal and 
symmetrical relationship between higher education governance with properties of autonomy 
and accountability. This means matters of autonomy and accountability are very important 
properties in any discussion of higher education governance. It is for this reason that 
autonomy and accountability foregrounds my investigation of UNIMA governance 
particularly as they relate to the periods before and after the implementation of the 
governance reforms. Since the study is guided by Social Realist theory, the investigation 
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seeks to understand the interplay of autonomy and accountability in the new governance 
structures, culture and agency introduced through the governance reforms in UNIMA. In 
other words, the focus in this study is on how autonomy and accountability have manifested 
in the UNIMA governance context (structures and culture) in the periods before and after the 
implementation of the governance reforms. The section that follows examines in detail how 
matters of accountability and autonomy have featured in the higher education governance 
broadly to underscore the argument being advance that there is an internal and symmetrical 
relationship between higher education governance and properties of autonomy and 
accountability. 
 
4.2 The manifestation of Accountability and Autonomy in higher learning institutions 
Clark (1983), after studying higher education governance structures in the United Kingdom 
and the United States, established that higher education governance is exercised at six levels 
of authority, namely: at the department, faculty, college, multi-campus, the State or 
municipality, and finally at the national level. For the purpose of this study, based on the 
higher education governance landscape in Malawi, as shall be noted later in Chapter Five, 
these six levels have been collapsed into three: The systems level, the enterprise 
(institutional) level and the disciplinary level.  
 
According to Clark (1983), the systems level is where one finds Government machinery most 
often in the form of Ministries of Education. This level is where policy issues and decisions 
concerning all levels of education in a country ranging from basic education (primary) and 
secondary to tertiary level are made. But as shall be seen later, in some instances, the State 
has not restricted its role to policy making only, but it has extended its mandate beyond 
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policy. Here, State agencies function as corporate agents while leaders of higher education 
institutions function as primary agents.  
 
According to Clark (1983), below the system level is the enterprise level also known as the 
institutional level. At this level one finds University governing bodies. It is here where trustee 
authority is manifested or corporate agency operates. Some people are appointed to play the 
role of corporate agents and exercise some degree of ownership of higher education 
institutions on behalf of the general population of a country, state or region. Hence matters of 
representation, composition, size and legitimacy of decisions of governing bodies matter a lot 
at this level. Existing alongside these bodies, according to Clark (1983), are bureaucrats that 
comprise expert managers who derive their powers from explicitly defined positions and 
normally perform coordinating roles. University Vice-Chancellors are found here and 
become part and parcel of corporate agency in matters of decision-making.  
 
Below the enterprise level is the disciplinary level where the core business of higher 
education takes place. It is at this level where one finds the professoriate, the collegial 
rulership or faculty.  
 
Harman & Treadgold (2007) have further simplified how higher education governance has 
manifested by arguing that what prevails in higher education governance structure is simply 
the ‘academic core’ and ‘shell.’ The academic core comprises the faculty, school or 
department that controls both teaching and research and is surrounded by a broader 
University environment encompassing students, and support services that complement 
teaching and research. The ‘shell’ on the other hand comprises active administrative cadres 
that help to attract faculty, students and resources. The ‘shell’ is also responsible for 
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infrastructural development. The ‘shell’, according to Harman & Treadgold (2007) is the 
most conspicuous aspect of a University.  
 
While various categorisations of governance structures are available, beyond those outlined 
here, the point to stress is that these structures are mechanisms of control and accountability 
and in the process are meant to safeguard autonomy at various levels of higher education 
operations, which in essence is what gives higher education governance its state of being. 
   
It is important at this stage to recall that one of the research objectives is to explicate 
emergent governance practices in UNIMA. To facilitate my understanding of governance in 
UNIMA it was important to extract from the literature, theories that have been developed in 
the literature on the higher education governance that explain different models of how issues 
of autonomy and accountability are exercised.  
 
4.3 Higher Education Governance models  
There are various models of governance in higher education that have prevailed over the 
years and in different regions of the world. Here I only discuss the ones that are prominent in 
the literature. Graham (2005) believes that policy makers and researchers have developed 
governance models based on particular education system’s conceptions of what an ‘ideal 
University’ should be, particularly its role. Such conceptualisations, it must be acknowledged 
at the outset, have undergone numerous revisions. 
 
4.3.1 The collegial model 
According to Graham (2005), the oldest University as we know it today was founded on 
religious grounds and it is the model that prevailed in the first universities in Europe and has 
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been referred to in literature as the collegial model. Education was believed to be advanced in 
pursuit of knowledge not for its own sake but to attain salvation. Universities were viewed as 
places that developed priests who would in turn help people to turn to God. The role of the 
University was therefore mainly teaching with an aim to develop professionals well-grounded 
in knowledge and theory. Universities were subsequently also meant to develop the minds of 
professionals such as lawyers and physicians (Maton, 2005; Graham, 2005). In the collegial 
model of governance emphasis is placed on critical inquiry and autonomous learning (Shore, 
2012). This model it would appear also influenced early higher education governance 
practices in Europe and Africa. The prevalence of this model in African Universities was as a 
result of colonization (Graham, 2013; Teferra & Altbach, 2004). It is worth recalling that 
most African countries, particularly those of sub-Saharan Africa were colonized by 
Europeans.  
 
The collegial model therefore views universities as an elite sector that operates independently 
of the State (except for funding) and exercises great autonomy in its management and 
governance. In this model, academics are considered as: 
 
...producers, users and owners of an esoteric knowledge whose quality or costs cannot be 
assessed or controlled by ‘profanes’ (public authorities, members of the civil society, etc.). 
Academics therefore receive a monopoly from the State to exercise their function. The State 
agrees to protect them from the external influences, as long as the academic community 
implements norms, values and practices preventing an abusive use of their knowledge. 
(Ferlie, et.al, 2008: 327) 
 
In this model, the governance principles of academic freedom and autonomy are emphasized 
a great deal. Concern for academic freedom leads to the State in some countries being 
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restricted to funding higher education only, leaving the scholarly business to the 
professoriate. According to Tapper & Palfreyman (2002), the following features manifest 
themselves in the collegial model: academics organize themselves as a coherent intellectual 
body that values input from individuals and complements each other; research flourishes 
through the continuous exchange of ideas among intellectuals; hierarchical authority is 
limited to intellectual prowess and not status; intellectualism is viewed as the very foundation 
of a successful academic life; there is respect for differing and divergent points of views and 
there are decentralized structures of governance that facilitate participatory decision-making.  
 
Institutional autonomy is also paramount in the collegial model and is concerned with the 
relationships that exist between the professoriate, internal higher education leadership and the 
external State and non-State players. Such relationships revolve around matters of the 
independence of the professoriate from internal and external controls as well as authority 
recognition and boundaries (Henkel, 2007). Specific issues that feature for example, are how 
universities and the State mediate on matters relating to: the definition of the institutions’ 
missions and vision statements, setting admissions standards, setting degree requirements, 
determining course content, setting student faculty ratios, establishing new degree 
programmes, reviewing existing programmes, eliminating existing programmes, adding or 
discontinuing existing academic departments and offering full fee paying courses (Wang, 
2010). It is important to observe that in this model, University governance puts a premium on 
individual academic freedom and institution’s self-regulation. 
  
The collegial model of governance has been lauded by Hellawell & Hancock (2001) as the 
most favoured style of governance particularly in academic faculties and departments even in 
modern universities. In a case study conducted in United Kingdom by Hellawell & Hancock 
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(2001) on the changing role of the academic middle manager in higher education, it is 
reported that nearly all the interviewees in that study mentioned collegiality as the most 
effective form of decision-making for higher education as it resonates well with the belief in 
shared ideas.  
 
From my analysis, in a collegial governance model structural and cultural systems 
complement one another such that there is morphostasis in the overall institutional 
governance context. From a Social Realist perspective in the collegial system of governance 
one notices properties of structure and culture to be necessary complementarities and hence 
fostering a situational logic of protection in the University landscape. Such protection of core 
values and systems in the collegial governance model may be desirable in many cases but can 
also potentially be a mechanism working against transformation or wider social inclusion. 
 
According to Hellawell & Hancock (2001), the collegial model of governance has tended to 
permit vocal and articulate academics to sway the decision-making process in favour of their 
personal ‘agendas’, or what Archer (1995) calls ‘agents’ personal projects’, some of which 
are negative and at variance with the goals and aspirations of the institution. Furthermore, the 
conceptualisation of a University as an ‘ideal University’ under the collegial model could not 
be sustained in the second half of the 20th century. There emerged research oriented 
institutions and practical and technical education oriented institutions (Maton, 2005; Graham 
2005) that challenged the viewing of the University as being run purely from the collegial 
model of governance because other stakeholders were emerging with interests in higher 
education governance. In addition, whereas the research oriented universities were viewed as 
communities of scholars where scientists would primarily be engaged in education for the 
generation of knowledge (Graham 2005; 2013); that is pursuit of knowledge for its own sake, 
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there gradually appeared new ideologies that viewed higher education institutions as places 
for skills development which emphasised a practical and technical education orientation. 
Pursuit for knowledge was understood in the context not for the sake of it but to resolve 
challenges affecting the society. Emphasis was thus placed on practical knowledge that 
imparts transferable skills (Maton, 2005; Graham 2005).   
 
Added to this, the changing role of the State in the early 1980s to 1990s is also believed to 
have played an important role in redefining the collegial model of higher education 
governance. For example, Ferlie et.al. (2008) noted that the State began to play an important 
role in mediating the interests of the society to the extent that the State started to get 
interested in matters of defining of institutions’ missions and vision statements in the higher 
education sector. The State became interested in determining the goals of higher education 
systems to ensure that higher education institutions were complementing State efforts in their 
social and economic development endeavours. Higher education institutions were 
increasingly required to be accountable to the State agencies. Additionally, Henkel (2007) 
noted that the advent of democratic principles also meant that the academe had to be seen to 
be responsive to the felt needs of the society. This necessitated that: 
 
the ideal of academe as a sovereign, bounded territory, free by right from intervention in its 
governance of knowledge development and transmission, be superseded by ideals of engagement 
with the societies in which academic institutions are ‘axial structures’, whose work is important to 
Government’s, businesses and civil society.  
          Henkel (2007: 98) 
 
The above situations in Archer’s (1995) configurations of situational logics could be 
described as the emergence of contingent contradictions in the institution’s social systems. It 
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is important to note that emergent from this has been a movement towards the State-centric 
model of higher education governance. 
 
4.3.2 The State-centric model 
According to Clark (1983), George (2006) and Neave & van Vught (1994), the state-centric 
model combines state bureaucracy and faculty authority. In this model the State exerted 
greater control on higher education systems through its education ministries. This model 
dominated higher education governance in Europe and Africa in the 1990s (Neave & van 
Vught, 1994). In some cases the State, for example, became responsible for the setting of 
University goals, students’ admission policies, curriculum, degree requirements, examination 
systems and the appointment and pay packages for staff. On the receiving end, the 
professoriate exercised collegial authority particularly through Senate by ensuring that the 
‘how’ of the academe remained solely their preserve. It would appear that under the state-
centric model therefore, matters of academic freedom sat side by side with those of political 
control. It is this ‘unholy matrimony’ that may have catalysed the many tensions that have 
characterized higher education governance practice under this model.  
 
According to Teferra & Altbach (2004), African Universities, particularly in the post-
independent era before democratization, largely manifested the state-centric model of 
governance. Saint (2009), for instance, observed that most Sub-Saharan African Universities 
had the head of state as the Chancellor of the University to ensure that there was State control 
on higher education. The head of state therefore was the one that appointed the University’s 
Vice-Chancellor and members of the University governing councils including its chairperson. 
Such appointments according to Aina (2009) had serious implications for State and higher 
education relations as the academy viewed senior managers as political appointees. It also 
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had significant implications on the matter of University autonomy as Universities were 
treated as extensions of State institutions (Aina, 2009).  
 
In my assessment of the literature, the state-centric model enabled systematization in the 
higher education sector which is contrary to the cultural practices favoured in the universities. 
The state-centric model therefore created tensions in universities as it contradicted the wishes 
and desires of the academe. There appeared within the same period another model that 
balanced the role of the State and that of higher education institutions. This is referred to in 
literature as the State-supervision model. 
  
4.3.3 State-supervision model 
The state-supervision model is one where the Government still plays a role in the governance 
and management of higher education institutions but at more of a distance (Clark, 1983) 
using intermediary bodies such as National Councils for Higher Education and other 
legislative tools. Each University is provided space by the State to exercise process authority 
such as to determine its admission policies, curriculum, the appointment and dismissal of 
staff and the determination of degrees programmes.  However, when it comes to matters of 
substantive authority, it is the State that has the final say (Clark, 1998; Neave & van Vught, 
1994; George, 2006).  
 
The post-apartheid era governance of higher education in South Africa is a good example of 
the state-supervision model (Hall & Symes, 2005). In South Africa, Hall & Symes (2005) 
observed that the first democratically elected Government of 1994 inherited a higher 
education system that perpetuated racial divides in the country and which had to be changed. 
In order to propel economic growth and address social injustices in the South African higher 
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education sector, the new Government introduced legislations through the 1997 White Paper 
and the Higher Education Amendment Act of 2000 that empowered the State, through the 
National Council on Higher Education, to exercise a supervisory role over the South African 
higher education sector. Institutional autonomy of higher education institutions were 
therefore limited to the matters of process authority as the State through various 
accountability mechanisms determined the overall policy direction of higher education. 
Through this legislation all Universities in South Africa were subjected to quality assurance 
processes of the Council on Higher Education while ‘academic freedom’ was enshrined as a 
right in the country’s Constitution. This model of governance created synergies in the 
structural and cultural institutional set-up which created a situational logic of syncretism in 
the governance context. Alongside this state-supervision model has also been the corporate 
model of governance that has obtained currency particularly in Europe, Australia and Asia.  
 
4.3.4 The Corporate model or neo-liberal model 
The corporate governance model, it would appear, came about as a result of the redefinition 
of nation states arising from political and economic trajectories of the late 1980s to early 
1990s. Ferlie et.al. (2008), writing about Europe, linked the transformation experienced in 
higher education governance from the 1970s to the 1990s to the redefinition of the role of the 
nation-state generally. He argues that the period between 1940 and 1980s was primarily one 
of the Welfare State. The State was preoccupied with meeting the needs of society and this 
precipitated the expansion of the public sector to provide goods and services to meet people’s 
demands. In this period higher education sectors were characterized by ‘massification’ in 
universities. As a result, the higher education sector expanded due to increased demand for 
higher education.  As the public sector expanded to meet the demands of the public, the 
	  107	  
	  
cascading effect was strong management in the public sector (Clark, 1998; Neave & van 
Vught 1994; George, 2006).   
 
Correspondingly, this is the same period in which higher education enjoyed relative 
autonomy in terms of its governance (Kai, 2009). However, the economic downturn of the 
1980s, coupled with the ever-expanding public sector, meant that the State could no longer 
afford to manage the entire public sector. This meant that the role of the State was reduced to 
cut down on cost as well as to respond to the then economic trends that called for smaller 
State machinery (Clark, 1998; Neave & van Vught 1994; George, 2006).  The drive to reduce 
the cost of the public sector resulted in reduced funding from Government to the higher 
education sector. This unfortunately happened at the time when there was increased demand 
for places in higher education.  Such developments posed serious challenges in the 
management of higher education and heralded a turn-around in higher education governance 
thinking (George, 2006; Ferlie et.al, 2008).  The ensuing crisis foreshadowed the spirit of 
value for money in the public service delivery and chaperoned the emergence of the 
corporate model of governance in higher education (George, 2006; Ferlie et.al., 2008). 
 
The corporate governance model has been associated with the following governance practices 
in higher education institutions: decentralization of management; the adoption of business 
culture in the management of higher education institutions; the introduction of performance 
indicators as monitoring tools for compliance in finances, student numbers and research 
outputs (which are viewed as important indicators of success); creation of extra-governmental 
agencies to supervise particular issues of higher education; broadening sources of income for 
institutions away from heavy reliance on Government sources; and the call to education 
institutions to provide educational and research services in a cost-effective manner with 
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universities asked to have clear goals and exercise flexibility. This has also entailed that 
higher education be more responsive to market demands rather than operate as ivory towers 
(Deem & Brehony, 2005; George, 2006; Harman &Treadgold, 2007). From this model of 
governance emerged significant morphogenesis in the governance of higher education sector 
across continents.  
 
In Australia for example, George (2006) and Harman & Treadgold (2007) observed that the 
adoption of corporate governance principles by universities brought about less Government 
intervention in higher education governance with institutions encouraged to have a lean 
governing council with a composition that had more independent members than those from 
within, especially from the private sector with some possessing financial and commercial 
skills. This was necessitated by the change of thinking in Australia that viewed members of 
governing councils not as stakeholders who were in council to protect their interests but as 
trustees who should protect the assets of the institutions and interests of the main stakeholder, 
which is the Government. In the same thinking, Government’s funding of institutions of 
higher learning was viewed not as benevolence but as an investment from which it must get 
returns (Deem & Brehony, 2005; George, 2006).  
 
In addition, corporate governance has also resulted in shifting roles for Vice-Chancellors so 
that they serve as Chief Executives of their respective universities. In Malawi I observed 
through the literature search that the Vice-Chancellor of UNIMA was treated by Government 
as a Chief Executive and enjoyed similar benefits as those applicable to Chief Executives of 
other public sector institutions. 
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Further, corporate governance has also seen deans and heads of academic department 
assuming executive leadership roles in their respective faculties and departments. This has 
been reflected in the manner they are being appointed as well as how their tenure is managed. 
Corporate governance has also resulted in the expansion in the scope of University missions 
and goals from the traditional way of knowledge generation for its own sake to knowledge 
for value adding (Deem & Brehony, 2005; George, 2006; Ferlie, et. al., 2008; Shattock, 2002; 
Maistry, 2012) thereby influencing changes in the roles of agencies in the organization. From 
the foregoing, it can be concluded that corporate governance has influenced significantly the 
structural and cultural morphogenesis of universities. 
 
Critics of the corporate model have argued that rather than limiting the role of the State in the 
governance of higher education institutions, corporate governance has enhanced it. For 
example, Shore (2010), commenting on his experience of corporate governance in New 
Zealand Universities, observed that corporate governance has intensified State intervention 
through a complex funding formulae and a network of new intermediary bodies. He cited 
Government funding of universities through what are known as ‘strategic investments’ as 
having compelled Universities to embark on applied research, at the expense of basic 
research which is known to lead to profound scientific discoveries. Furthermore, Shore 
(2010) also pointed out that the competition for research funding had fuelled institutional 
rivalry and brought about internal divisions among universities in New Zealand. He stated 
that the adoption of corporate governance had led to a shift of the attention of University 
managers from traditional academic pursuits to begin defining their University missions in 
terms of its commercial interests and entrepreneurial output, with focus being placed on 
political and economic value adding.   
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Similar sentiments have been expressed by Weinberg & Kistner (2007); McKenna (2012) 
and Maistry (2014) commenting about South African higher education. They observed that 
governance practices ushered in by corporate governance had undermined the role of 
academics in the sense that they no longer were at the helm of policy formulation as policy 
was now being directed by the demands of value adding and cost containment. According to 
Weinberg & Kistner (2007), professional administrative cadres have taken centre stage in 
influencing policy direction at the expense of their academic colleagues. McKenna (2012) 
and Maistry (2012) have observed that this trend has influenced the construction of the 
University particularly when it comes to matters of staff development and performance 
assessments in South African Universities. For example, McKenna (2012:9) argues that ‘If 
staff development is perceived to be a set of managerial processes foisted on academics by a 
group of ‘outsiders’ who are not themselves academics and who are oblivious to institutional 
and disciplinary context, it cannot hope to be a driver of institutional transformation’.  
Maistry (2012) argues that the focus on national and global competitiveness, at the core of 
the neo-liberal project, is in tension to calls for research that takes local contexts and 
communities into account. Maistry argues that the logic of the University in this model of 
governance makes management, including middle management such as heads of department, 
‘complicit’ in the ‘alienating, market-driven University’ (2012: 515). Consequently, the 
notion of ‘University of culture’ – (traditional University with a focus on knowledge 
generation and the development of critical minds) is said to have gradually waned and in its 
place a ‘University of excellence’ – where attainment of certain pre-set standards of control 
such as enrolment figures, research outputs, and number of publications has taken centre 
stage (Lynch, 2006; Weinberg & Kistner 2007).   
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It is sentiments such as these that led Shore (2010: 26) to conclude that corporate governance 
has meant that:  
 
University management teams… not only arrogated to themselves the role of ‘speaking for 
the University’; increasingly, they now claim to be the University, and relegate staff, 
alumni and students to the role of ‘stakeholders’ – along with students, parents, industry 
and Government . 
             
Shore has described the above scenario as a discursive turn, which represents significant 
shifts in power relations of New Zealand Universities. Harman &Treadgold (2007) 
commenting on Australian Universities’ experiences noted that the limiting of the size of the 
governing boards to smaller numbers that exclude key stakeholders such as students and 
professors, has failed to value shared governance (which I describe in section 4.3.5), a critical 
aspect for the success of the academe in terms of the collegial model.  
 
Finally, corporate governance is criticized as having impacted negatively on academic work 
particularly for those academics that have occupied senior management positions. For 
example, in a study conducted by Harman (2002) in Australia on the impact of corporate 
governance among deans and heads of academic department, he found that the corporate 
model resulted in major changes in work roles and in the social and educational backgrounds 
of those who occupy these posts. Harman (2001) also found that deans and heads occupying 
management positions were spending more time on administrative work at the expense of 
their academic work. This resulted in less academic publishing on their part when compared 
to their colleagues.  In this regard, the corporate model impacted on the role of agency as 
heads of department and deans gradually began assuming the role of corporate players, 
thereby reducing the number of primary agents. According to Archer (1995; 2003b) 
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whenever the number of corporate agents expand at the expense of the primary agents, who 
are reduced in number, the society undergoes morphogenesis.  
 
Furthermore, by leaning on neo-liberal thinking the corporate governance model has also 
resulted in silent colonization of both academics and students in universities according to 
Giroux (2002) and Lynch (2006). Research is undertaken in the spirit of its economic value 
and academic programmes that are perceived as of low economic value to the students are 
being side-lined despite their importance to the development of students’ minds.   
 
4.3.5 Shared governance model 
According to Shattock (2002), Dearlove (2002), shared governance is a system of 
governance where de jure of either governing body or academic body is seldom exercised 
and instead a sense of common purpose is nurtured in universities. According to Brian 
Taylor (The Chronicle of Higher Education: July, 23, 2009), shared governance is 
premised on principles that no one person should arbitrarily make important decisions in 
universities absent of the advice of key constituents. Decision-making should not be 
simply a function of making decisions by consensus through committees but that various 
stakeholders should participate in well-defined parts of the process. Shared governance 
also recognises that certain constituencies should be given primary responsibility over 
decision-making in certain areas. In this respect, Taylor (2012) has defined key 
constituents to imply academics. In his support for shared governance, Taylor (2012:12) 
has argued that: 
 
A University is unlikely to succeed without the cooperation and active engagement of its 
academics; and centralisation of decision-making to the exclusion of academics is likely to 
	  113	  
	  
reinforce academics’ natural tendency towards a stronger allegiance to their discipline than 
to their institution and to foster academic alienation from institutional strategy and 
objectives.  
 
Of interest to me based on the discussions in the preceding sections of the different 
governance models is how issues of autonomy and accountability are mediated in the process 
through which governance structures, culture and agency undergo morphogenesis. The 
collegial model emphasised structures and culture that promote individual and institutional 
autonomy, which means that academics should be accountable to themselves or to bodies in 
which they are the dominant players. The State-centric model is on the other extreme where 
Government structures and its agencies determine the direction of the University and what it 
should be pre-occupied with. In the state-supervision model governance oscillates within 
governance structures of the State and of universities each playing defined roles. The State 
being pre-occupied with the promotion of the ‘what’ of the academe – the mission, goals and 
objectives of the University, while the academic institutions are essentially concerned with 
promoting their vested interest in the ‘how’ of the academe, (how to go about teaching and 
learning). In the corporate model, it is as if the State should not play any significant role; 
University governance structures, practices and agency must be enabled in such a manner 
that they be conditioned by the cultural practices emergent from the dynamics of the free 
market. In the shared governance model emphasis is on mutual respect when it comes to 
University governance. 
 
Equally important to observe from the foregoing discussion is how the underlying notion of 
an ‘ideal University’, which is the realm of culture in Social Realist terms, has influenced the 
above models. One cannot fail to notice that under the collegial model of governance a 
University is viewed more as a research institution where the independence of academics is 
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seen as a catalyst for knowledge generation. However, it appears that under the other models 
discussed, universities are little by little losing that position and rather being constructed as 
being responsible for preparing a skilled labour force to develop the economy. It is for this 
reason that Shore (2010) criticised features of corporate governance as being neo-liberal, 
enabling universities to pursue multiple objectives, a phenomenon he described as 
transforming higher education institutions from being universities and becoming 
multiversities beholden to many stakeholders, including the State.  
 
Over time the conceptualisation of universities has undergone morphogenesis. Emergent 
from such transformation have been various governance practices that resulted in the 
development of the models of governance discussed in the preceding sections. This is 
consistent with Archer’s (1995) morphogenetic theory which theorises that because of their 
relative autonomy in the regeneration of structural, cultural and agential properties brings 
about emergent properties that behave as causal mechanisms that can explain the 
morphogenesis (or morphostasis) of institutions. As can be recalled from Chapter Two, the 
interplay of various structural, cultural and agential mechanisms generates emergent 
properties some of which are completely out of synchronicity with the existing structural, 
cultural and agential properties. It can thus be concluded from the foregoing discussion that 
various governance models presented in the preceding sections are emergent from the 
interplay of structural, cultural and agential governance practices. All the models that have 
emerged and been discussed so far have however involved shifting balances of University 
autonomy and accountability either within structures of the higher education institutions 
themselves or between the structures of higher education institutions and outside State 
agencies and the market. It is also important to observe that these models were not 
necessarily discrete or happening at entirely different points in history, but rather the higher 
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education system has been characterised by continuous shifts between the various models 
portrayed here.  
 
Of interest to this study is how these shifts in governance models have manifested themselves 
in the UNIMA governance practices period before the initiation of governance (T1), all the 
way through the period when the governance reforms were being implemented (T2 - T3) and 
the causal mechanisms responsible for the emergent morphostasis or morphogenesis of 
governance system in UNIMA by 2013 (T4).  
 
4.4 Events that have shaped Higher Education Governance models 
The major developments highlighted in the foregoing section have underlining causal 
powers. According to Critical Realism, what is experienced is an outcome of events, which in 
turn emerge from particular mechanisms (Bhaskar, 2008). A review of the literature reveals 
that a number of complex events have occurred in our society that could help to explain the 
developments experienced in higher education governance discussed in section 4.3. In the 
sections that follow, I focus on mechanisms that repeatedly emerged in the literature I have 
consulted, though all the time bearing in mind the Critical Realist caution about the partial 
and fallible nature of knowledge.  
 
The issues that repeatedly emerge in the literature as mechanisms underpinning shifts in 
higher education governance are globalization, which is defined and elaborated upon in 
section 4.4.1 and its associated discourses of neo-liberalism discussed in section 4.4.2. Most 
reforms in governance in the public sector in general appear also to have been shaped by 
New Public Management (NPM) ideas which I discuss in section 4.4.3. NPM ideas appear 
also to have emerged from neoliberalism and globalisation so the division of the discussion 
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into these three segments is largely for ease of reading. Equally significant and discussed in 
the sections that follow are discourses of internalization and entrepreneurship particularly 
their link with globalization and how these too have shaped current higher education 
governance practices. Since society exists in an ‘open system’ (Danermark et.al., 2002), there 
is a constant interplay and relationship between mechanisms. The identification of individual 
mechanisms as entirely separate entities as being discussed here is largely an analytical 
device of the researcher.  
 
4.4.1 Globalization and its associated discourses 
Globalization is a discourse that has been associated with the emergence of global networks 
and communities of practice as a result of which knowledge is easily accessible almost 
anywhere by almost anyone (George, 2006). Globalization remains one of the main 
underlying causal mechanisms of most of the economic and political developments that have 
shaped the higher education governance landscape in the last decade (George, 2006). 
According to Armstrong (2007), the significance of globalization in higher education is 
associated with the desire by many nation-states to increase skills in their students to enable 
them to be competitive in the globalized economy and to generate funds for University’s 
sustenance in the period of reduced funding.  
 
Globalization in higher education has also led to reforms in higher education aimed at 
realigning institutions to better serve the knowledge based, hi-tech economy and help 
increase the production of goods and services which should compete favourably on the 
international market (George, 2006). The process of realigning higher education institutions 
in this direction has led to an enormous shift in higher education governance models. For 
example in Singapore, Mok (2005; 2010) notes that globalization has led to shifts in higher 
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education governance from interventionist governance practices (state-centric model) where 
the state dominated all aspects of higher education governance and management to what has 
been described as a ‘deregulated state model’ or state-supervision model which is 
characterised by decentralization and deregulation.  
 
According to Vaira (2004), forces of globalization catalysed political and economic reforms 
in Africa through mechanisms of foreign aid and grants. Vaira (2004) has argued that western 
nations capitalised on the weakened state of economies of less developed countries to 
propagate their political and economic ideologies. Developing nations were ‘coerced’ 
through Structural Adjustment Loans, Sectoral Adjustment Loans and the Structural 
Adjustment Programmes to adopt structural transformation of their political systems and 
economies along the institutional archetypes dictated by the North. Structural Adjustment 
Programmes are macroeconomic reforms introduced by the World Bank and IMF and applied 
to developing countries to solve short-term structural constraints that inhibited them from 
participating favourably in the free world market (Williams, 1995). These institutional 
imperatives and archetypes were carried to developing nations by the World Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund, extremely powerful multinational agencies (Vaira, 2004) and 
they have also affected the higher education landscape in Africa. For example, it was noted 
by Altbach, Reiseberg & Rumbley (2009) that globalization accorded higher education 
institutions worldwide with new opportunities for study and research by driving the need for 
technological development.  
 
Advances in technology and communications brought about by adherence to the principles of 
globalization have enhanced international cooperation, led to a rise in networks and improved 
sharing of scientific information on the global level. However, for African Universities it can 
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be argued that such trends have done the opposite in some cases. Zeleza & Olukoshi (2004) 
have argued that adherence to the principles advanced under globalization has isolated 
African Universities and undermined their autonomy by emphasising Information, 
Communication and Technology (ICT). African Universities have failed to invest in ICT to 
the level the developed countries have done (Zeleza & Olukoshi, 2004). Many Sub-Saharan 
African Universities have failed to sufficiently invest in ICT because Structural Adjustment 
Programmes (a concept I shall discuss in a later section) eroded their financial muscle 
(Altbach, et.al., 2009). This is evidenced by the static total participation rate (the ratio of 
University enrolment to the overall number in the age group that should be in universities) 
experienced in Sub-Saharan African in the higher education sub-sector which has remained at 
5% in 2005 compared to 17% for other developing countries and 66% for developed 
countries by the 1990s (SARUA, 2008).  Besides, African countries that have attempted to 
invest in ICT have been constrained by the ever-rising cost of the bandwidth. It is believed 
that the above scenario has impeded African Universities’ participation in the cyber world 
(Zeleza & Olukoshi, 2004). Consequently, African Universities have not benefitted as much 
as their counterparts in Asia and Europe from globalization. It is thus important in this study 
for me to interrogate the extent to which globalisation has been a mechanism in the shifts in 
governance reforms in UNIMA. 
 
As observed earlier, knowledge of the world or a phenomenon involves identifying the 
underlying properties or causal mechanisms that make a social object behave the way it does 
(Harvey, 2002; Bhaskar, 2008). Development of the particular governance approaches 
discussed in the previous section could not have come about without underlying generative 
mechanisms. It would appear from the literature that underlining globalization in the context 
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of higher education governance trends has been economic and political imperatives, such as 
neo-liberalism, to which I now turn.  
 
4.4.2 Neo-liberalism  
Neo-liberalism is a catchphrase that has been associated with all that is problematic with the 
rampant consumerism experienced in the 1980s and beyond. In the context of this study neo-
liberalism is used to refer to a theory of both politics and economic practices. It is premised 
on the belief that human well-being can best be realised by appealing to individual 
entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional framework (Harvey, 2005; Olssen 
& Peters, 2005; Giroux, 2009). This would demand that there be strong private property 
rights, free markets and free trade. As further argued by Harvey (2005), from the foregoing 
the State should create and preserve institutional frameworks by guaranteeing the integrity of 
the money supply and the provision of security of property through defence, policing and 
legal structures. The State should also develop regulatory frameworks to enable markets to 
function properly (Olssen & Peters, 2005).  
 
The State should in this regard, not directly participate in the markets as doing so would 
distort it according to the logic of neo-liberalism, because the State lacks the required 
information to effectively regulate markets (Olssen & Peters, 2005; Giroux, 2009). It is 
further believed in this theory that markets left alone, would guide rational thinking (Harvey 
2005; Olssen & Peters, 2005; Giroux, 2009). This is so because in neo-liberal thinking it is 
held that real knowledge is gained and true economic progress is attained from local 
knowledge that emerges from particular circumstances of time and place (Harvey, 2005).  
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Neo-liberalism has influenced a number of political and economic reforms globally.  Harvey 
(2005) has associated political reforms that were initiated in the public sectors of Great 
Britain by Margaret Thatcher and in the United States of America by Ronald Reagan and in 
China by Deng Xiaoping, three powerful and influential nation-states, to have emerged from 
the neo-liberal philosophy. In the field of higher education neo-liberal thinking has 
revolutionised the role of the higher education from being viewed as a ‘public good’ to being 
treated as a ‘commercial commodity’ tradable on the international market (Giroux, 2002; 
Lynch, 2006).  One notable movement or ideology that may have come about as a result of 
neo-liberal thinking and is highlighted quite extensively in the literature as having provided 
the framework for institutional public sector reforms, including in higher education, is New 
Public Management (NPM). 
 
4.4.3 New Public Management 
NPM is said to have evolved from the blending of economics and management theories 
(Hood, 1992; Christensen & Leagreid, 2002; Olssen & Peter 2005). Specifically, NPM is 
believed to be a hybrid of neo-liberal economic principles of public choice, transaction cost, 
property rights theory and principal-agent theories on one hand (Olssen & Peter, 2005) and 
the scientific management movement’s set of administrative reforms based on ideas of 
professional management and high discretionary powers on the other (Hood, 1992; 
Christensen & Leagreid, 2002).  According to Olssen &Peter (2005), neo-liberalism 
embraced the public choice view of the free market and advocates the introduction of 
external levers and internal targets on the market that would strengthen compliance. It has 
also embraced Transaction Cost Economics as neo-liberalism is concerned with introducing 
sets of institutional arrangements in a particular market context that would maximise benefits 
and minimise operational costs. NPM is also premised on the belief that private sector 
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business ideas and practices are superior to those of the public sector and should therefore be 
imported into the public sector to improve efficiency (Deem & Brehony, 2005). Neo-
liberalism institutionalises aspects of self-interested human behaviour as it relates issues of 
entitlement to scarce commodities, systems of exchange and the rules governing terms of 
transfers in the commodity market which are important in Property Rights Theory. Finally, 
neo-liberalism embraces Principal-agency Theory’s concern for compliance and control in a 
hierarchical work environment as a panacea for facilitating clear and accountable 
management functions (Christensen & Leagreid, 2002; Olssen & Peter, 2005).  
 
It is argued that NPM ideas have come about through the blending of the above economic 
principles with principles of managerial supremacy (Hood, 1992; Christensen & Leagreid, 
2002). It is further argued that by mixing economic and managerial principles NPM has 
placed great emphasis on the role of free markets and public control as hallmarks of public 
sector reorganization. This has meant that service delivery be subjected to dynamics of the 
free market while at the same time managers of public organizations be placed under the 
control of political authority through performance management systems. It is through such 
blending that has seen an emphasis in public sector re-organizations being modelled on 
aspects of decentralization, devolution and delegation of power to enable greater discretion 
on the part of managers that run public sector organizations (Hood, 1992; Christensen & 
Leagreid, 2002; Olssen & Peter, 2005). These are some of the issues that are interrogated in 
my examination of the UNIMA governance reforms. 
 
Champions of NPM have considered it as both a movement and an ideology (Hood, 1991; 
Christensen & Leagreid, 2002). A movement because, as Birnbaum (2000) has observed 
regarding higher education reforms, at every moment of the life cycle of public sector 
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organizations there have been new ideas that have been presented as universally applicable 
quick-fix solutions to address the challenges being faced which have with time faded but left 
a mark on society. NPM ideas could as well be one of those ideas that have come and faded, 
considering the manner NPM was popularized particularly by public sector reformers who 
obligated Governments to adopt it in the early 1980s and how eventually the ideas were 
discarded by some Governments in the 1990s.   
 
NPM can also be described as an ideology because of its hegemonic inclination towards 
beliefs (Deem & Brehony, 2005). NPM has thus been described as a framework of general 
applicability for organizing Government capacity to deliver public services. Its advocates 
have argued that NPM is a universal agenda that has succeeded public administration and 
transcends across different contexts, organizations, policy fields, levels of Government and 
countries in solving the management tribulations in the public sector (Hood, 1992).  
 
In this study, NPM ideas are examined in the context of either being contingent 
contradictions or compatibilities to the existing UNIMA governance practices. As can be 
recalled from Chapter Three, contingents are cultural or structural practices that emerge 
externally in a given society that either conforms to or contradicts existing structural and 
cultural practices (Archer, 1995). 
 
In most European countries NPM types of public sector reforms have evolved gradually in 
response to critical problems that have affected the state machinery (Hood, 1992; Christensen 
& Leagreid, 2002). The growing popularity with NPM type of reforms among Governments 
in these countries is believed to have mainly been triggered by apathy within public sector 
services especially; in Social Realist terms this would be seen to be a result of the reflexivity 
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by agency to their involuntaristically placed constraining socio-cultural systems. In Europe 
for example, it is argued that there was a steady realization (in Social Realist terms, agency 
reflexivity) that delivery of service by the public sector was inefficient and in many cases 
ineffective; the public sector was becoming costly and compromising quality; the public 
sector was seen to be facilitating undue influence by employees, especially professionals at 
the expense of the public they served (Hood, 1992; Christensen & Leagreid, 2002). It became 
increasingly obvious that if the above problems in the public sector were not going to be 
checked, it would eventually bring about undesirable growth in the tax bills, leading into 
declining standards of public services and eventually creating dissatisfaction among the 
electorate (Hood, 1992).  It was in this conceptualisation of the problem that NPM took hold. 
 
NPM is grounded in a number of doctrinal components. Here, I mention six that are relevant 
to this study. The first component is hands-on professional management, implying that the 
manager at the top must be given clear and evidently discretionary powers (Hood, 1992; 
Christensen & Leagreid, 2002) in Archerian terms (1995) this would bring about change 
through increasing corporate agency. In Australian higher education where NPM ideas have 
been adopted, this has led to shifts in governance authority from the professoriate towards the 
University governing boards with compositions that resembled those of the private sector 
(Harman & Treadgold, 2007). This has meant universities having governing boards chaired 
by persons appointed by the State but asked to function more or less as the head of a private 
sector corporation. Similarly, Vice-Chancellors have assumed the role of the Chief Executive 
Officer despite there being fundamental differences between a company board and a 
University governing body (McKenna, 2012; Taylor, 2012). In some cases, universities have 
opted to recruit Vice-Chancellors from industry rather than from within the academe. There 
has also been proliferation of new executives in universities such as Executive Deans and 
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Executive Directors of Institutional Planning, Student Affairs, Infrastructure, Quality 
Assurance etc. This means higher education institutions have experienced an expansion in 
corporate agents. Taylor (2012) has noted the challenges with this: Board members appointed 
from outside much as they were acknowledged as bringing new ideas and orientation to the 
University business, have tended not to possess adequate information of the institution. 
Furthermore, because of their lack of understanding of the academic culture, many of them 
have opted for short-term agendas which have not pleased most of the higher education 
stakeholders (Harman & Treadgold, 2007; Taylor, 2012).  
 
In the United Kingdom, where NPM ideas also featured as result of Margaret Thatcher’s 
public sector reforms (Deem, 2004), there have been similar shifts in governance authority 
from the professoriate towards University governing bodies. The justification for extending 
the reforms in the public sector in general to universities in particular was based on the 
premise that public universities are part of the public sector so that measures aimed at 
controlling the overall national spending should not exclude public universities since they too 
receive most of their funding from the State. A major development aligned to this thinking in 
the United Kingdom was the merging of public universities and restructuring of polytechnics 
which catalysed the infusion of business practices in the public universities (George, 2006; 
Clark, 1998; Shattock, 2010).  
 
The second point is that NPM advocates the formulation of well-defined goals, targets and 
indicators of success, most significantly in quantitative terms (Hood, 1992). It is envisaged 
that accountability and efficiency would be evident where goals and objectives are clearly 
stated (Christensen, 2001; Lane, 2000), a phenomena that has implied that Universities 
formulate strategic plans covering periods of 5 to 10 years with clear objectives that are 
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measurable to guide their operations.  In some countries, universities have been forced by the 
State to develop strategic plans as a regulatory requirement for example in Namibia, 
Mozambique and Ethiopia (Saint, 2009) and more recently in South Africa. 
 
Similarly, at national education sector level, national education plans have been developed to 
provide frameworks within which higher education institutions should operate. For example, 
in Malawi in 2006, the Government developed a National Education Sector Plan which 
outlines three key areas higher education institutions must aim to address which are: 
increased access and equity, quality and relevance and governance and management with 
focus on broadening sources of revenue for the sector (Malawi Government National 
Education Sector Plan, 2006). 
 
Like any contingencies, as would be expected according to Archer (1995), insistence on 
strategic thinking in universities has not however been received without criticisms. This has 
ranged from questions being raised as to whether by insisting on strategic planning 
universities are not increasingly being forced to subject their academics to behave like 
‘schizophrenic scholars’ based on the multifarious goals Universities are required to pursue 
(Shore 2010), to legitimation claims of whether or not what is being witnessed in higher 
education governance landscape does not mean the demise of Universities as knowledge 
producers (Barnett, 2000). 
 
The third point to note about the NPM is that components of its framework give great 
attention on output controls rather than on process (Hood, 1992). In higher education, 
emphasis is being placed on accountability monitoring measures by State agencies such as: 
the number of students graduating from each programme; the number of publications per 
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faculty member per year; and the amount of resources being generated through research and 
consultancy activities in universities (Shore, 2010; Maistry, 2012; McKenna, 2012). This has 
seen the creation of regulatory bodies such as National Councils for Higher Education to 
oversee the implementation of Governments’ policy plans by higher education institutions. It 
has also led to the creation of Quality Control bodies by the State to monitor compliance by 
universities in certain areas of management such as enrolment trends (Hall & Symes, 2005). 
 
Fourthly NPM emphasises a shift to the disaggregation of units in the public sector (Hood, 
1992; Christensen & Leagreid, 2002). The idea has been that ‘small is better than large’. 
Small not in the sense that units of universities are required to admit fewer students than 
before but small in the way University units are organised and managed. Here, organizations 
have been re-organized into smaller units focusing on specific activities to which they have 
relative advantage over other similar units. For example, the reforms that were implemented 
at the University of Makerere in Uganda led to faculties creating smaller and focused units 
(centres of excellence) to carry out specific objectives (Mamdani, 2007). Large faculties such 
as those of social sciences that embrace a cross section of disciplines have been broken into 
specialised units such as a ‘Centre of Commercial Studies’. Such centres have introduced 
professional programmes and reviewed their existing academic programmes to better respond 
to market demands and therefore be able to attract full-fee paying students in addition to 
Government subsidised students (Mamdani, 2007). Reforms of this nature in higher 
education have seen an expansion in student enrolment and a corresponding emphasis on 
value for money at the expense of imparting knowledge for its own sake (Lerner, 2008). They 
have however been criticized as having watered down academic standards as the orientation 
of universities has been shifted from research and knowledge production to vocational 
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training thereby undermining the very purpose of a University (McLeandor, 2003; Lynch, 
2006; Lerner, 2008; Mamdani, 2007). 
 
The fifth component of NPM has been a move to greater competition in the public sector 
(Hood, 1992; Christensen & Leagreid, 2002). In this regard, where services have to be 
secured from the open market, modes of acquiring such services have taken the form of open 
tendering so that those that are willing and able to offer the sought after services with great 
efficiency have been preferred rather than those that are not able to demonstrate the same 
agility (Hood, 1992; Christensen & Leagreid, 2002). The implication of these reform 
measures has seen redefinitions of higher education institutional boundaries to encompass 
private sector players. This supports those that have argued that higher education institutions 
are gradually moving away from being bounded territories free by right from interventions 
towards becoming comparable to the commercial industrial sector (Mok, 2002; Harman & 
Treadgold, 2007; Henkel, 2007; Mamdani, 2007). 
 
The final component of NPM that has had a marked effect on higher education has been the 
greater prominence placed on parsimony in resource utilization (Hood, 1992). In 
implementing this aspect, universities have opted for outsourced services to external 
companies for many facets of University support services such as catering, gardening, 
security, maintenance, cleaning, printing and photocopying. It has also involved universities 
opting for part-time staff or short contract staff instead of full-time employees. In some 
instances, staff members have been retrenched with the aim of doing more with fewer staff 
members (Lerner, 2008). While retrenchment of tenured staff members or use of contract 
staff might be appropriate in some organizations, in the higher education and particularly for 
teaching positions, this practice has been shown by Harman & Treadgold, (2007) to affect the 
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quality of higher education. It has been noted from experience that academics require long-
term investment in training and experience, to enhance their expertise.  
 
This emphasis on discipline and parsimony has also led to a broadening of the higher 
education resource base through attracting third stream income to supplement their resources 
(Badat, 2009) or by requiring students to make some contributions towards their education in 
the form of increased tuition and introduction of user fees for some services which were 
previously provided for free, a phenomenon that has been described as ‘cost-sharing’ 
(Johnston, 2004). Experiences in higher education from countries in Africa that have 
introduced student loan schemes as a result of adopting cost-sharing measures under the 
rubric of NPM reforms, such as Ghana and Ethiopia, show that the measures have had their 
own unintended consequences ranging from administrative concerns of defining who is a 
needy student, to low levels of loan repayments (Yizengaw, 2003; Atuahene, 2009).  
 
It would appear that NPM has also brought about unintended consequences in sectors other 
than higher education. It is argued that the transformation of public sector organizations 
through NPM has in general led to excessive rule-bound, hierarchic and thus inflexible 
governance practices which have resulted in deleterious consequences on the performance of 
public sector employees (Hood, 1992; Christensen & Leagreid, 2002). NPM reforms have 
also been accused of corroding the character of public servants and undermining public 
service motivation. It has been argued in the literature that it has brought about restructuring 
of public organizations that have made public sector employees perpetually fearful of job 
losses as they no longer see their organizations as stable entities where they can build lifelong 
careers (Lerner, 2008). NPM reforms are also said to have enabled corrupt practices in the 
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public sector organizations (Tambulasi, 2009) because they have undermined a sense of 
commitment to an institution or its project.  
 
Viewed from a Social Realist perspective it can be concluded that the NPM reforms have 
been exogenous contingent properties that have been introduced in public sector 
organizations such as public institutions of higher learning with the intention of transforming 
their structures and agency to be compatible with neo-liberal ideas in the domain of culture.  
In Africa, the introduction of NPM type public sector reforms has been associated to a large 
degree with the Structural Adjustment Programmes of the World Bank and International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) (Williams, 1995). One issue to observe is that where NPM reforms 
have been introduced in higher education, the outcomes have not corresponded to the 
intentions of the reformers (Christensen, 2001). In this connection, as Archer (1995) has 
argued, unintended consequences are the bedrock of emergent practices which explain 
morphostasis or morphogenesis of a particular social system. It is in this regard that I 
examined whether NPM ideas had an influence or not in the governance reform measures 
recommended by the MIM Report and introduced in UNIMA in 1997 or not. I assessed 
whether NPM ideas played a role in reshaping the UNIMA governance context and with 
what consequences. 
 
4.4.4 Internationalization 
Another mechanism that repeatedly emerges in the literature underpinning shifts in higher 
education governance is internationalization. This is defined as ‘the process of integrating an 
international, intercultural and global dimension into the purpose, function (teaching, 
research and service) and the delivery of higher education’ (Knight, 2006:18). 
Internationalization has been touted as one of the most significant policy responses to 
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globalization by higher education institutions (Altbach et al., 2009).  Internationalization has 
thus led to the reconfiguration of higher education structures to position higher institutions in 
the global market for students and research. The following were the emergent features of 
internationalization in the higher education landscape in the 1990s according to Jowi (2009): 
the prevalence of diverse players (private and foreign) in both teaching and research, 
increased mobility of students and staff across nations and continents, curriculum reforms 
aimed at both preparing students to compete favourably on the international job market as 
well as credit transfers to facilitate easy mobility of students from one country or region to 
the other and the growth of international and regional higher education networks. 
A recent global survey conducted by the International Association of Universities (Egron-
Polak & Hudson, 2014) indicated that internationalization is pursued worldwide to fulfil five 
different objectives, namely: to improve student preparedness; internationalize the 
curriculum; enhance the international profile of the institution; strengthen research and 
knowledge production; and diversify faculty and staff. It also found that that there are 
variations across continents as to the reasons why internationalization is pursued. For 
example, it established that most African Universities pursue internationalization policies 
primarily to strengthen research and knowledge production. In Europe the motives go beyond 
this. Internationalization is advanced mainly to improve student preparedness to compete on 
the global market; to internationalize the curriculum and hence increase student mobility and; 
to enhance the international profile of the institution.  
The Bologna process is one example of internationalization initiatives. The Bologna process 
aims to harmonize quality assurance policies and qualifications throughout Europe. It 
endeavours to promote transparency, student and staff mobility, students’ employability and 
student centred learning (Kwiek, 2004; Keeling, 2006). Furthermore, the Bologna process 
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seeks to integrate higher education institutions in Europe into one common higher education 
area. It has an advanced common degree structure and qualification framework and attempted 
to create research synergies which the majority of the signatories to the process have adopted 
(Keeling, 2006). A number of universities in Europe have restructured their higher education 
systems in the wake of the Bologna process. Along these lines there is also the Lisbon 
process that seeks coherence in research policies. The Lisbon process developed strategies for 
increased public support for research. It is a framework that conditions how research and 
development in Europe should be undertaken (Keeling, 2006). Furthermore the Tuning 
project was also developed and designed with the aim of catalyzing synergies in academic 
programme development and delivery within the European region (Haug, 2001).  
The formulation of a common qualification framework is premised on the NPM focus on 
outputs rather than process. As long as the student has attained certain credit levels, it is 
accepted that they have acquired a certain degree of skills and competencies that would 
enable them to seek alternative University place or employment anywhere within the 
European Region. NPM ideas of doing more with less underlie the thinking behind the 
Bologna process, the Lisbon process and the Tuning projects as all of the above strategies 
seek to harness expertise available within the region to work on common  agendas that would 
benefit from the concentration of the ‘best brains’ within the region for refined outputs 
(Keeling, 2006).   
 
It would however appear that there have been notable disjunctions between the policies 
adopted under such processes and the imperatives of globalization. Whereas globalization is 
understood to be promoting greater diversity in the higher education sector, the Bologna 
process, the Lisbon process and the Tuning projects seem to be pulling the strings in a 
different direction by introducing measures aimed at harmonization in higher education 
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sector in Europe (Kwiek, 2004; Keeling, 2006). By commenting on the Bologna process and 
other processes associated with it such as the Lisbon process and the Tuning projects (Haug, 
2001) in this way, I am not claiming that the above process have had direct impact on the 
UNIMA reform measures but I highlight them here as an example of the wider impact that 
NPM has had on higher education reforms. I hereby articulate why in this study of the 
UNIMA governance reforms, NPM ideas have received serious scrutiny. 
 
4.4.5 Entrepreneurship 
Tied to both neo-liberalism and internationalisation is entrepreneurship which has also 
featured highly in higher education as a result of globalization. Entrepreneurship is about 
transforming universities from a traditional way of operating where the State was the main 
financial provider to beginning to operate and function as business enterprises on the service 
supply market (Clark 1998). This has been accelerated by neo-liberal economic thinking, 
already discussed earlier. It has also been facilitated by the classification of higher education 
as a tradable service under the General Agreement in Trade and Services (GATS) of the 
World Trade Organization (Knight, 2006). Entrepreneurship has involved universities 
diversifying their sources of revenue away from sole reliance on Government funding to third 
stream financing in order to mitigate the effects of reduced funding from the State. It has also 
entailed universities commercializing some of their services. This has resulted in universities 
creating and running business units outside their traditional functions of teaching and 
research; universities exercise patents on research undertaken by their staff members and the 
introduction of market driven academic and professional programmes thereby inculcating a 
business culture among all actors in the academic institution (Clark 1998; Knight, 2006).  
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The rise of the entrepreneurial spirit in universities has arguably been underpinned by NPM 
ideologies as well (Mok, 2002). Restructuring in higher education of the type described 
above has however been criticised as having eroded the character of public higher education 
and negatively impacted on quality by moving universities away from being social 
institutions concerned with knowledge generation as an end in itself towards treating 
universities as an industry which should adopt market imperatives including borrowing terms 
applicable in industry (Mok, 2002; Harman &Treadgold, 2007). 
 
In Africa, Makerere University in Uganda is considered to be a good example of a University 
that has embraced an entrepreneurship spirit, according to Mamdani (2007). The Makerere 
University is said to have from 1990 embarked on a process of reforms guided by the World 
Bank’s belief that higher education is primarily a private good rather than a public good 
under the Structural Adjustment Programme (Mamdani, 2007). Publicly funded students 
were construed as liabilities to the institution and privately funded students as net assets 
(Mamdani, 2007; Saint, 2009).  The reforms led to devolution of decision-making to faculties 
which led to them assuming financial and administrative autonomy. It also encouraged 
competition within and among faculties, institutes and departments; the introduction of 
market driven courses and programmes among other developments and the introduction of a 
full fee paying category of students.  
 
The UNIMA reforms were introduced through an external consultant at the time when these 
ideas about an entrepreneurial University were gaining popularity. These ideas were thus 
considered to be potential mechanisms in the UNIMA governance reform process and the 
analytical process sought to identify whether this was indeed the case and, if so, to what 
extent.  
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4.5 Other drivers of higher education governance trends 
It is evident from the discussions so far that globalization and its related forces have acted as 
important mechanisms from which higher education governance reforms have emerged. 
However, this should not make us overlook other forces at the macro level that also have 
emergent properties and powers in higher education governance reforms, particularly in 
Africa. In the section that follows, I briefly examine some of these forces.  
 
4.5.1 Economic and Political Challenges unique to Sub-Saharan Africa  
It is important to note that while it has been observed in the review of the literature that 
globalization, internationalisation, entrepreneurship and NPM were some of the properties 
that have revolutionized higher education governance across continents, particularly in Asia, 
America and Europe, in the Sub-Saharan Africa there were other forces over and above these 
that the literature suggests account for the state and the direction of higher education 
governance in the region.  
 
4.5.1.1 Colonial System 
Most of the countries on the continent of Africa were, in the mid to late 19th century, 
colonized by western nations such as Britain, Belgium, France, Germany, and Portugal. 
These colonial masters, according to Teferra & Altbach (2004), introduced their own systems 
of education in the colonies. Questions have been raised as to the relevance of such education 
systems to the development needs and aspirations of most African countries (Assie-
Lumumba 2006).  
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4.5.1.2 One Party System of National Governance 
The political trajectories of the emerging nationalist movements characterised in some 
instances by the one party system of governance and dictatorship have had serious effects on 
academic freedom in many higher education institutions in Africa, particularly those of East 
and Southern Africa (Aina, 2010).  Riley (1992) has argued that most statesmen who took 
over power from the colonial rulers were able to appeal to nationwide support because they 
had promised that the newly-independent states would reverse the economic marginalization 
that the colonial system had introduced. However, by the late 1980s it became apparent to 
most people in these independent States that although independence had resulted in local 
leaders taking over from colonial rulers, there was no commitment on the part of the new 
rulers to improve the livelihoods of ordinary people who were in the majority (Riley, 1992). 
Poverty and destitution had worsened instead of improving. It is further argued by the same 
author that such disillusionment by the local populace with economic marginalization 
perpetuated by their new leaders gave impetus to civil society to get organized politically and 
challenge their leadership.  
 
Universities became the bedrock of many such movements. Academics and students emerged 
as strong critics of the new leadership in Africa. Evidence in this regard is argued to be 
abundant in Southern Africa (Omari and Mihyo, 1991; Kerr and Mapanje, 2002). The 
impetus in this respect has been ‘if the University cannot uphold human values and maintain 
high standards of human decency in all facets of its affairs, it is difficult to think of any other 
institution in these countries that will’ (Omari and Mihyo, 1991:74). Besides, Teferra & 
Altbach (2004) have observed that national governance under one-party systems in Africa 
has impacted on the governance of universities. They observe that politics of one party 
system in many Africa countries has meant that the State President assumes the role of the 
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University Chancellor. The Vice-Chancellors in many of Sub-Saharan African States have 
been appointed by the State President either directly or on the recommendation of the 
Council.  This as noted in section 4.3.2 had serious implications for State and higher 
education relations and undermined the autonomy of universities in Sub-Saharan Africa 
(Aina, 2009).  
 
 
4.5.1.3 The Debt Crisis 
Another force that seems to account for the state and direction higher education governance 
has taken in the Sub-Saharan Africa is the debt crisis. Immediately after Sub-Saharan African 
countries attained their independence from the colonial masters, almost all of them embarked 
on public projects with heavy reliance on foreign financing. Many of these projects were 
established with good intentions to expand the industrial base of the countries’ economies 
and social infrastructures with a view to generate income and improve export production 
(Greene and Khan, 1990; Dwivedi, 1994). Some were undertaken in response to the 
development model of the time which emphasized industrialization or modernization as the 
engine of economic growth. The understanding then was that development was supposed to 
begin with industrialization that would come about through an injection of capital from the 
Developed World to the ‘Underdeveloped’ countries. Industrialization would in turn lead to 
economic growth. Initially, it was believed, economic growth would benefit a few capitalist 
individuals and with time, through the ‘trickle-down effect’, it would benefit the entire 
society (George, 1990; Dwivedi, 1994). Such industrialization was funded mainly through 
external borrowing.  It would appear that the ‘trickle-down’ theory was an illusion rather than 
a practical approach to development (Dwivedi, 1994). Whilst economic growth under the 
‘trickle-down’ effect had led to prosperity in the West, albeit with greater divisions between 
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the rich and the poor in such economies, in the majority of the societies in Sub-Saharan 
Africa it did not bring about the purported improvements in the standard of living of the 
majority of the people (Dwivedi, 1994). Instead, as Dwivedi (1994:9) pointed out, ‘poverty, 
disease and hunger had either worsened or remained unaltered.’ 
 
The debt crisis was equally exacerbated by external borrowing used to finance militarization 
of many countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. Sub-Saharan Africa expanded its volume of 
external debts to strengthen their security institutions. According to the Stockholm 
International Peace Research Institute, by 1985, 20 per cent of Third World debt was due to 
arms purchase, especially from the poorest countries in Africa (cited in George, 1990). Arms 
purchase has also been associated with corruption, meaning not all the moneys that were 
borrowed were spent on military equipment. For example, Feinstein (2011) has argued that 
the arms trade has accounted for 40 per cent of the corruption that has taken place in all 
world trade. Repayments of these debts has negatively affected African economic capacities 
and led to reduced funding to sectors such as higher education.  
 
4.5.1.4  Role of World Bank and International Monetary Fund 
The neo-liberal economic forces of reforms which were initiated by the World Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) to ‘correct’ some of the structural challenges majority of 
African countries were facing as a result of debt crisis, brought about funding policies that 
privileged basic education at the expense of higher education on the basis that the former was 
perceived to have a higher social return on investments than the latter (Johnson, 2003; 
Adesina, 2006). This created serious funding gaps in the higher education sector. For 
example, Bloom, Canning & Chan (2006) observed that between 1985 and 1989 the World 
Bank was allocating 17 per cent of its worldwide education-sector spending to higher 
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education. But from 1995 to 1999, the proportion allotted to higher education declined to just 
7 per cent. Higher education in Africa suffered as a result of this reduced funding.  
 
According to Williams (1995), the World Bank introduced the Structural Adjustment Loan 
and the Sectoral Adjustment Loans in the 1980s. Both the Structural Adjustment Loans and 
the Sectoral Adjustment Loans were created to force developing countries to adopt 
development policy dictated by the North. The IMF for its part introduced the Structural 
Adjustment Programmes and later the Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility among other 
facilities which brought about many unintended consequences such as worsening the poverty 
situation among the already poor people (Dollar & Svensson, 2000), privatization of state 
owned companies (Ramamurti &Vernon 1991), and privatisation of state owned natural 
resource endowments (Njeru, 2013).  
 
Through IMF policies for example, it is argued by Kandoole (1990) that the Malawi 
Government was forced to introduce cost-cutting measures in public service deliveries. The 
reduced funding resulted in the deterioration of infrastructure in institutions of higher 
learning due to inadequate funding; brain drain of highly qualified academic staff members 
who felt they were being lowly valued as their salaries were deliberately kept low; inadequate 
teaching and learning resources such as books, laboratory materials and equipment as funding 
could only manage to pay salaries of staff (Kerr and Mapanje, 2002). Structural Adjustment 
Programmes also brought about cost-recovery measures that led to the introduction of user 
fees resulting in the introduction of tuition fees in public universities; and a reduction in food 
and accommodation subsidies to students (Saint, 2009). The reduction in subsidies according 
to Assie-Lumumba (2006) was a common feature in many Sub-Saharan African universities 
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and is believed to have precipitated violent reactions on University campuses from students 
and strikes by both staff and students which led to University closures. 
 
Furthermore, according to Kandoole (1990), under the Structural Adjustment Programmes 
the Government of Malawi was forced to introduce a cash budget system as an expenditure 
control measure designed to limit Government domestic spending to domestic revenue 
collected. The cash budget system according to Mnyanga (2005) led to inadequate funding to 
UNIMA which resulted in inadequate teaching and learning materials, delays in curriculum 
reviews, low staff retention and delays in implementation of the academic calendar as the 
University could not open on the agreed date and was sometimes forced to break for a longer 
period in between semesters than planned. The above are unique features to the higher 
education landscape in Africa. 
 
To sum up, it can be argued that underlying all the above forces on higher education 
governance are political and economic imperatives. In Critical Realist terms, one could 
conclude that political and economic considerations have created both enabling and 
constraining conditions for higher education governance which explains the morphogenesis 
that has been experienced in the higher education sector. There is evidence in the literature 
that suggests that higher education practices that have taken place in Sub-Saharan Africa 
emerged from these political and economic mechanisms (Vaira, 2004; Mamdani, 2007; Saint, 
2009; Altbach. et.al., 2009). This study concerns itself with one particular case of governance 
reform, UNIMA, and therefore this study has interrogated the extent to which such 
mechanisms were at play in this particular context. 
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4.6 Conclusion 
I have in this chapter defined higher education governance as it has been deliberated in the 
literature. I have also described what I have identified from prior research as some of the 
constitutive properties of this social phenomenon and in doing so I have looked at the higher 
education governance models that have emerged over the years which have informed 
governance practices. The chapter presented macro-level events that could reasonably be 
considered to be causal mechanisms contributing to the emergence of the morphogenesis that 
has occurred in higher education governance over the years. Building from the presentation 
in this chapter, in the next chapter, Chapter Five, I report on my findings regarding the state 
of the UNIMA governance period before the reforms were introduced. This is the context of 
UNIMA governance at T1 of Archer’s (1995) morphogenesis theory.  
 
As will be recalled from section 2.2.1.5, it was argued that Critical Realists are of the view 
that what is observed about society is part of the story. There are always generative 
mechanisms in the form of historical antecedents that shape society. Collier (1994) and 
Bhaskar (1978) have argued that social researchers should be interested in knowing about 
such histories since they account for events and experiences in a given society at a given 
point in time.  
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Chapter 5  
T1 – THE STRUCTURAL, CULTURAL AND AGENTIAL CONDITIONINGS PRIOR TO 
REFORM 
5.0 Introduction 
Archer (1995) explained that structural and cultural systems predate what humans encounter, 
as discussed in Chapter Two. These are materials such as wealth and power (sanctions and 
expertise) as well as doctrines, theories, beliefs and ideas that enable or constrain agents’ 
projects. These structural and cultural properties are intended and unintended consequences 
of past actions of agents’ interactions amongst themselves as well as with the structure and 
culture that preceded them in turn. Such structures and cultures have objective existence, in 
the sense that they have causal powers or the potential to exert influences, which are either 
exercised or remain unexercised depending on the activities of agents. In a Social Realist 
perspective this concern with the structural and cultural mechanisms conditioning the context 
prior to a particular event enacted by a particular set of agents is known as T1 of the 
morphogenetic cycle. In the context of this study, the governance reforms that were 
introduced in UNIMA in 1997 were made in a situation of prevailing structures and cultural 
systems. These had objective existences as they had causal influence on the activities of 
agents before the reforms took place. This chapter is therefore dedicated to locate UNIMA’s 
governance configurations at T1 – the period before the governance reforms were initiated.  
 
The aim is to describe the events and what was experienced regarding the UNIMA 
governance period before the governance reforms were introduced. The analysis of the 
UNIMA governance at T1 presented in this chapter is done using Archer’s (1995) 
morphogenetic theory and interrogates the constitutive particles of structure, culture and 
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agents of the pre-governance reform period by utilising the analytical dualism. According to 
Bhaskhar (2008), events and their manifestations in nature are emergent from underlying 
causal mechanisms in the domain of the ‘real.’  In the process of interrogating the aspects of 
structure, culture and agents, attempt is also made to explicate through abstraction the 
possible causal mechanisms that help to explain why the governance context was as it was in 
the period before the MIM governance reforms in 1997. I end this chapter by presenting my 
findings regarding the objectives of the governance reform measures that were introduced in 
1997 mindful that in social realism, it is people’s intentions that mediate either morphostasis 
or morphogenesis.  
 
5.1 The Parts: Structural and cultural properties in UNIMA pre-dating governance 
reforms 
Archer (1995) defines structure as the material composition of the society. She identifies 
power and wealth distribution as the essence of structure in society. Although the analysis of 
structure in this study is based on Archer’s morphogenetic theory, I employed the framework 
developed by Clark (1983) graphically summarised in Figure 5.1 to delineate the power 
relations in the UNIMA governance period prior to the time governance reforms (T1) were 
introduced. As readers will recall from section 4.2, Clark (1983) established that higher 
education governance is practiced essentially at three levels: at systems, enterprise and 
disciplinary levels as depicted in the Figure 5.1. These are the same levels at which I 
interrogate the UNIMA governance period prior to the MIM reforms.  
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Systems level -  National Government    and Politics 
---------------------------------------------------------------- 
Enterprise level- Governing Board and Bureaucrats (Vice Chancellor) 
   ----------------------------------------------- 
Disciplinary level -   Personal rulership (Professorial) 
Collegial rulership 
 The guild 
  ------------------------------------------------ 
Figure 5.1: Structure of higher education governance (adapted from Clark 1983) 
Figure 5-a: Structure of higher education governance (adapted from Clark 1983) 
Based on the information contained in the MIM Report (MIM Report, 1997) and 
correspondences that I analysed from files obtained from the University’s Central Office 
contained in files (RD15 and RD18), it was evident that UNIMA was under the control of the 
Government of Malawi in the period prior to the introduction of the MIM governance 
reforms. The Ministry of Education and Culture (MOE&C) now the Ministry of Education 
Science and Technology (MOEST)8 was responsible for the entire education systems in 
Malawi from the primary to secondary and tertiary levels including the University of Malawi 
(UNIMA). In a memorandum dated 3rd July, 1981 from the Secretary to the President and 
Cabinet9, contained in file RD15, the Government recognised UNIMA as an organization 
under the statutory control of the Ministry of Education. UNIMA was reporting to the 
Ministry of Education governance wise and it is the same Ministry that controlled UNIMA 
by determining the policy direction UNIMA should take on matters affecting the academic 
administration of UNIMA. For example, in 1988, Government through the Ministry of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8	  The Ministry of Education is one Ministry in Malawi which has had its name changed frequently to reflect the 
additional responsibilities it has been assigned in addition to Education. 
9 Secretary to the President and Cabinet in Malawi is the highest officer in the Malawi Public Service. This title 
was changed to Chief Secretary in 2004.	  	  
	  144	  
	  
Education and Culture directed that the admission of students to undergraduate programmes 
should be done based on quota system. Under this system of admission each District of the 
then 24 districts in Malawi were guaranteed 10 spaces to fill in UNIMA, Malawi’s only 
public university at the time. As one would recall from section 4.1.1.2, determination of who 
to admit in Universities is an important aspect of higher education autonomy (Hellawell & 
Hancock, 2001; Tapper & Palfreyman, 2002). That the Government of Malawi came up with 
such a policy underscores the degree of control the State had on UNIMA.  
 
It would appear that Government control on UNIMA started when the University was being 
developed. According to Ian Michael who was the first Vice-Chancellor of UNIMA in 1964 
when it was being founded and who has published a number of articles on his experiences in 
UNIMA, the University was highly controlled by the Government so much so that he 
commented that it would have been better if it was located within the Ministry of Education 
rather than developed as an autonomous institution (Michael, 1978). Michael (1978:478) 
summed up his experience by citing the response he received in a conversation with one 
senior Government official as follows: 
 
Can a government possibly be said to 'interfere' in an institution for which it is responsible? 
The government is, by definition, responsible in the last resort for everything which happens 
in the country. It cannot 'interfere' in anything.  
 
The genesis of UNIMA therefore conforms to what Teferra & Altbach (2004) had observed 
regarding the role of first nationalist leaders in the creation of higher education institutions as 
reported in the literature review in section 4.5.1.2. 
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Furthermore, the correspondences contained in RD15 and RD18 attested to the fact that 
UNIMA was not only under the statutory control of the Ministry of Education and Culture in 
the pre-governance reform era, but it was also under the direct supervision of the Comptroller 
of Statutory Corporations especially in management matters. It is important to note that in 
Malawi all government companies are supervised by the Government Department of 
Statutory Corporations which is headed by a Comptroller and this department is under the 
Office of the President and Cabinet. By this arrangement UNIMA was obliged to adhere to 
all Government policies as issued from time to time by the Department through 
memorandums. An analysis of the prevailing law governing UNIMA, that is the UNIMA 
Act, shows however that there is no provision in the Act that empowers the Comptroller of 
Statutory Corporations to exercise powers over the University.  An analysis of some of the 
policy issues arising from the Comptroller of Statutory Corporations show that UNIMA was 
however obliged to adhere to Government’s directives indicating that UNIMA did not enjoy 
autonomy in the period before the reforms.  
 
For example, UNIMA employees, just like any Government employees, were required, based 
on a memorandum dated 18th April, 1993 contained in RD15 from the Secretary to the 
President and Cabinet, to seek permission from the Office of the President whenever 
undertaking any foreign trip, be it official or private. One of the objectives of UNIMA, 
according to the UNIMA Act (RD13), is to make provisions for the dissemination of 
knowledge. Ordinarily, forums such as seminars, workshops and conferences particularly 
international ones are best suited for this. Asking researchers to seek permission to attend 
such forums can be detrimental therefore to the advancement of knowledge. Equally, 
UNIMA was required to seek prior approval from the Comptroller of Statutory Corporations 
before carrying out the following actions: amending the terms and conditions of service 
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governing its employees; appointment of staff members from outside the country; 
appointment or dismissal of senior staff members; sending staff members for further training 
outside Malawi; embarking on major contracts for works or procurement of goods and 
services beyond a certain threshold; undertaking new infrastructural projects and sale of 
major capital assets. These restrictions are contained in a memorandum dated 4th August, 
1989 from the Comptroller of Statutory Corporations (RD15). This means that despite 
UNIMA being established as an autonomous corporate body under the 1974 Act of 
Parliament it was essentially treated as another government department. According to the Act 
it is the UNIMA Council that is empowered to perform the above roles and not central 
government agents. 
 
In addition to the above, in the pre-MIM reform era the State President of Malawi was the 
Chancellor of UNIMA. According to Michael & Mnthali (1971) ; Michael, (1978) UNIMA 
as an institution grew through personal face-to-face interaction between him and the first 
State President of Malawi, Dr Hastings Banda in the early 1960s. It appears that because of 
this, according to RP2, the then Head of State personally took a number of important 
decisions affecting the University such as the appointment of the Vice-Chancellor, 
recruitment of college principals, promotion of professors and the appointment of some 
expatriate staff members. These are functions that should have been taken by UNIMA 
Council, according to the Act.  
 
An example was given by RP2 on how one of the Principals was appointed by Dr. Hastings 
Banda as an example of Government control over University functioning. The public was 
informed about the appointment at a graduation ceremony by the Chancellor, who was the 
Head of State, and it took the appointed person by surprise too as he was not consulted before 
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hand. He later learnt that members of UNIMA Council were equally taken by surprise by the 
announcement because they were not consulted either prior to this announcement being 
made. The UNIMA Act requires that appointments of Principals should be undertaken by the 
UNIMA Council. In terms of the UNIMA Act, the Chancellor was only responsible for the 
appointment of the governing board – the UNIMA Council - and approving the appointment 
of the Vice-Chancellor on the recommendation of the UNIMA Council. Kerr & Mapanje also 
attest to how the then Chancellor of UNIMA, Dr. Kamuzu Banda, used to exercise control of 
UNIMA through State agents and thereby ‘severely restricted the University’s autonomy’ 
(2002:73). Similar trends have been reported in Sub-Saharan Africa (Teferra & Altbach 
(2004). 
 
It was interesting to note nevertheless that as much as the State machinery exercised control 
on UNIMA, Parliament, which is one of the important State organs in the country, did not 
seem to exercise a similar level of control on the University in the pre-UNIMA governance 
reforms era. Parliament appears to have restricted itself to allocating financial resources to 
UNIMA. From the numerous documents I analysed, there was no evidence of any direct 
reference on any matter by UNIMA to Parliament. Neither was there any reference on 
follow-up mechanisms from Parliament to monitor the spending of funds allocated to 
UNIMA. This underscores that the executive branch of Government was the main corporate 
agent that influenced the governance of University in the period under review - T1. During 
the pre-UNIMA governance reforms era, there was no State organ that operated between the 
State and UNIMA such as a national council for higher education. As such, the controls 
described above were direct.  
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At the institutional level (enterprise level) the UNIMA Council, which was appointed by the 
State President, was the only one empowered to exercise governance control of UNIMA 
based on the UNIMA Act. For example, the enabling Act of the University before the 
governance reforms were initiated (UNIMA Act, 1974) gave the following powers to the 
UNIMA Council:  
 
The Council shall be the governing body of the University and shall be responsible for the 
management and administration of the University and of its property and revenues, and, 
shall exercise the general control and supervision over all the affairs of the University 
including its relations with the public.      
     (Part III section 10 of the UNIMA 1974 Act).  
 
This meant that at the institutional level the UNIMA Council had the legal mandate to govern 
and manage the University in ways it felt fit. This notwithstanding evidence from the 
documents searched (RD15 and RD16) as well as from what a research participant (RP2) told 
me, such powers were in some instances superseded by Government agents as observed in 
the preceding paragraphs. Perhaps the key point to note here in the case of UNIMA is the fact 
that the whole Council was appointed by the then State President, Dr. Banda and hence 
probably deferred to his wishes.  
 
According to the same Act, the Vice-Chancellor was the principal academic and 
administrative officer of UNIMA but under the control and direction of the UNIMA Council. 
The Vice-Chancellor was supported by a Central Office that served as the secretariat of the 
UNIMA Council and coordinated the affairs of the entire University. The Central Office 
comprised the University Registrar and the University Finance Officer. Both officers were 
also direct appointees of the UNIMA Council (RD13). Since the UNIMA Council was 
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appointed by the State President and all principal officers were direct employees of the same 
Council one can appreciate how the State machinery was exercising its agency in UNIMA’s 
governance. Indeed, according to the Minutes of the University Appointments Committee 
and the Senate (RD17 to RD 21), it was apparent that important decisions usually associated 
with the collegial rulership highlighted in Chapter Four such as the determination of 
appropriate staff establishments (that is how many staff members should an academic 
department hold); the recruitment of some academic staff members such as teaching and 
research staff; the actual selection of students; and the approval of curriculum were all done 
at the Central Office and were all subject to the approval by the Council.  
 
An examination of the UNIMA Act showed that the manner in which Government agents 
behaved in matters of UNIMA governance was in contradiction with what the Act specified. 
This appears to have been enabled by the one party political system that Malawi experienced 
during this period. Dr. Banda ruled Malawi as a personal estate when he was made life 
president in 1971 at the Malawi Congress Party’s annual convention. His style of rule became 
more apparent in the early 1990s (Kerr and Mapanje, 2003).  Dr. Banda led Malawi 
independence from British colonial rule in 1964 and ruled the country as a single-party 
dictatorship under the Malawi Congress Party (MCP) up to 1993. During his reign as the 
President Dr Banda created a hegemonic system of governance in which he was revered as a 
semi-God (Chirambo, 2004). The one-party system of governance suppressed people’s 
freedoms including academic freedom (Kerr & Mapanje, 2002). The manner in which Dr. 
Banda and his Government behaved meant that the political systems permeated into UNIMA 
governance context to the extent that even Government agents took advantage of this to 
direct UNIMA affairs and suppress any dissent (Kerr & Mapanje, 2002). Dr Banda died in 
1997. In such a context one could not expect the University to enjoy a significant degree of 
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academic freedom, self-governance or institutional autonomy, the fundamental ingredients of 
higher education governance established in Chapter Four. 
 
At disciplinary level, according to the MIM Report (1997), UNIMA was operating a federal 
structure with five colleges10 below the Central Office. This arrangement was sanctioned by 
the UNIMA Act. Given the way UNIMA was controlled one cannot fail to speculate that 
there might have been fears that having five colleges operate as separate Universities would 
have compromised direct control of Government over higher education institutions. It was 
therefore found safe to have all these colleges under one Council.  
 
All five colleges were situated in different geographical locations as described in Chapter 
One, again suggesting strong political intervention/planning to curb united action by the 
different entities. Each of the five colleges was under the direction of a Principal appointed 
by the UNIMA Council. The Principal took direction from the Vice-Chancellor. Each college 
had either a faculty or faculties headed by a Dean or Deans who reported to the Principal. 
The Dean was however appointed by Faculty members from amongst themselves. Below the 
Faculty were academic departments headed by Heads of Department who also were 
appointed by the departmental academic staff and from amongst themselves. It was thus at 
the faculty and departmental level of UNIMA governance that leadership was decided upon 
by agents other than those of the State.  
 
Having a Principal appointed by the Council and Deans and Academic Heads of Department 
appointed by faculty members operating in one college, created its own contradictions in 
UNIMA’s governance. As noted by RP7, the mere fact that Principals were directly 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10	  UNIMA had five campuses up to 2012 when one of them was delinked to become a separate University. 
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appointed by Council marked them in the perception of faculty members as owing their 
allegiance to Central Office whilst, Deans and Academic Heads of Department who were 
appointed by show of hands by faculty members were seen as part and parcel of the faculty 
and thus representing the interests of faculty members. The Head of Department reported to 
the Principal on administrative matters and to the Dean on academic matters. This too might 
have been deliberate to ensure that on governance matters, departments were well aligned to 
the wishes of the establishment. Structurally therefore, an academic head, dealt with the 
Principal rather than the Dean on matters relating to staff. A Professoriate existed in UNIMA 
at T1 but was embedded within the department with no macro-level governance power.   
 
An analysis of the Minutes of Senate (RD9 – RD11) revealed that Senate was responsible for 
all academic policy matters including coordination of research centres. However, the major 
academic policy decisions made by Senate were subject to the approval of the Council (MIM 
Report, 1997). For example, from the Minutes of Council (RD6 and RD7), Senate decisions 
relating to the introduction of new academic programmes, curriculum reviews and 
appointment of external examiners were recommended to the UNIMA Council for approval. 
There were also occasions when some academic decisions were made by the Government and 
not Senate. For example, Classics and Greek language studies were introduced in UNIMA 
following a directive of the then Head of State, Dr. Hastings Banda (Kerr & Mapanje 2002). 
Similarly, political science as a subject was not permitted to be taught in UNIMA because it 
was construed by Government as implanting rebellious views among students (Kerr & 
Mapanje 2002).  
 
This is in contrast to Saint’s observation of sub-Saharan Universities whereby such decisions 
were made by Senate without reference to bodies such as Council (Saint, 2009). Such 
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practice is also in sharp contrast with the preference of many academics as observed by 
Hellawell & Hancock (2001) who argued that academics prefer that academic decisions be 
decided upon by academics themselves. In many ways, my analysis of issues of structure in 
UNIMA governance at T1 echoes this summary by Michael (1978:468): 
 
In the day-to-day life of the University the sudden intervention of the President, of a minister, or of 
a senior official, usually concerning a single matter considered out of its context, became more and 
more frequent. Such interventions were not invariably damaging; their intentions and their 
consequences were sometimes good. But they disturbed the efficient running of the University 
because they represented the arbitrary incursion of the personal and a disregard of the formal. It 
was extremely difficult to explain to those in authority that these incursions were undesirable even 
when benevolent. 
 
However, research participants RP3 and RP4 confirmed that academic operations such as 
how teaching and research were to be managed were left to the discretion of faculties and 
academic departments consistent with what George (2006) and Neave & van Vught (1994) 
had observed to be the case in State-centric governance models. In as far as governance at 
faculty and academic departments were concerned therefore, faculty and departmental 
governance structures possessed minimal agency in terms of impacting on major academic 
and administrative policy decisions of UNIMA but had strong agency in the ‘how’ of the 
academe to the extent of determining the delivery of their academic programmes.  
 
In Chapter Four, section 4.1.1.3 institutional autonomy was presented as a key property of 
higher education governance. Institutional autonomy arises from the belief that in institutions 
of higher learning such as Universities, important decisions can only be competently taken by 
academics alone or under the mandatory advice of them because of their expertise and 
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commitments (du Toit, 2007). These are mainly decisions that relate to the work of 
academics such as deciding the syllabus of a course, staff appointments, the admission or 
graduation of individual students, standards of academic performance, and the detailed 
allocation of resources between competing usages within a department or faculty (du Toit, 
2007). That this was lacking in the UNIMA governance period before UNIMA governance 
reforms is evident enough that the governance institutional configuration that existed in the 
UNIMA period before the UNIMA’s governance reforms were introduced undermined 
institutional autonomy and conformed to what Neave & van Vught (1994) described as the 
state-centric governance model.  
 
You will recall from the beginning of this section that Archer (1995) defined structure as the 
material composition of society. She identifies power and wealth distribution as the essence 
of structure in society. In the foregoing paragraphs the discussion has dwelt on my findings 
of governance structures at T1, the period before UNIMA reform, from the perspective of 
power relations within UNIMA, using Clark’s 1983 framework. I now want to focus my 
attention on UNIMA governance structures during the same period from the perspective of 
wealth distribution.  
 
From my analysis of the pertinent UNIMA Council Minutes (RD1 to RD6), it is evident that 
the Government of Malawi was the main source of financing for UNIMA. According to the 
MIM Report (1997), in 1995 Government funding to UNIMA for operations was 93 percent, 
3 percent was from students’ fees and 6 percent from other income generating activities. 
Furthermore, financing of faculties and academic departments was through Central Office. 
This is apparent both from Minutes of Finance Committee of Council (RD19 – RD21) and 
Minutes of Council (RD1).  From the analysis of the Minutes of Council (RD1) it was 
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ostensible that colleges were required annually to submit and defend their budget estimates to 
Central Office for the latter to submit the same in a consolidated form to Government through 
the University Finance Committee of the UNIMA Council. Minutes of the University 
Finance Committee RD19 - RD23 revealed that once the budget had been approved, colleges 
were allocated funding by Central Office based on a formula known as full-time equivalent 
student (FTE). Decisions as to how funding would be apportioned to non-academic 
departments, such as the Central Office itself, were not clarified in the documentation. 
 
According to the MIM Report (1997), this manner of distributing Government approved 
budget to UNIMA colleges by Central Office masked internal distinctions of individual 
academic departments.  For example, academic departments offering laboratory based 
science programmes which by the nature of the programmes demanded that they be allocated 
more resources to procure laboratory materials were disadvantaged because most of them did 
not have the low overheads or the large numbers of students found in humanities 
programmes. The MIM Report (1997) concluded that budgeting in the UNIMA period prior 
to the reform implementation was characterised by an incremental approach and hardly 
reflected the strategic direction of each individual college (MIM Report, 1997: 21).  
 
As per Archer (1995), the institutional context provides directional guidance which 
predisposes different agents to various courses of action depending on their position relative 
to the resources. From the above findings it would appear that in as far as decision-making in 
UNIMA was concerned, the governance structures prior to the MIM reforms advantaged 
State agencies and disadvantaged faculties and academic departments. In other words, the 
governance context was not favourable to the advancement of the interests of academic 
freedom and self-governance in UNIMA at faculty and academic departmental levels (du 
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Toit, 2007). A further analysis of the relationship between State agencies (the Chancellor, 
Council members and principal officers in UNIMA) and faculty and academic leadership in 
the period before the governance reform was implemented reveals that the relationship was 
symmetrically linked, implying, one could not explain the UNIMA governance without 
invoking this relationship. Be that as it may, it is important to stress that this relationship 
though internally and necessarily related, was characterised by contradictions or 
incompatibilities; a conclusion echoed in the writings of Michael (1971; 1978) and Kerr & 
Mapanje (2003).  
 
The fact that Kerr & Mapanje (2003) and RP2 reported that many students and academic staff 
were resigning from the University shows that the governance context was not conducive to 
their interests.  According to Archer (1995), necessary incompatibilities are circumstances 
where in a given society one finds internally and necessarily related structures which are not 
compatible with each other. This entails that the operations of some structures threaten the 
endurance of the institution because there are structural contradictions within the system. In 
the context of these findings therefore, the operations of State machinery in the governance of 
UNIMA during the pre-MIM reform era had the effect of threatening the endurance of 
governance systems in the University. Kerr & Mapanje (2003) underlined the fact that the 
governance structure in UNIMA in the 1980s was severely restrictive and led to the exodus 
of academics and students who could not conform to the dominant ideology. Furthermore, 
according to Archer (1995), necessary incompatibilities create a situational logic of 
elimination or compromises. This is the case because the structures are linked to such an 
extent that the existence of subordinate agencies (primary agents) depends on the power of 
the powerful agency (the corporate agency) in a manner that operations of primary agency 
are often impinged by actions of the powerful agency. Primary agency in this regard has no 
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choice, according to Archer (1995), but to leave or become compliant. The high level of 
resignations contributed to the brain drain that was experienced during this period. Those 
who stayed did so for other reasons but certainly not because they were satisfied with the 
institutional governance as shall be noted later.  
 
According to Archer (1995), in a situation where there are contradictions between internally 
and necessarily related institutions (such as the one revealed in this section about UNIMA 
governance structure) there is potential for change. This is because ‘Structural contradictions 
represent obstructions to certain institutional operations and these translate themselves into 
problem-ridden situations for the agents associated with them’ (Archer, 1995:230). Archer 
indicates that there would always be an incident that would be a precursor to this. 
 
True to the above observations, according to the Minutes of the 59th meeting of the UNIMA 
Council which was held in May 1995 (RD1), a decision to engage MIM consultants was 
taken by members after observing that the 1995/96 budget was not adequate to take care of 
all the UNIMA’s annual  requirements. These Council Minutes (RD1) suggested that during 
this meeting the University Management proposed to Council for consideration a budget of 
K109 million for the 1995/96 financial year11. The UNIMA Council had however learnt that 
the Government was ready to provide only K84 million of the required sums which was 
about 82 percent of the required expenditure. The UNIMA Council had observed, according 
to these Minutes (RD1), that based on the available resources from Government for the 
1995/96 financial year the University was likely to face a financial crisis.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11	  The currency in Malawi is known as Kwacha and abbreviated as ‘K‘. At the time of this MIM Report, the 
Malawi Kwacha was trading at 1 United States of America Dollar to approximately 400 Malawi Kwacha.	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According to the same Council Minutes of the 59th meeting (RD1), one of the College 
Principals during that meeting suggested that to mitigate the low funding, the University 
should reduce its student intake that year to correspond with the finances it would receive. It 
is also important to indicate that when presenting the 1995 budget estimates to Parliament 
during the budget session, the Minister of Finance announced the devaluation of the Malawi 
Kwacha that year by 50 percent (Government of Malawi Budget Statement, 1995) under the 
influence of the IMF. It is therefore no wonder that it was feared that the already reduced 
funding was going to be seriously undermined by the devaluation of the currency. The 
UNIMA Council therefore resolved as the Minute below shows to engage a consultant to 
assist it in coming up with measures that would mitigate this situation. 
 
Council agreed that there was need for the University to have a consultant to examine the current 
financial problems of the University and suggest ways and means of generating income and also 
areas where the University could exercise economy and have some savings.   
          (RD1) 
 
UNIMA relied heavily on Government financing structure in the period before UNIMA 
governance reforms were introduced. Table 5.1 below shows the sources of funding for the 
UNIMA period between 1990 and 2009. As can be observed from this Table on average over 
90 percent of the UNIMA expenditure budget came from Government. What this means is 
that UNIMA’s expenditure budget was contingent on Government’s structures. Such 
vulnerability by UNIMA had the potential of exposing corporate agency in UNIMA to a 
fragile financing situation in the event that the latter had reduced its funding, which was the 
case in 1995. As I explained in Chapter Three, where there are internal and necessary 
structures in an institution that contradict each other as the case was in UNIMA from what I 
have described above, contingencies disrupt the thin bonds that tie the institution together 
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(Archer, 1995).  The negative feedback that ensues from existing structural and cultural 
systems is one that promotes mobilization of resources to counteract the contingency (Archer, 
1995). In the context of UNIMA therefore, the reduction in Government funding invoked the 
causal mechanisms of elimination. In such circumstances, according to Archer (1995) 
contingent incompatibilities have the potential of disrupting a highly integrated social system. 
It creates situational logic of protection which calls for strategic mobilization of resources to 
counteract the threat imposed by the occurrence.  
 
	  0
	  2,000
	  4,000
	  6,000
	  8,000
	  10,000
M
ill
io
ns
	  o
f	  K
w
ac
ha
University	  Budget
Government	  Subvention
University	  Own	  Income
Total	  Income
	  
Figure 5.2: UNIMA funding for the period 1990/91 - 2008/2009 
Figure 5-b: UNIMA funding for the period 1990/91 - 2008/2009 
 
From Table 5.2 , it is also evident that Government funding to UNIMA started to reduce from 
1995. The trend continued up to 2009. Retroduction of the situation suggest that this was not 
of UNIMA’s own making but had necessary links with economic events that were happening 
at the same time both nationally and globally. What is experienced in the realm of the actual 
is often an emergent from the way of doing things or the natural behaviour of a social object 
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(Bhaskar, 2008). Adamolekun, Kulemeka & Laleye (1997) argued that the Malawian 
Government was in the 1990s forced to adopt the Structural Adjustment Programmes of the 
International Monetary Fund. These were strict fiscal disciplinary policies that had to be 
applied by the Malawi Government in order for it to access foreign aid and loans. By 1994, 
the Malawian economy was facing serious problems arising mainly from huge debts it had 
accumulated from international lending agencies (Kandoole, 1990).  As a consequence, the 
Government introduced a cash budget system as an expenditure control measure designed to 
limit Government domestic spending to match domestic revenue collected. This system 
forced Government to reduce most of its funding to public sector institutions (Kandoole 
1990). It also meant that the flow of funding from Government to public sector institutions 
became erratic. For example, funding began to be dispersed on a monthly basis rather than on 
quarterly (three months in advance) basis as was the case before.  The result was that during 
some months, public sector institutions would receive less than the expected amount 
(Kandoole, 1990). This scenario included UNIMA (Mnyanga 2005). The cash budget thus 
was a contingent incompatibility on UNIMA core functions. However, the above situation 
emerged from the confluence of multiple mechanisms. 
 
As can be recalled from section 4.4.1, globalization was a major driving force behind many 
structural reforms experienced in the higher education sector of the World between 1980 and 
the late 1990s. Makerere University was cited as a good example (Mamdani, 2007; Saint, 
2009) of higher education reforms under the pressures exerted by economic exigencies of 
globalization. There is a link therefore between economic and political reforms that were 
taking place in the global environment and what was occurring in public sector organizations 
in Malawi in the early 1990s. The concept of organizational allomorphism developed by 
Vaira (2004) is insightful in understanding this link. According to Viara’s (2004) conceptual 
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framework, public sector organizational changes experienced in the 1980s to 1990s were 
induced by political and economic global dynamics. It is argued by Viara (2004) that the 
global politics and economy is regulated by the powerful States of the North. They design 
institutional imperatives and archetypes to which organizations of the World must conform. 
These imperatives and archetypes are reproduced, objectified and legitimated and carried 
across all the continents of the world by powerful multinational institutions such as the World 
Bank and IMF. Developed countries are coerced to adopt them through dynamics of 
international competitiveness. Developing countries because of the economic dependence on 
the developed world are in turn thus forced to adopt them as they are tied to foreign aid or 
grants. The archetypes are also forced on developing countries in the form of penalties such 
as economic sanctions if they are not adhered to. However, because these archetypes are 
introduced by nation states with their own structure, culture and social judgement, they are 
adapted by nation states to suit their local situation. They therefore become allomorphic 
institutional structures because much as they are subjected to further interpretation under 
local structural dynamics, they still contain a residual pattern or form which can easily be 
discerned. The national allomorphic institutional structures so created are then forced on local 
institutions through coercive policy-making mechanisms (Viara, 2004).  
 
Assie-Lumumba (2006) observed that the Structural Adjustment Programmes were 
responsible for many higher education reforms that took place in Africa because the 
Structural Adjustment Programmes had led to the introduction of cost-recovery measures 
which in turn led to the introduction of user fees, high tuition fees and reduction in food and 
accommodation subsidies to students among many other in African Universities. In Malawi, 
Kandoole (1990) observed that the Structural Adjustment Programmes forced the 
Government of Malawi to undertake a number of public sector reforms including the 
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introduction of a cash budget system which resulted in reduced funding inflows to UNIMA.  
The reduced funding, according to Mnyanga (2005), undermined the capacity of UNIMA to 
deliver in the late nineties.  
5.2 Culture: The role of Culture in UNIMA pre-dating governance reforms 
Having examined the structural properties underpinning governance context in the period 
before the MIM reforms were initiated, I now, following Archer’s analytical dualism, turn to 
a consideration of the cultural domain. Cultural systems are doctrines, theories, beliefs and 
ideas that define what is possible and what is not possible in a social system.  It is the domain 
in which reside views of how things ought to be done in society (Archer, 1995, 2003; 
Giddens, 1979). It is important to note that cultural contexts emerge from the interplay of 
structure with agency. Archer (1995) has argued that the degree of concentration of material 
influence has an impact on the cultural domain because it predisposes agents to various 
courses of action. This means that the structural tensions in a social system can translate into 
problem-ridden cultural situations which are characterised by cultural tensions.  
 
From abstraction of the data, it was evident that UNIMA’s cultural context was characterised 
by fear and dependency on Government structures. Because UNIMA relied solely on 
Government financing structures, it meant the ensuing culture was one of dependency. RP2 
stated that in those days Dr. Banda was ‘not just the Chancellor but everything’. No major 
decision would be made without his approval. Even the decision to have all University 
students reside on University campus was his own under the pretext that it was through this 
that the University would train a disciplined cadre of graduates (RP2). However, this policy 
restricted the number of students UNIMA could enrol (MIM Report, 1997) because UNIMA 
could only admit the number of students it was able to provide bed spaces to much as the 
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other institutional infrastructures were enabling for accommodating more students (MIM 
Report, 1997).  
 
Furthermore, the University could not visualize any developments on its own as per a 
memorandum from the Office of the President and Cabinet dated 4th August, 1989 contained 
in (RD15). UNIMA had to seek prior approval of Government such that even the decision to 
create a College of Medicine under UNIMA had to be made by Dr. Banda. He donated the 
first premises of the College by handing over his official guest house to accommodate the 
programme team for the creation of that new College.  Furthermore, according to RP2 it is 
believed in UNIMA that most of the infrastructure that was built in the 1980s to 1990 in 
UNIMA was built under Dr. Banda’s direct intervention, either from resources he personally 
sourced from donors or through his Press Trust, the State Company he had established and 
controlled himself. According to the MIM Report (1997), the responsibility for sourcing 
funds for development projects in UNIMA was in the hands of the Chancellor.  
 
Furthermore, as observed by Chirambo (2004) and Newell (1995), the culture of fear 
engulfed Malawi as a result of Dr Banda’s one party system. This confirms what Teferra & 
Altbach (2004) had also observed regarding the situation of Sub-Saharan Africa where the 
national governance under one-party systems in Africa impacted negatively on the 
governance of universities. It is the same fear that has been observed to have permeated 
throughout UNIMA governance context and thus undermined the autonomy of the institution. 
Government was able to dictate decisions on the University through memos that mainly 
emanated from the Chief Secretary and the Comptroller of Statutory Corporations because 
the one-party political system had introduced a culture of fear among agency in Malawi that 
enabled this to happen. According to documents RD26 and RD27 even mundane decisions in 
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UNIMA governance were subject to the approval of Government agents. There were a lot of 
memos that I reviewed in this study arising from UNIMA managers to Government which 
were meant at seeking directions on various mundane matters. Interestingly, most of them 
were concluded by the following statement: ’I remain Sir your most obedient servant’, ‘Sir’ 
in this context referring to either the Head of State or the Chairman of Council. Michael 
(1978); the MIM Report (1997) and Kerr & Mapanje (2002) all refer to the culture of fear 
dominating UNIMA in the 1980s and early 1990s.  
 
RP2 explained that during this period, T1, as a result of the one-party political system many 
students and academic staff members particularly from Chancellor College were arrested for 
holding what were construed as contrary views from those of the State. Those who did not 
want to oppose things merely conformed to what was going on. Archer (1995) argues that in 
situations of the above nature containment is held in balance with syncretism – that is the 
sinking of differences so that there is a resemblance of unity in the society. The end result is 
that there is morphostasis of a society. However, according to Archer (1995) the sort of 
stability that prevails is temporal as it can be disrupted by powerful contingent occurrences 
either legitimizing one set of ideas or completely eliminating the rival ideas.  
 
Both structural and cultural contexts exert directional guidance to agents in the sense that 
they predispose agents to rewards and penalties for every intention or action they take or omit 
to undertake (Archer, 1995; 2003). This is the case because according to Archer (1995), 
structural and cultural properties do no act as hydraulics for agents but they are conditioned 
by actions and omissions of agents, implying that those born in a resource rich environment 
will find reasons to perpetuate their situation or improve it whereas those in a disadvantaged 
situation will find motives for escaping from such a situation. In similar vein, people born in 
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a resource endowed situation would carry a different agency to those born in resource 
deprived environments. In the pursuit of protecting or improving their inherited context, 
structures and culture become in this regard both enabling and constraining depending on the 
agency’s position on the defence of vested interests. Agency, through the process known as 
reflexivity which I defined in Chapter Two operate within these enablements and constraints 
to meet their projects, a process which leads to either the elaboration or the regenerating of a 
given society. The sections that follow examine the composition of UNIMA agents’ (various 
UNIMA stake holders) in the period before the reforms were introduced and their role in the 
regeneration and or elaboration of UNIMA’s structural and cultural context at T1.  
 
5.3 The People: The role of Agents in UNIMA pre-dating governance reforms 
According to Archer (1995), the distinguishing feature of agency in interest groups is their 
degree of articulation and organization. I explained in section 2.2.1.4 that corporate agency is 
active and able to express itself as well as mobilize resources to attain their desired goals. 
According to the University Act of 1998 (RD13) and numerous Minutes of Council (RD1 to 
RD6), by 1995, institutional governance was in the hands of powerful agents in the UNIMA 
Council. The Chairperson of the UNIMA Council was appointed by the State President 
together with two other members from outside the University. The composition of Council 
furthermore had four senior Government officers who served on it as ex-officio members. 
The UNIMA Council had two ex-officio members who were appointed by Council from 
industry or other interest groups. The Vice-Chancellor and College Principals were also 
members. The University Registrar was the secretary to Council (RD13). Council therefore 
had a combination of politicians, senior academics, senior Government officials and 
representatives of industry on its membership. All together there were fifteen Council 
(agents) members. Of these, three were political appointees (the Chairman and two other 
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members); six academics, (Vice-Chancellor and the five College Principal), four Government 
officials and two representatives from industry – totalling fifteen. In terms of representation 
between academics and non –academics therefore, the UNIMA Council had 40 percent 
academics and 60 percent non-academic members or a ratio of 1:3.  
 
According to Maton, (2005) espousing on Pierre Bourdieu’s concept of field forms, decision-
making in higher education institutions is a function of dynamics between the positional 
autonomy of agents and their relational autonomy. The former refers to the composition of 
academics in decision-making bodies in relation to other players from outside the academe 
whereas the latter refers to the principles pursued in decision-making whether there is heavy 
reliance on inward looking principles or principles emanating from external sources such as 
industry or politics. In this regard, according to (Maton, 2005:697) Bourdieu argued that if 
agents occupying positions in a field such as governing councils that originate from or 
primarily locate from other fields such as industry the field exhibits relatively weaker 
positional autonomy  (PA-). On the other hand, if agents occupying positions in decision-
making bodies such as governing councils originate from or solely are from within the field 
in higher education, the field exhibits relatively stronger positional autonomy (PA+). This 
explains perhaps why much as academics by nature of their training and professionalism are 
very articulate and vocal, in UNIMA they were not able to exercise much leverage in 
determining the governance context compared to the UNIMA Council because the Council 
exhibited weak positional autonomy. It must be noted that the UNIMA Council formed the 
corporate agency of UNIMA going by the UNIMA Act.  
 
Furthermore, the dominance of the majority players in the Council from outside UNIMA, 
who also possessed political agency meant that the Council had the leverage of 
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superimposing ideas drawn from economics and politics at the expense of those from inside 
the academy. According to Maton (2005:264): 
 
if ways of working, aims, practices, and measures of achievement within higher education are 
drawn from other fields such as economic or politics it indicates relatively weaker relational 
autonomy (RA-). Where the field’s principles look inwards to its specific activities such as 
academic excellence it exhibits stronger relational autonomy RA+).  
 
Based on the governance structures that existed in UNIMA in the pre MIM governance 
reform era as discussed already, it is no wonder that agency in the UNIMA Council exhibited 
weak relational autonomy which RP2 believed had a detrimental effect on academic 
excellence, an observation echoed in Kerr & Mapanje (2002).  
 
From Council Minutes, before 1994 the chairperson of the Council was John Tembo who was 
then a very senior, powerful and influential cabinet minister. According to Kerr & Mapanje 
(2002:78) John Tembo was a de facto life chairperson for the Council until the multi-party 
election in 1994. It is only after 1994 when Malawi assumed democratic principles of 
governance after Banda’s regime lost a referendum to perpetuate one party rule that UNIMA 
had a person other than a cabinet minister as chairperson of Council. From the foregoing, it is 
not surprising that the governance culture in UNIMA predisposed primary agency to being 
subordinates of the ruling regime. Kerr & Mapanje (2002:73) asserted that: 
 
After independence (in 1964) President Banda, who established a repressive one-party state, 
severely restricted the University's intellectual autonomy through modalities of censorship. Some 
academics and students went into exile; others conformed to the dominant ideology; others resisted 
it furtively. 
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At Senate level the composition was different. The University Act of 1998 (RD13) and 
Minutes of Senate (RD9 to RD11) show that by 1995 Senate was chaired by the Vice-
Chancellor and had Principals, Deans and Academic representatives as its members. In 
essence, Senate was comprised of academics only with none of its membership coming from 
outside the University. According to the UNIMA Act, Senate was the highest academic 
making policy committee in UNIMA. An initial perception is that in as far as academic 
decision-making was concerned Senate reflected strong positional autonomy. However, this 
must be viewed within a specific context. To begin with UNIMA had five colleges. Senate 
was therefore composed of representatives from these five colleges. From the perspective of 
faculty or department, one should note that there was still weak positional autonomy because 
decisions at Senate level were carried out by a body whose composition had the majority of 
its members outside the particular needs and wishes of any individual college or faculty. The 
scenario above indicates that by 1995 colleges and faculty did not have strong agency in both 
management and academic decision-making in UNIMA because their representation as 
individual colleges or faculties was limited. In other words, faculty and academic 
departments were isolated. In addition, according to the UNIMA Act, all important decisions 
of Senate were subject to the ratification of Council. This means, Senate could not realise its 
strong positional autonomy as a result of the above structural constraints. Besides, as already 
demonstrated in section 5.1, UNIMA relied on Government financing structures. This is the 
same Government we have observed whose economy was subsequently under the direction 
of IMF. In so far as Senate’s decisions had any financial implications, its relational autonomy 
was therefore very weak. It can thus be concluded that faculty and academic departments had 
weak agency from all perspectives of autonomy.  
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Finally, the need for alternative ideas was there but the mechanisms through which such 
alternative ideas could be expressed were also limited. Staff members in the UNIMA period 
before the governance reforms were initiated were not unionised (RD16). Staff members 
were not allowed by the political structures of the one party state to form unions or 
associations through which they could express their dissatisfaction with what was going on. 
So, the rest of the agents in UNIMA were not voluntary adherents of ideas emanating from 
corporate agency (Archer, 1995), but they were constrained by lack of organizational 
structures within which they could articulate their concerns, implying that at T1 there was 
little academic freedom for academic agents. 
 
According to Archer (1995), a monolithic form of social organization allows superimposition 
of elites’ ideas on the rest of the population. UNIMA at T1 was characterised by conjunctions 
between structural morphostasis and cultural morphostasis that disposed UNIMA agency to a 
constraining context. The UNIMA governance reforms emerged from the above context.  
 
5.4 Objectives of the UNIMA governance reforms 
I set out in this section to present my findings regarding the espoused objectives of the 
governance reform measures that were introduced in 1997 because in social realism, 
according to Archer (1995), one of the most differentiating characteristic of people is their 
intentionality; that is the capacity of agents to entertain projects and design strategies to 
accomplish them (Archer, 1995). The term projects stands for ‘any goal countenanced by 
social agents, from the satisfaction of biologically grounded needs to the utopian 
reconstruction of society’ (Archer, 1995:198).  
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Intentions of people do not just come from nowhere. From the morphogenetic theoretical 
perspective grounding this study, it is believed that through involuntaristic placement, 
agency is introduced into pre-existing structures and culture that are both enabling and 
constraining. Since agents are endowed with reflexivity, they entertain projects that are 
either enabled or constrained by a given context at a particular time (Archer, 1995). As 
established in the preceding section, it was Council that saw the need to introduce the 
governance reforms in UNIMA. In this section my focus is on addressing the following 
ontological question: what provoked the self-consciousness of the Council’s agency at T1 
to opt for the MIM inspired reforms? It is imperative to know the vested interests of this 
corporate agency in introducing change because morphostasis (regeneration of society) or 
morphogenesis (transformation of society) is conditioned by agency (Archer, 2003a/b), 
that is to say, for events to be actualised they must affect the projects of agents. ‘For 
anything to exert the power of constraint or enablement, it has to stand in a relationship 
such that it obstructs or aids the achievement of some specific agential enterprise’ (Archer, 
2003a:5).  
 
From interview data, it seems that the reason why the MIM governance reforms were 
introduced was to enhance efficiency and effectiveness of University functions so that 
more students could be admitted. In other words, it appears the reforms were meant to 
address internal inefficiencies in governance practices that were constraining expansion in 
students’ enrolment in UNIMA. This was confirmed by all research participants. It 
appears that the corporate agents had realized that the governance systems in UNIMA in 
1995 (at T1) were not operating efficiently and effectively, that is they were constraining 
their intentions to expand students intake. Indeed, RP2 indicated that management was 
worried that although Zambia had the same population as Malawi, University intake in 
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that country was higher than in Malawi. RP2 also observed that Botswana had a 
population of less than two million people but had more students in higher education than 
Malawi which by then had a population of ten million people. Efficiency has varied 
meanings in different disciplines. In the context of this study the term is used to describe a 
situation where it was recognised that there were structural and cultural constraints that 
impinged on optimal utilization of existing capacity of the UNIMA to satisfy the vested 
interests of its corporate agency. The interview data makes clear that UNIMA governance 
reforms were therefore introduced to find the best mix of structural and cultural practices 
that can enable the University’s corporate agency to attain their intentions.  
 
It is important to note that at the time of initiating the governance reforms, UNIMA’s 
enrolment figures were the lowest compared with many countries within Sub-Saharan Africa. 
For example, the World Bank had found that between 2003 and 2008 UNIMA’s enrolment 
was 51 per 100,000 inhabitants, as compared to Sub-Saharan African countries’ enrolment 
that averaged 337 per 100,000 inhabitants (World Bank 2010). This report (World Bank 
2010) nevertheless acknowledged a significant improvement in University enrolment in 
Malawi compared to its previous situation, indicating how poor participation rates must have 
been previously.  It is submitted that the main objective of the MIM reforms according to 
these findings was to enhance efficiency and effectiveness of doing business in UNIMA so 
that more students could be admitted. 
 
5.5 Conclusion 
In as far as governance is concerned at T1 in UNIMA, it can be concluded that the context 
was constraining by 1995, which predisposed UNIMA stakeholders to a situational logic of 
elimination. The situation was amenable for alteration because of the tension that emerged 
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from this disjunction. I have shown that while the internal governance context was 
characterised by tension emerging from morphostasis of the parts, the external context of 
UNIMA was vulnerable to economic and political external forces emerging from the 
morphogenesis at the global or macro structural levels. The above contradictions predisposed 
UNIMA agents to a situational logic that necessitated change. The change was however 
mediated by the desire of UNIMA corporate agency, Council, to expand the University’s 
intake.   
 
Having established the objective of the UNIMA governance reforms initiated in 1995 against 
the constraining governance context, my next task was to know the constitutive properties of 
these UNIMA governance reform measures. From an ontological perspective in this context, 
my interest was in knowing the constitutive governance practices that characterized the 
UNIMA governance reform measures. For Critical Realists, such as Bhaskhar (2008), this is 
the form the phenomenon took as an object of social inquiry. Understanding of these 
proposed practices and ideas generated by MIM would also offer insights into whether indeed 
the governance reforms were designed with the above cited objective in mind or not. This is 
the purpose of Chapter Six to which I now turn. 
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Chapter 6  
T2 – T3 – STRUCTURE, CULTURE AND AGENCY IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF 
REFORMS 
 
6.0 Introduction 
The objective of this chapter is to present my findings regarding the changes that were 
adopted by the Council of UNIMA from the Malawi Institute of Management (MIM) Report. 
It describes the experiences of UNIMA with governance reform measures from T2 to T3 of 
Archer’s morphogenetic cycle. In Chapter Five I interrogated the structural, cultural and 
agential conditionings of UNIMA governance at T1, the period before the reforms were 
introduced and argued that this period was characterised by conjunctions between structural 
and cultural morphostasis. This internal institutional configuration created a situational logic 
of elimination in the structural domain of UNIMA governance which confronted UNIMA’s 
corporate agency in 1995.  
 
While this was the case internally, I also argued in Chapter Five that externally, there were 
structural and cultural forces that were working towards reshaping the governance context in 
UNIMA, particularly being exerted from political and economic changes that were impacting 
on public sector institutions globally. I argued that it is this vulnerability to the external 
political and economic mechanisms that predisposed UNIMA agents to a situational logic 
that necessitated change. I showed in Chapter Five that change in UNIMA was precipitated 
by the reduced funding that was experienced as a result of the Government of Malawi’s 
adoption of fiscal structural reforms emanating from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
and the World Bank.  
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In this Chapter I explain the practical measures UNIMA’s actors took. I particularly take note 
that the interventions introduced took the form of governance reform adopted from the 
Consultancy Report which the MIM had produced. I thus in this chapter interrogate the 
constitutive practices that formed the essence of the governance reforms in UNIMA.  
 
6.1 Governance reforms measures introduced in UNIMA between 1997 and 2013 
I employed the morphogenetic framework to analyse the governance reform measures the 
Council adopted from the MIM recommendations. In presenting my results I utilise the 
framework developed by Clark (1983) graphically summarised in Figure 5.1 of Chapter Five. 
From the analysis of the data, it was evident that the UNIMA Council adopted the reform 
measures mainly at two levels of the higher education governance hierarchy. First, there were 
reform measures that were adopted by the Council which were intended to condition the 
structural properties of governance at the systems level. These were few in number and I 
present them first in section 6.1.1. Secondly, there were reform measures which were adopted 
by the Council meant to shape the governance structure, culture and agency at enterprise 
level of the University and these are presented in section 6.1.2.  In Table 6.1 I summarise all 
the reform measures that the analysis reveals were adopted by the UNIMA Council in 1997 
based on the MIM Report.  
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 Reforms at System (Governance) levels 
1. Government to articulate policy for education sector in a holistic manner 
2. Establish a specialist department in the Ministry of Education to be in charge of Higher Education 
3. Depoliticise the Office of the Chancellor and the appointment University Council members 
 Reforms at Enterprise/Institutional Governance levels 
 1. Outsourcing of non-core functions of the University 
  2. Deconcentration to enable line managers at college level to have decision-making authority, hire their 
own staff; Principals to exercise executive leadership at college level and Registrar and Finance Officers 
at colleges to be responsible to the Principal and not to the University Registrar 
  3. Decongestion of Central Office making it lean and making it to concentrate on policy and strategic 
issues 
  4. Colleges should justify their budget to government and disbursement of funds should be made straight to 
colleges 
 5. Vice Chancellor should play the role of Chief Executive 
 6. Deans to become executive 
 7. Merging of academic departments 
 8. Rationalization of academic programmes 
 9. Phase out unpopular programmes 
10. Minimize programme duplication 
11. Freeze excess staff establishment and transfer some positions to departments of critical need 
12. Reduction in the size of Senate 
13. Selection of students should be based on classroom space and not bed spaces 
14. Selected students should be in two categories: Government sponsored and self-sponsored 
15. UNIMA to increase enrolment of students in areas of scarce expertise such as medicine, accountancy 
and architecture 
16. Increase the enrolment of female students 
17. Diploma programmes should be phased out 
18. Staff houses owned by the University should be sold 
 
Table 6.1: Recommended reform measures adopted by the UNIMA Council in 1997 
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6.1.1 Governance reform measures adopted by UNIMA Council in 1997 
The Council adopted some recommendations from the MIM Report (1997) that compelled 
Government to introduce new governance structures at systems level; that is, in the higher 
education sector as a whole which were important to the sector but lacking in Malawi. It 
almost seems pretentious to imagine that the Council could adopt reform measures that would 
compel Government to react to its findings. From the perspective of the morphogenetic 
theory, this may not be an unusual contingency considering the composition of the Council as 
described in section 5.3 of Chapter Five. It can be inferred from this that the presence of both 
Government and UNIMA corporate agency in the Council provided an enabling environment 
for a combined agency that mediated the transformation of governance structural and cultural 
properties in both directions, at systems (governmental) levels and at the enterprise level. 
Through the Council, it is contended, structural and cultural governance properties of 
Government were able to interact with those of the University via agency. In the process of 
such interactions, either intended or unintended emergent governance properties were 
produced that can explain the transformation of structures and culture in both directions 
(Archer, 1995). As shall be noted later in this section, this interaction also had the effect of 
transforming Council’s own agency.  
 
It is important to recollect that if there are strains or congruence in the second level of 
emergent properties of structure and cultures at the institutional level (Archer, 1995) that is, if 
past and present actions of agency relate in a manner that there are either constraints or 
congruence in their relationship with the Structural Emergent Properties and the Cultural 
Emergent Properties, the net impact can have far reaching consequences beyond the 
institution. This potentially was the situation in the Council where emergent properties of 
agency arising from the varied membership of the Council (political, government and the 
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university) when reacting to the MIM findings provided the directional guidance that had an 
effect on the entire system of higher education governance in Malawi and hence explains 
these reforms that were adopted at systems levels.  
 
The investigations of the MIM Reforms (1997) revealed that there was no specific policy 
guidelines for higher education in the Malawi Government to which the University could 
relate to, implying that there was no clear articulation of a framework that governs the 
relationship between Government and public universities in Malawi. The MIM Report (1997) 
had observed that the overarching national policy documents that existed in the country in 
1995 mentioned higher education in passing without any comprehensive statement in them 
worthy of the term ‘national higher education policy’. It appeared therefore to the Council 
that this was an opportune moment to indicate to Government the gap that was there in higher 
education governance structures in Malawi for Government to correct. Secondly, Council 
also agreed that Government should establish a separate department within the Ministry of 
Education to be responsible for higher education affairs in the country (MIM Report, 1997). 
Considering how big the secondary sector was in Malawi, the Education Ministry it appears 
was not sufficiently managing higher education issues. The above scenarios were in sharp 
contrast with what prevails in most countries in the Sub-Saharan Africa where there is clear 
articulation of the relationship between higher education institutions and Government in the 
form of national policy blue prints as well as separate government departments specifically 
responsible for higher education governance issues (Saint, 2009). The above reform measures 
were therefore intended to correct these observed gaps in the higher education sector in 
Malawi to ensure that there was an articulation of higher education governance policy at 
systems level supported by a robust institutional structure within the Ministry of Education 
that would provide the platform for the formal Government and UNIMA relationship.  
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It is not however clear as to how these decisions were communicated to Government because 
there was no correspondence in the files I consulted at Central Office which showed that 
Government was formerly approached to consider adopting these recommendations. 
Furthermore, none of the research participants were able to recall that the Council had come 
up with these recommendations although these governance reform measures appeared in the 
Report that the Council adopted in 1997. There is a record of discussions in the Council 
Minutes, particularly those of the 60th Meeting of Council document (RD2) that reveals that 
Government was requested to make commitments with regard to the reform measures which 
were being proposed. But these were confined it would appear, to financial commitments. 
Judging from the composition of the Council as outlined in section 5.3 of Chapter Five, it is 
possible that these decisions therefore were taken by the Government representatives on the 
Council. If this was the case then it is worth noting that this is consistent with Archer’s 
morphogenetic theory which explains that through mediation of agency, structures, culture 
and agency get reshaped and this accounts the transformation of societal structures.  
 
Although it took a long time, there is evidence that these measures were finally implemented 
by Government. For example, Government introduced a separate directorate within the 
Ministry of Education responsible for Higher Education which I believe was in response to 
the recommendation the Council had made. Furthermore, in 2006 the Government developed 
a National Education Sector Plan in which higher education policy plans of the Malawian 
Government were outlined. In this policy document, Government acknowledged the 
significant role that higher education can play in the national development of the country and 
it outlined strategies the Government would take to ensure that higher education assists it to 
achieve its national development objectives. In the same document Government expressed its 
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commitment to revise the Education Act in order to facilitate the establishment of a 
Commission for Higher Education (Malawi Government, 2006). It also outlined its policy 
objectives for public universities to achieve. The Education Act was revised in 2013 and in 
the same year the Government established the National Council for Higher Education 
(NCHE). In my view, all these developments happened in the higher education governance 
sector in Malawi as a result of University Council’s decisions of 1997.  
These recommended reforms had the potential of increasing State influence on UNIMA and 
can be considered to be within the state-centric model of governance although they were 
advanced as mechanisms for catalysing greater autonomy of UNIMA from direct State 
control.  
 
Furthermore, the Council adopted a recommendation that stated that the Head of State should 
cease to be the Chancellor and instead a prominent member of Malawi society should take up 
this role (MIM Report, 1997). When one recalls that the one-party system suppressed 
UNIMA autonomy and interfered with academic freedom as reported in Chapter Five, it 
cannot be doubted that a recommendation of the foregoing nature would be proposed. 
Interestingly, what was being proposed above is what prevails in many higher education 
reforms in Universities in Sub-Saharan Africa (Saint, 2009) where the State President has 
ceased to be the Chancellor. Related to this, the Report which was adopted by the Council 
also recommended that the appointment by the State President of members to serve on the 
Council should not be based on political patronage. People should be selected based on their 
position in society in relation to the interest of UNIMA’s development needs (MIM Report, 
1997).  
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The Council’s recommendation to Government to remove the State President from assuming 
the office of the Chancellor met structural resistance. The draft amended Act that was 
presented to the Ministry of Justice included this recommendation but the final Bill that was 
presented to Parliament by the Minister of Education (and which eventually became Law) 
maintained the previous clause. The clause had been reinstated that indicated that the Head of 
State was to serve as the Chancellor of the University.  
 
There was, however, a new clause in the revised Act that was introduced to enable the Head 
of State to choose another person in the event that she/he did not want to serve in the office of 
the Chancellor (UNIMA, 1998 Act). This seems to have been a compromise. With regard to 
the latter recommendation regarding the appointment of the Council members, I noted with 
interest from the Minutes of the Council that the composition of Council changed. Some 
prominent members in society started serving on the Council other than full-time politicians. 
There was a mixture of members appointed to the Council by the State President ranging 
from prominent retired civil servants, successful business and professional people to retired 
prominent academics but not active politicians. For example, between 2010 and 2013, the 
Council has been chaired by retired professors from the University. In addition, in 2010 of all 
the three Council members that were appointed by the State President, in addition to the 
chairperson, were retired UNIMA employees. This is in sharp contrast with the situation 
before these reforms were adopted whereby it was prominent active politicians that took turns 
in chairing and being members of the Council. It is important to note that among the 
membership of the Council is the Secretary for Education who serves as an ex-officio 
member. In Malawi, the composition of the governing boards is the responsibility of the 
appropriate responsible Ministry. A recommendation is made by the responsible Ministry 
through the Department of Statutory Corporations to the State President who approves such 
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recommendation. As previously observed, the mere fact that the Secretary for Education 
carries with her or him a double agency, as a Government employee and as a Council 
member at the same time means that she or he is strategically positioned to influence change 
in both directions, that is, Government and the University. This underscores Archer’s (1995) 
assertion that agency mediates structural and cultural transformation in society.  
 
From the foregoing, it is evident that the majority of the reform measures the Council 
adopted in 1997 aimed at conditioning the governance structures at systems level were 
implemented by Government. However, such implementation has had both intended and 
unintended consequences, as is discussed in Chapter Seven. In the section that follows, I 
consider recommendations adopted by the Council aimed at reforming the enterprise level of 
governance. 
 
6.1.2 Reform measures adopted by UNIMA Council at Enterprise level of governance 
The focus of my analysis reported on in this section was largely based on the interviews 
conducted with the research participants. My research participants were asked to tell me 
which governance reform measures they could recall were adopted by the Council in 1997. 
The position that I took was that the reforms that would be mentioned by the majority of the 
research participants had objective existence. Meaning, such reform measures had causal 
effect in the governance reforms in the University considering that I was interviewing my 
research participants fifteen years after these reform measures were adopted by the Council. 
The reforms that had frequent and extensive mention were understood to have had significant 
import on the governance reforms undertaken in the University. I thus ranked the reforms that 
were mentioned to have been adopted by the Council based on the frequency with which they 
appeared in the responses I got from the research participants. The summarised results appear 
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in Figure 6.1. While this is a fairly crude measure of importance, as it is difficult to determine 
discrete counts of mentions of each issue within the interview data, this allowed me to 
identify which issues needed further analysis. Those reforms whose frequencies were 
particularly high were subjected to further analysis to understand their importance in the 
governance reforms in the University.  
 
 
Figure: 6.1: Stakeholders’ perceived reforms	  
Figure 6-a: Stakeholders’ perceived reforms 
From the results obtained as shown in Figure 6.1, I noted that the reform measure that was 
recollected by all the research participants numerous times was the outsourcing of non-core 
services. Furthermore, when asked as to which reform measures were successfully 
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implemented in the UNMA all the research participants also mentioned the same outsourcing 
of the non-core services (see Figure 6.2 below). When I examined the schedules of the 
services to be outsourced in the University I noted that the following services were 
earmarked for outsourcing: catering, cleaning, gardening, maintenance and security (MIM 
Report, 1997).  
 
It is necessary to recall from Chapter Four that underlining outsourcing of services in the 
higher education sector has been the New Public Management (NPM) idea of greater 
prominence placed on discipline and parsimony in resource utilization (Hood, 1992). 
According to Harman & Treadgold, (2007) in implementing this aspect of reforms, 
universities have opted for outsourced services in many facets of University support services 
such as the ones cited above. In the University outsourcing of non-core functions was 
recommended for three main reasons according to the research participants and the MIM 
Report (1997). First, all the research participants concurred that outsourcing was adopted to 
ensure that the University concentrated its energy and financial resources towards the core 
business of the University which according to the University Act (1998) are: teaching, 
research, consultancy and outreach services. Second, according to the Report (MIM Report, 
1997) outsourcing of non-core functions was justified after it was observed that the 
University’s wage bill was high because the institution had too many staff members 
especially in support services. It was argued that this scenario was crowding out the main 
players in the University business (academic staff members) as the institution was failing to 
appropriately reward them due to the high wage bill and thus contributing to the brain drain. 
It was therefore envisaged that outsourcing of the non-core services would enable the 
University to retrench the majority of its support staff to pave the way for salary increase for 
the remaining core staff (MIM Report, 1997). Third, it was highlighted by the MIM Report 
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that the presence of a large pool of support staff were skewing the student-staff ratios in the 
University when compared with other universities in the World thereby creating the 
impression that the University had excess capacity. Outsourcing of non-core services was 
therefore adopted by the Council as a strategy to correct these anomalies.  
 
All the research participants agreed that outsourcing of non-core services was justifiable. 
Two of the research participants (RP3 and RP8) confirmed that outsourcing of non-core 
services enabled the University to reduce its staff numbers and hence costs. This finding also 
serves to confirm what Gawa (2006) established that outsourcing on non-core services at 
UNIMA reduced the cost to the University of providing such services. Research Participant 
(RP5) stated that outsourcing of non-core services in the University had enabled managers to 
concentrate on providing support to teaching and research services as the retrenched staff 
members were perceived to be ‘… a bother to everyone and really everyone wanted to do 
away with them’  
 
 
Figure: 6.2: Stakeholders’ perception of successful reforms	  
Figure 6-b: Stakeholders’ perception of successful reforms 
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Various reasons were advanced by the research participants for the success of the 
implementation of outsourcing of non-core services in UNIMA. Research Participants (RP1 
and RP5) ascribed the success of this initiative to Government’s commitment. It is noted that 
Government supported the process of outsourcing by providing training to all the 
administrative staff that were charged with the implementation of the policy prior to the 
implementation of outsourcing of the non-core functions. RP1 recalled that there was also 
political will at the systems level in Government. He stated that it was felt that with the 
advent of the multi-party system of Government in Malawi, support staff members in the 
University (who were the first category of staff to be unionised) became difficult to manage 
as they were regularly involved in industrial disputes with their employer and hence the need 
to reduce its size to minimise an unnecessary management problem. In addition, both RP1 
and RP5 attributed the success of outsourcing of non-core services to the financial support 
Government provided. Retrenchment entailed financial resources which the University on its 
own could not afford from its budget. The Government therefore provided the required extra 
financial resources needed for paying-off all the retrenched staff members. As a result of this, 
all the support staff members who were identified to be retrenched were laid-off. The non-
core services such as catering, maintenance, grounds management and security were 
advertised and assigned to private service providers.  
 
While this outsourcing of non-core services can be seen to be a logical emergence of multiple 
mechanisms as outlined in the previous chapter and was indeed referred to as a positive 
outcome by all the research participants, it can also be viewed through a broader NPM lens. 
There is much literature that is critical of the economic logic underpinning such reforms and 
shows how the NPM model of outsourcing non-core processes has significant human 
consequences (Balfour and Grubbs, 2000; Lerner, 2008).  
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The Council also introduced an income generating measure by introduction a high fee paying 
cohort of students in public universities. By 1995 the UNIMA students were already paying a 
modest contribution to their tuition. The Council decided in 1997 that all the undergraduate 
students should contribute more to their tuition than was the case previously when students 
were only contributing about 2 percent (MIM Report, 1997). A decision to increase students’ 
tuition fees in this regard reflected the desire of the Council to shift the perception of students 
to see themselves as life-long beneficiaries of their education. This position is in line with the 
corporate model of governance which, as discussed in Chapter Four, advocates for the 
importation of economic imperatives into the governance of universities.  
 
On implementation, the above reform measure resulted in the Council categorising 
undergraduate students into two groups. Category A comprised those students whose tuition 
would largely be paid by Government (subsidised fees) and who were to contribute a rather 
increased sum towards their tuition but who were to be provided with accommodation and 
meals by the University – known as residential students. These were to be selected based on 
merit, that is, high performance at the O-level certificate stage. Category B comprised 
students who would pay higher fees than students in Category A and find their own 
accommodation and provide for themselves in terms of meals. These were known as non-
residential students. They would be selected on merit but after the selection of Category A 
students was completed. The idea was that this arrangement would allow the University to 
generate more money from tuition while expanding the intake. This reform operated on the 
assumption that the demand for University education among Malawian youths was inelastic 
and that an increase in the ‘price’ of University education would not impact severely on the 
number of students applying and attending. This thinking was backed by the other 
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assumption that since the University was previously selecting students based on bed space 
which limited access of school leavers to the University, this latter category of students 
would be willing to pay more because they would appreciate the opportunity given to them 
through this new policy. Otherwise, they were destined not to make it to the University if it 
were not for this policy change. In other words, the students would view this decision as a 
necessary contradiction to what prevailed before in the sense that although they were 
disadvantaged, this policy offered them an opportunity to obtain a University education. It 
would appear that indeed the assumptions made were correct as the policy was tolerated.  
 
In order to avoid some Government sponsored students from being barred from accessing 
University education because of the increase in tuition fees, the Council agreed that the 
student-means-tested or a needs-based loan scheme should be enhanced and transferred from 
the University to another specialist unit to manage it. Before this, the scheme was managed 
by UNIMA. These loans were to be restricted to the Category A students only. The 
understanding was that those who were to be selected under Category B had the financial 
capacity to support themselves.  
 
According to Johnson (2003:404), cost sharing is premised on the assumption that: ‘costs of 
higher education in all countries and in all situations can be viewed as being borne by four 
principal parties: (1) the Government, or taxpayers; (2) parents; (3) students; and/or (4) 
individual or institutional donors.’ In this regard, where Government was not able to 
adequately meet all the demands of higher education financing, it was imperative to involve 
parents, students and  philanthropy to supplement the financing (Johnson, 2003). This is what 
happened in Malawi after it was realised that State funding to the University was declining. 
However, it would appear that the focus was mainly on sharing costs between Government 
	  187	  
	  
and the student/parent as I did not find any measure that was focussed on tapping from 
philanthropy.  
 
Essentially, a means-tested or need-based loan scheme described above is introduced 
wherever cost-sharing strategies such as the introduction of high fees have been implemented 
(Johnson, 2003). The argument is that if this is not done, higher education participation 
would not be equitable. Students particularly from low income families would be prevented 
from accessing higher education (Johnson, 2003). However, experiences by some countries 
in Africa such as Ghana and Ethiopia is that such loan schemes have been beset by 
management problems particularly low repayment levels by students, which has made the 
sustaining of such schemes challenging. The schemes have also faced implementation 
challenges in these countries particularly how to assess the most deserving students 
(Yizengaw, 2003; Atuahene, 2009). Interestingly, the same trends were experienced in 
Malawi. To begin with, by early 2000, UNIMA was facing serious challenges in identifying 
needy students according to the Minutes of the Finance Committee of Council (RD20). A 
decision to have some applicants awarded the loans while rejecting others led to students’ 
unrest according to records sourced from the Central Office. Eventually, the Council bowed 
to pressure and started awarding loans to all those that had applied for them. The ‘means-test’ 
was in a way abandoned in this regard. However, this was not sustainable as resources were 
insufficient to accommodate every ‘needy’ student. Correspondences (RD26) at the Central 
Office indicate that Government altered its policy and decided that the loan scheme should be 
managed by a private provider (in line with the MIM Report’s recommendation), namely a 
firm that would be able to enforce the ‘needs’ test as well as be able to inject more resources 
into the scheme.  
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A commercial bank was identified. However, the private provider served only for a year and 
withdrew from the scheme because of structural incompatibilities surrounding the 
arrangements under which the loan scheme was to be managed. According to one 
Government official from the Ministry of Education I consulted, who was responsible for 
managing the scheme, Government had wanted the commercial bank to issue the loans but 
required the students to start repaying the loans after four years, that is, after graduating. 
However, the business practice of commercial banks could not accommodate such an 
arrangement. The Reserve Bank regulations governing operations of commercial banks in 
Malawi did not allow banks to lend out loans for repayments after four years as was proposed 
with the students’ loans. This meant that the commercial bank could not proceed to 
administer the loan scheme. According to records at the Central Office (RD27;RD28), 
Government was therefore forced to assume the responsibility of administering the loan 
scheme once again after the commercial bank had abandoned it. Furthermore, although it was 
assumed that the non-government sponsored students would not require the loans, pressure 
mounted to extend the loans to them as well. At the time of writing this thesis, Government 
had just submitted a new Bill to Parliament to regulate the loan scheme which would enable 
all students in both public and private universities to benefit from the loan scheme if they 
meet all the requirements of the needs test. It remains to be seen whether the Government 
will have sufficient financial resources to accommodate students from both public and private 
universities as the experience so far has shown that this has not been possible even when the 
scheme was restricted to public university students only. Moreover, according to the 
Government official I consulted, at the moment the Government is failing to pay universities 
the amount owed to them by students who benefit from the loan scheme. If the Government 
is currently unable to release funding from the scheme to public universities, it is even more 
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unlikely to be able to do so when provisions are made for private University students to claim 
from the scheme. 
 
From the foregoing, one can note that both outsourcing and the enhancement of cost and 
income generating measures by students were deliberate interventions by the Council aimed 
at configuring the UNIMA financial governance structures to contain expenditures. The 
measures, as can be observed, were equally intended to foreground a corporate culture of 
governance in the University, one that placed a premium on value for money in service 
delivery in line with NPM principles. In addition, there was an attempt as well to reconfigure 
the composition of agency in the University in the process.  
 
Outsourcing was accompanied by retrenchment of support staff and, according to RP1 this 
also was aimed at checking the influence of this unionised cadre and redirecting the savings 
into salaries of the academic members of staff. Additionally, measures aimed at collecting 
more revenue from students through cost sharing were not only meant to inculcate a culture 
of valuing the benefit of one’s education on the part of students, but they also had a 
corresponding conditioning influence on the agency students were to carry. There emerged 
categorization of students into residential and non-residential. Each of these had its own 
agency which had the potential to influence the way UNIMA was to manage them. For 
example, scheduling of classes had to be done mindful that not all the students were 
operating from campus. Similarly, these measures meant that increased numbers of students 
were admitted and this had implications for the delivery of programmes against the existing 
staff members the academic departments were supposed to have in view of the staff: student 
ratios that were being proposed. In concluding this section we should not lose sight of the fact 
that all these reform measures were emergent governance properties contingent from the 
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constraining financial context in the UNIMA period preceding the reforms (T1) outlined in 
Chapter Five and had far reaching cascading consequences at enterprise as well as 
disciplinary levels in the UNIMA governance context.  
 
The second most significant reform measure the Council adopted according to the research 
participants was an attempt to shift the power distribution in UNIMA from the centre to the 
periphery to enable faculties and academic departments to assume more decision-making 
authority. According to the research participants, major decisions taken by Council in this 
respect were as follows: First, the Council agreed that the UNIMA Act should be amended to 
align itself to the new governance processes that were being adopted. It is important to 
observe that until this time the UNIMA Act had been revised only once in 1974. Second, the 
Council agreed that Central Office should be decongested through devolution of powers and 
made lean. It should reduce its concern on operational matters and focus on policy and 
strategic issues. The operational matters should be devolved to colleges. According to all the 
research participants matters such as the hiring of staff, staff discipline, budget formulation 
and staff payroll were to be removed from the Central Office to be undertaken by colleges. In 
this connection, principals of colleges and their registrars and finance officers at college level 
were empowered to assume executive leadership. Third, the University Senate was to 
devolve most of its powers as well and become lean in its composition. According to what 
RP1 and RP8 recalled: 
  
it was felt that maybe the clearing house of these academic issues should not be Senate but 
that work should be done by academic boards at college level, and if those academic boards 
did the work at college level a much leaner Senate would have very few issues to deal with. 
(RP1) 
	  
	  191	  
	  
…the Academic Board, it’s like sort of a replica of the Senate, we should have such a Board like 
Senate, I can say Senate B at a college. (RP8). 
 
The Council agreed that the University Senate should focus its attention on academic policy 
matters. Colleges should introduce academic boards to be chaired by the principal with 
membership drawn from faculty deans and heads of department. The college academic 
boards were to take over most of the functions of the University Senate such as approval of 
students’ examination results, curriculum reviews and academic programme changes with 
regular reports submitted to University Senate to ratify (MIM Report, 1997).  
 
The justification for this decision was that the academe would regain its rightful autonomy of 
self-governance if most of the academic functions of the University were to be decided upon 
at college levels where faculty and academic departments were operating (MIM Report, 
1997; RP1).  
 
It can be recalled from discussions in section 4.1.1.2 that the main feature of self-governance 
is that important decisions in universities can competently be taken by academics alone, or 
under mandatory advice of them because of their expertise and commitments (du Toit, 2007; 
1996). These are mainly decisions that relate to the work of academics such as the syllabus of 
a course, individual staff appointments, the admission or graduation of individual students, 
standards of academic performance, and the detailed allocation of resources between 
competing usages within a department or faculty (du Toit, 2007). Therefore, by devolving 
most of the decision-making powers to colleges in the manner it was agreed and the creation 
of college academic boards, it meant that colleges would to a greater extent attain self-
governance.  However, the devolution of responsibilities can be interpreted quite differently. 
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Giroux (1992) makes the point that decentralization appears to increase academic power and 
freedoms but actually increases the bureaucracy and administrative responsibilities of 
academics. 
 
Devolution of decision-making powers is one of the principles advanced in NPM reform 
measures. According to Hood (1992), NPM governance reforms have tended to emphasize 
issues of decentralization, devolution and delegation of power to allow greater discretion on 
the part of managers that run public sector organizations. It is grounded in the belief that if 
efficiency has to be improved and for accountability to be easily monitored, those that 
manage public institutions should be given great discretionary powers in resource 
mobilization and use (Christensen & Leagreid, 2002). Devolution in UNIMA was therefore 
adopted by the Council to ensure that there were internal efficiencies in the management of 
colleges as important decisions that affect the core functions of the University would be done 
with speed as well as reflect differences in the operating contexts of each of the five 
individual colleges (MIM Report, 1997). 
 
Fourth, having devolved its operational functions, the Council directed that Central Office 
should now develop a strategic plan as a governance framework in its role of guiding 
colleges. One of the principles that the NPM reform framework advocates is the formulation 
of well-defined goals, targets and indicators of success, most significantly in quantitative 
terms (Hood, 1992). It is envisaged that accountability and efficiency would become evident 
where goals and objectives are clearly stated (Christensen, 2001; Lane, 2000). This compels 
universities to formulate strategic plans covering periods of 5 to 10 years with clear 
objectives that are measurable to guide their operations.  In some countries such as Namibia, 
Mozambique, South Africa and Ethiopia Universities as earlier observed in section 4.4.3 have 
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been forced by the State to develop strategic plans as a regulatory requirement (Saint, 2009). 
The idea in UNIMA though was that Central Office would come up with pillars drawn from 
the National Education Sector Plan which would form University wide policy plans and 
objectives. Colleges would in turn develop their sector plans aimed at achieving the 
University’s objectives.  
 
From my findings (Figure 6.2), deconcentration, which in summary is what the above 
discussion has entailed, was found justifiable by the majority of the research participants. 
Similarly, most of these administrative measures that were proposed have been implemented. 
For example, according to the majority of the research participants, devolution of managerial 
decision-making was successfully implemented because Central Office was pressurised by 
both the Council and faculties and departments to take that route. It can also be deduced that 
with the advent of democracy it was extremely difficult that Central Office could justify most 
of the decision-making powers it held. It should be recalled from the findings presented in 
Chapter Five that it was the one party political system of governance that systematized 
centralization at T1. While this was possible then, with changes in systems of governance at 
the macro-level in 199412 such systematization was hard to sustain, particularly when the 
composition of corporate agency in the Council went through morphogenesis. Besides, 
according to RP1 and RP5 faculty were increasingly demanding openness and accountability 
in the way Central Office was managing its affairs so that holding onto more power at the 
centre was becoming unsustainable. In addition, RP5 indicated that devolution was enabled 
by adequate consultations and good communication that preceded its implementation. He 
also recalled that before the devolution of administrative and financial functions, college 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12	  Malawi abandoned the one-party system of governance in 1992 following a referendum and adopted the 
multi-party system of government. This change heralded the proliferation of new political parties in the country 
and political freedom. The Malawi Congress Party lost the elections that were held later in 1994 to the United 
Democratic Party.   
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managers were called to several meetings with senior managers at central office where they 
were briefed as to what exactly the devolution was about. This was followed by a 
Memorandum from the University Registrar outlining in detail those activities which were to 
be devolved. RP7 underscored this point quite succinctly when he argued that: ‘before you 
decentralize, make sure that the people who will be delegated to do that job are properly 
prepared because you don’t delegate a thing to a person who is not prepared.’ RP5 explained 
that devolution of managerial decision-making was also successful because it was attractive 
to colleges as it gave them the platform to take charge of their affairs.  
 
The reforms were found attractive particularly to College Principals who were the agents in 
the Council pushing for this change. To understand this one needs to recall the background of 
the University’s governance context at T1 as described in Chapter Five. Given the 
systemization that was there before the reforms, which subordinated most University agents, 
measures introduced to ameliorate them from such a constraining situation would certainly 
have been welcomed. Furthermore, from a morphogenetic perspective, the introduction of 
contingent compatibilities which align with the vested interests of agents create a situational 
logic of opportunism (Archer, 1995:226). In the context of this study, in the pre-reform 
period, decision-making was the preserve of few senior managers in the University. With the 
devolution of decision-making authority it meant that decisions would now be made within 
faculties and departments, hence the attractiveness of devolution.  
 
Similarly, UNIMA complied with the Council directive to develop a strategic plan. This was 
done in 2004 when a plan was designed to run from 2004 to 2009. Information sourced from 
the Central Office (D25) revealed that this plan was not however successfully implemented 
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because of the lack of an implementation strategy as well as inadequate funding to finance 
some of the strategies outlined in the plan. RP8 observed that the plan was too ambitious.  
 
RP8 explained that another strategic plan was developed in 2012 that built on the strength 
and weaknesses of the previous strategic plan. This plan has a five year implementation phase 
(2012 – 2017). Documents RD 25 indicates that the UNIMA Council has prioritised areas 
that it plans to focus upon. According to documents RD 25 Council has requested the 
University’s management to follow suit by identifying areas they plan to implement in the 
short to medium term.  It would appear that there are strong indications that the Council is 
poised to see this plan implemented. It is not known however whether this shall succeed as 
the problem of inadequate finances seems to continue and the membership of Council 
changes every two years.  
 
Furthermore, Senate powers are yet to be devolved. This reform measure, I was told, is 
awaiting the amendment of the UNIMA Act. The amendment to the Act which was done in 
1998 did not include provision for changes likely to enable Senate to be devolved to colleges. 
There are strong indications that once the enabling legislation is amended, this reform 
measure will be implemented. However, in my view once this is done, this might signal the 
disintegration of UNIMA into separate independent Universities as the College Senates 
(Academic Boards) is a significant embodiment of self-governance. At the moment, the 
existence of one UNIMA Senate, seems to serve as the main uniting mechanism for the 
University. Without it, the situation might be different. However, it would be necessary in 
future, once the Act is revised to enable the creation of academic boards, to test the above 
hypothesis. 
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There were other related measures that were designed to restructure governance at 
institutional level mentioned in the MIM Report (1997) that Council adopted such as 
recommending that the Vice Chancellor assume the role of the Chief Executive; the creation 
of a new position of the Deputy Vice Chancellor; devolving the responsibilities for managing 
research centres from the Central Office to faculties. However, these reforms were not easily 
recalled by the Research participants or where they were recalled they were only mentioned 
by a single participant. I did not therefore interrogate these any further. However, it should be 
noted that similar reforms are central to New Public Management ideologies. As with all the 
reforms outlined thus far in this chapter, there is the potential for both intended and 
unintended consequences and for ambiguity in understanding what these reforms indicate in 
terms of governance models. The designation of the Vice-Chancellor to ‘Chief Executive’, 
for example, can be interpreted either as a move away from the previous state-centric model 
of governance to a scenario where UNIMA was to gain more control over its own governance 
or could be seen to be a move towards a corporate model of governance in which the values 
of industry are imported into the academy. 
 
From the above presentation it can be observed that reform measures planned at the 
institutional level of governance in the UNIMA were both structural and cultural and with 
implications on agency in their implementation. They were structural because the reform 
measures proposed fundamental reconfiguration of power relations between central office 
and faculties and academic departments whereby the former was shedding some powers and 
transferring these to colleges. The reforms were cultural in the sense that the changes in the 
power relations mentioned above impacted on the way of doing business in the University. 
For example, it meant that matters that previously would be referred to the Central Office 
were to be handled in the periphery which involved changing the mind-set of the stakeholders 
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in the UNIMA. Cultural systems are doctrines, theories, beliefs and ideas that define what is 
possible and not possible in a social system.  It is also about how things ought to be done in 
society (Giddens, 1979; Archer, 1995, 2003a).  Furthermore, all the above proposed changes 
in structure and culture affected and were also to be effected by agency through their 
mediatory role. Emergent from these changes were consequences for governance practices, 
some intended as described above and others unintended as shall be presented in Chapter 
Seven.  
 
The third reform measure that had a significant presence in the interviews with my research 
participants and impacting specifically on structure, culture and agency at enterprise level is 
the merger of faculties and academic departments. The merger of faculties was an important 
governance reform measure that was agreed upon by the Council in 1997 as Table 6.1 can 
show.  
 
According to the MIM Report (1997) which informed the Council’s decision in this respect, 
merging of faculties and academic departments involved undertaking the following academic 
restructuring measures: Firstly, it was decided that diploma programmes should be phased 
out. It was observed that most of the various degree programmes in the University were of 
four-year duration but diploma programmes were of three-year duration. Council felt that it 
would be cost effective to phase out the diplomas and allow students to stay one more year 
and get a degree. In this way, there would be value for money spent as a degree carries more 
currency than a diploma. Additionally, the phasing out of diploma programmes would mean 
that entire academic departments that were servicing diploma programmes only would 
dissolve and the staff members concerned be integrated into other academic departments 
where their services would be utilised efficiently.  
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Secondly, the Council also decided that those degree programmes that were not popular 
based on enrolment figures should be phased out as well. Thirdly, the Council further decided 
that all academic programmes should be rationalized to minimise programme duplication and 
wastages. This also involved shifting courses from one department to another (MIM Report, 
1997). For example, Chancellor College had language and literature courses taught by four 
different departments: English, French, Chichewa and Linguistics, and the department of 
Classics. It had been observed by the MIM consultants that lecturers in these departments 
when called upon to teach in another department were only willing to do so if engaged on 
part-time staff basis and with an extra remuneration. This was proving costly and wasteful. 
Besides, the presence of many small departments created a situation where there were more 
heads of department and since the headship role attracted extra compensation, it meant that 
this arrangement was also costly to the University (MIM Report, 1997). The Council agreed 
to require the college concerned to carry out a restructuring process. In the case of Chancellor 
College the expectation was that all the language courses and literature courses would be 
housed in two departments (MIM Report, 1997). In this way, the duplication of courses 
would be eliminated and there would be a more focussed approach to delivery of 
programmes as academic departments would benefit from synergies arising from pulling 
together of expertise within the same fields.  
 
Fourthly, the Council agreed that there should be a broad assessment of appropriate 
student/staff ratios with a view to coming up with an appropriate cost-effective ratio (MIM 
Report, 1997). Accompanying this reform measure was a decision to freeze all positions 
found in excess after an appropriate staff-students ratio was agreed upon.  
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Fifthly, the Council decided that some programmes should share resources. For example, the 
Home Economics Department at Chancellor College was asked to share its human resources 
with the Department of Nutrition at Bunda College because the two departments were 
perceived to be offering programmes that had many similarities. In addition, Council 
resolved that the Law Faculty at Chancellor College should move to become a faculty at the 
Polytechnic to enable it to service the Faculty of Commerce which was also offering law 
courses so that its expertise should equally benefit that faculty. Kamuzu College of Nursing 
which had one faculty but two campuses: one in Blantyre and another in Lilongwe, was 
asked to close its Blantyre campus to minimise administrative cost overheads (MIM Report, 
1997). 
 
Of interest in all these measures is the ideology that seemed to have influenced these reform 
measures. It is evident to me from the literature review that underlining all the above reforms 
was again the NPM principle of greater prominence placed on control in resource utilization 
(Hood, 1992). Public institutions that reflect this reform principle have adopted strategies 
aimed at efficient utilisation of available resources (Hood, 1992). Among the measures 
adopted in universities under this ideology are the restructuring of academic programmes of 
the nature described above. However, such restructuring has also been described as eroding 
the character of public higher education by moving universities away from being social 
institutions concerned with knowledge generation as an end in itself towards treating 
universities as an industry (Giroux,2002; Mok, 2002; Lynch, 2006). Besides, this sort of 
restructuring has also the potential of infringing on vested interests in academic freedom. 
 
There was mixed reaction from the research participants regarding whether these reform 
measures were successful or not. For example, RP3 confirmed that at her college two 
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departments were successfully merged. RP5 claimed that at another college restructuring of 
departments took place as a result of these reforms. RP7 confirmed that the process of 
merging departments commenced at yet another college amidst a lot of resistance from 
faculty members. While some departmental mergers did occur, in other colleges where 
restructuring was recommended the original departmental structures have remained intact.  
 
When asked as to why there were positive changes in their respective colleges both RP3 and 
RP5 attributed the success to the approach their college management had taken in mediating 
the reforms. The decision was left to faculties and academic departments and as such, it was 
easy for them to agree and implement the Council’s decision.  According to RP1, the Home 
Economics Department at Chancellor College refused to share its human resources with the 
Department of Nutrition at Bunda College; the Law Faculty at Chancellor College refused to 
move to Blantyre and Kamuzu College of Nursing refused to close its campus in Blantyre. 
RP1 attributed this development to ‘stubbornness’ on the part of some faculties and academic 
departments:  
 
the colleges felt too big to respect what their Council had told them they thought they knew 
better when in actual fact in as far as governance is concerned it should have been Council 
determining the priorities for the rest of the University to follow because Council has a larger 
picture of what it wants to achieve, that was not done.     
          (RP1) 
 
RP7 felt that mergers of departments were not successfully implemented at her college owing 
to the strong agency in academic hegemony that most faculty members exhibited. ‘…there is 
always as they say in governance, ethnic hedging, this is my territory, you can’t move me 
around’ (RP7). She further attributed the failure of departmental mergers to a lack of agency 
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for change management at the senior leadership level in the University. RP7 believed 
strongly that decisions such as these required University management to engage faculty on a 
face-to-face basis to explain things and respond to questions for clarification rather than 
expect to achieve success through memos. Referring to University management, RP7 stated 
that: 
 
When the University is bringing in a change, don’t leave it to the Principal, otherwise people 
think, they now blame the Principal but you are the bosses right, so come down and explain, 
this policy… engage staff, they will ask you questions but in the end, they will be satisfied as 
long as the principle is good.  
 
RP7 cited a process in her department that led to the successful creation of a new department. 
She said first it took long to have the department created because of the manner in which 
college management was approaching the issue. However, when a new Principal came in, he 
sat down and discussed the merits and demerits of the proposed creation of the new 
department with faculty members and this worked, indicating that change was possible after 
direct persuasion.  
 
Council also agreed that deans should assume executive leadership positions. According to 
the MIM Report (1997) which informed the Council’s decision, it was agreed that 
appointment of deans should cease from being done at faculty level. As explained in Chapter 
Five, at T1, the dean was elected by the faculty members from among the faculty members 
by themselves. It was agreed by the Council that this practice must change. Positions of 
deans, when they became vacant should be advertised and interested candidates undergo an 
interview to be conducted by the College’s Staff Appointments’ Committee, which was 
dominated by the executive rather than faculty members and chaired by the Principal of the 
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college. Recommendations from this committee were to be submitted to the Vice-Chancellor 
who would make such an appointment. The appointment was to be on performance related 
four-year contract basis, renewable based on satisfactory performance to be determined by 
the Vice-Chancellor on the recommendation of the College Principal (MIM Report, 1997). 
The appointment was to be accompanied by an ‘appropriate remuneration package’.  
 
This reform measure is closely aligned to NPM principles which advocate that public 
universities just like any public organizations can be run in the same way as private sector 
organizations are run based on market imperatives including borrowing terms applicable in 
industry such as ‘executive’ (Mok, 2002; Lynch, 2006). But reforms of this nature have been 
criticized as contradicting the demands of the type of leadership the academy respects. In a 
study conducted by Harman (2002) regarding academics assuming managerial leadership 
roles, he established an observable pattern which indicated that many academics disliked the 
managerial roles which they had assumed because they were being done at the expense of 
their academic work. In fact, Harman (2002) observed that fewer publications were coming 
from academics in managerial positions when compared to those who were not. Furthermore, 
Harman (2002) observed that a social relations rift was emerging between academics who 
were serving in managerial positions and the rest of the faculty members, as the governance 
model shifted from a collegial one to a corporate one. Academic managers were being 
associated more with senior management than their colleagues and hence creating tensions in 
faculty and academic departments.  
 
The decision to make deans executive received mixed reactions according to my Research 
participants. RP1 justified the Council’s decision of making deans executive managers thus: 
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I think the introduction of executive deans and executive heads of department is a must and it 
was a very good decision done in good faith and if it had been implemented I think could have 
improved the situation in the UNIMA. I am saying that because if the University of Malawi 
does not respect its procedures, system processes and so on it is largely because it has what I 
may call reluctant managers in the form of HoDs, in form of deans who do not want to take the 
difficult decisions that are expected of managers in an environment of financial austerity. You 
know when you have limited money thus the more reason we need to have managers who 
should be able to know what to say ‘Yes’ to and what to say ‘No’ to.  But the majority of 
managers that are around in the University now do not have that kind of attitude…  
           
RP7 justified the need to make deans executive by arguing that: 
 
I am for executive deanship, the reason why for executive deanship is that, the way things are 
now because we put each other in positions because of popularity context, the one who is 
popular, the one who will release us to do whatever we want, I can give an example that you 
find, I am Head of Department, a member of staff can go and teach at any University, can go 
wherever and I will have no idea, I don’t think that’s the way any institution should be run. So 
we should have at least a system where you know where your member of staff is, if they apply 
for holiday, that should be known and I thought the executive deanship or even headship brings 
that to the fore, people think they can go, get away with any, we are free range, can I say that! 
We are free range lecturers and I think it’s only this University that has that kind of system…  
 
Similar sentiments were also expressed by RP3 in support of executive deanship when she 
argued that: 
 
…currently in the University of Malawi people can vote for anybody into that leadership 
position not necessarily because the person is capable but they know that they will get what 
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they want and in my own College what I have experienced over time is that many people want 
a weaker leader someone who will not caution them when they disappear on campus.   
 
It is important to note here that the sentiments described above were shared by the research 
participants from both pools: policy formulators and policy implementers. To me the 
foregoing arguments, suggest that there is need in the UNIMA to have leaders at faculty and 
academic departmental level who have the leadership agency that exudes executive power. In 
the literature I consulted however, having a leader emerge from the peers is ideal. The 
selection of the dean in this perspective is on the basis of their academic credibility and the 
support for the dean is on the basis of him or her being the first among equals. The collegial 
governance assumes compatibility between the various structures, cultures and agents 
(Archer 1995). However, where there are incompatibilities, as seems to be the case in 
UNIMA, then the model of the dean being elected from within the peer group becomes 
problematic.       
 
I noted from reviewing a memo that academic staff members from one of the constituent 
colleges had written to the Vice-Chancellor dated 11th December, 2012 (RD28) that such 
apprehension regarding making deans executive was gaining currency among union members 
in the University during what became known as ‘the academic freedom fight’ in 2012. 
During this period two of UNIMA’s colleges were closed as a result of staff protests over one 
academic staff member who was summoned and questioned by the police over allegations 
that he had given an example in his class which was viewed by the ‘authorities’ to be a 
security threat to the country. The academic staff members protested and demanded an 
apology and a commitment from the then Head of State not to tamper with academic 
freedom. When this was not forthcoming staff members engaged themselves in a protracted 
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industrial action in the form of stopping teaching for over six months which greatly affected 
the academic calendar of the University.  
 
The memo of 11th December, 2012 that emanated from the staff union after this event 
revealed that union members were opposed to making deans executive managers. In the 
memo the union members indicated that making deans executive would further undermine 
their academic freedom as the deans would cease to owe allegiance to the faculty and the 
academic project and instead owe allegiance to the appointing authority. Hence, they rejected 
this move strongly.  
 
From a morphogenetic perspective, these variations in opinion regarding making deans 
executive reflect the directional guidance vested interests that agency provides in determining 
the course of events in an institution. According to Archer (2003:264), ‘Frustration and 
gratiﬁcation are therefore the basic aﬀective responses to constraints and enablements’. Here, 
there was an attempt by the Council to change the structure of governance in the University 
by increasing the size of corporate agency through incorporating new members in the form of 
Executive Deans. It will be noted that the research participants who agreed with making 
deans executive viewed this move as a contingent compatibility to the existing structures of 
governance in the University as it offered an opportunity to increase the influential members 
of the corporate agency in the University. According to Archer (1995; 2003b), increasing the 
members of the corporate agency by reducing the size of primary agency can catalyse 
change. On the contrary, academic staff union members, including one of the research 
participants I interviewed, viewed executive deanship as a contingent incompatibility, an 
affront to academic freedom which is the vested interest of the majority of the academic staff 
members. Hence, this reform measure was vigorously fought and has not been implemented. 
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Based on the above findings it appears that the implementation of the Council’s decisions to 
make deans executive has failed to materialise mainly because of strong agency in academic 
freedom exhibited by academic members of staff in the UNIMA. This is the scenario Bercher 
and Trowler (2001) described as ‘territorial hegemony’.  
 
One would be tempted to conclude here that the decision to make deans of faculty assume 
executive powers was premised on the social realist belief that agency is a catalyst for change 
management. This reform measure, as can be observed, was intended to catalyse a corporate 
governance culture in faculties and academic departments. By placing executive authority in 
the hands of the dean it was expected that she/he would be more accountable to the executive 
management rather that faculty members. It is a reform measure that is in line with the NPM 
principle of hands-on professional management, which implies that if accountability is to be 
achieved, responsibility for action should be given to the one on top rather than having it 
diffused. This could explain why in UNIMA, this decision by the Council was not supported 
by the majority of the academic members of staff who were not in leadership positions.  
 
However, according to the research participants both the merger of departments and making 
deans assume executive leaders failed to succeed as planned because of weak agency in 
change management at the senior leadership level in the University. For example, RP1; RP5 
and RP8 argued that these reforms would have succeeded if the top leadership in the 
University had developed an implementation strategy. RP3 and RP7 felt that leadership at the 
Central Office failed to communicate effectively, hence the failure to implement these 
reforms. RP6 was categorical when he put the blame on the office of the Vice-Chancellors 
for failing to own the reform measures. 
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6.3 Conclusion 
In this chapter I have presented my findings regarding how UNIMA actors responded to the 
constraining governance context they faced before 1997. I have described the reform 
measures that were agreed upon by the Council. I have argued that these governance reform 
measures, which had implications on agency, were intended to shape the governance 
structure and culture in the University at system, institutional and at faculty and academic 
departmental level in some manner desired by the corporate agency that introduced them. I 
have also demonstrated that the majority of these reform measures were influenced by the 
NPM ideology.  
 
From these findings therefore, I argued that the reform measures were meant to infuse a 
corporate culture of governance in the University. I must stress though that from the Social 
Realist perspective guiding this research work, the infusion of new structures, ideas and 
changing the composition and roles of agents as done in UNIMA through the governance 
reforms does not always bring about the intended changes. There are bound to be some 
unintended/emergent outcomes. This is the case because structures and cultures have the 
tendency to behave independent of each other during the process of their interactions as 
mediated by agency. Emergent from such interactions are properties that sometimes are 
completely out of synchrony with the intentions of the corporate agents (Archer, 1995). 
Could this have happened in the UNIMA as well? This is the question I interrogate in 
Chapter Seven that follows.  
	  208	  
	  
 
Chapter 7  
THE ELABORATION OF UNIMA GOVERNANCE SYSTEMS?  
7.0 Introduction 
In Chapter Five I concluded that the reforms in UNIMA were implemented in response to a 
financial crisis and a constraining governance context. The reforms were to be achieved 
ostensibly through the introduction of what I have established to be corporate governance 
practices under the auspices of the New Public Management ideologies. In Chapter Six I 
presented some of these reform measures that were proposed and demonstrated that they 
were intended to impact on structure, agency and culture in the University’s governance 
context. I also described the reform measures that were eventually implemented and those 
that have not been implemented. As Archer (1995) has argued, structure and culture tend to 
exhibit relative autonomy in the manner in which they behave and this impacts on the 
projects of agency differently. While structures and culture can enable the realization of the 
projects of agents, in some respects structures and culture can also impinge on agency’s 
intentions.  
 
As noted in Chapter Five, the intention of the University Council in introducing governance 
reforms in 1997 was to change the University’s governance structures and culture in order to 
attain efficiency and effectiveness in the University’s governance. Archer (1995) theorised 
that unintended consequences would have occurred as well in pursuit of this change. This 
chapter is therefore aimed at locating whether there were any unintended practices (emergent 
governance practices) that emerged from the implementation of governance reforms in the 
University of Malawi and their enabling and constraining mechanisms.  
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The chapter is subdivided into three sections. Section 7.1 describes the emergent governance 
practice in the University period after the implementation of the governance reforms in the 
University. This section in a way is a continuation of the presentations regarding my findings 
at T2 – T3 of the University governance context started in Chapter Six. In section 7.2 I 
analyse the enablements and the constraints of governance practice in the period under 
review. In section 7.3 I present the overall context of governance practice in UNIMA at the 
time and space when this study was being carried out. I conclude this chapter by presenting 
my interpretation of the above findings and what it means in regard to the governance context 
in UNIMA in 2013 – that is the governance context at T4.  
 
7.1 The emergent governance practices in UNIMA  
As can be recalled from section 2.2.2  of Chapter Two, emergent properties are by definition 
‘supervenient’ properties with irreducible causal powers (Corning, 2002). By irreducible it is 
meant that emergent properties are objects whose powers depend on their underlying bases 
and are autonomous and yet have irreducible causal powers which give them their novel 
ontological form - that is, features not previously observed in the system. This further means 
that while the emergent properties can be traced to their originating components, they have 
unique features and are out of synchrony with their originating bases.  
 
In the context of this study the infusion of new governance structures and cultures in the 
University were intended to bring about some desired governance practices that would enable 
the University to attain its objective of improving efficiency and effectiveness in service 
delivery and hence increasing productivity through increased intake of students, for example. 
While this was the case, it is acknowledged here that there were other governance practices 
that have emerged in the University which were not the intentions of the reformers. These are 
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novel governance practices precipitated by the governance reforms introduced in 1997 but 
which are out of synchrony with the original intentions of the corporate agents who 
introduced the University governance reforms. I present them in sequence based on the levels 
of governance they were observed after the analysis of the data. However, it is the emergent 
governance practices at the enterprise level which I discuss in greater depth consistent with 
the objective of this study. 
 
7.1.1 Governance at system level (Government machinery) 
My findings have revealed that systematization at systems level of UNIMA governance has 
intensified after the implementation of governance reforms. As can be recalled from section 
5.1 of Chapter Five, governance practices in the period before 1997 at systems level were 
characterised by the concentration of decision-making powers in the hands of a limited 
corporate agents. The profile of these corporate agents led to the characterisation of UNIMA 
in the interviews as being more of a Government department than an autonomous institution. 
As noted in Chapter Six, the reforms introduced at systems level were meant to ensure that 
decision-making at this level was streamlined through having a separate structure that would 
be responsible for supervising the University from a distance while allowing the University 
the freedom to carry out its mandated functions alone.   
 
However, the results have not all been as intended. For example, the Ministry of Education 
has strengthened its oversight role in the University’s governance and management affairs 
rather than facilitating the devolution of decision-making powers as intended. RD16, RD17, 
RD18 all indicate that the Ministry of Education continues to take an interest in the 
appointment of the Vice-Chancellor; has influence as to who is to be appointed to the 
UNIMA Council; directs the admission policy; directs matters to do with staff remunerations; 
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and directly intervenes in both student and staff disputes. For example, in 2010 when the 
UNIMA Council increased students’ tuition fees for its undergraduate students, the Ministry 
of Education wrote to the Vice-Chancellor to suspend the decision. In the same year, the 
Ministry directed UNIMA to establish degree and technician courses in mining engineering. 
It also directed UNIMA to carry out a curriculum review of its Geology degree programme 
according to information in (RD18). More recently, in 2013 the Ministry of Education 
queried the poor examination results in the University and demanded a report.  
  
More seriously, I have observed that the Department of Statutory Corporations, a 
Government department that oversees the affairs of all State owned companies in Malawi, 
had significant influence in the governance of the University. While the role of the Ministry 
of Education in the University governance can be understood, being the responsible Ministry 
for Higher Education in the country to which the University ought to report, it is surprising to 
note why the Department of Statutory Corporations has taken an interest in determining 
governance practices in the University when they do not appear anywhere in the enabling 
Act. I observed in RD16, RD17 and RD18 at the Central Office that between 2012 and 2013 
the Department of Statutory Corporations had issued numerous circulars to the University 
directing it on what to do on a number of administrative matters.  
 
For example, in one circular the department instructed the University not to allow its 
members of staff to accumulate leave days (RD17), effectively forcing all the University staff 
members to go for mandatory annual leave. All University staff members have a prescribed 
number of leave days they must take per year. However, because the University had a 
number of closures occasioned by both staff and students disputes, the academic calendar has 
not been stable. This has affected the time staff members can go on annual leave and resulted 
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in the accumulation of annual leave days. While the directive about forgoing such leave 
makes economic sense, the manner in which this was done and the corporate agency involved 
in making such decision is an issue here because the University has its governing council 
which should have been the one to take such decision.  
 
Furthermore, another circular from the same department in RD17 outlines the procedures 
University staff members should follow when proceeding on external trips such as 
conferences and workshops. In yet another circular, RD18, the department is determining 
salary increase levels for University staff members. These decisions imposed on the 
University by the Department of Statutory Corporations are outside of its mandate as the 
University Act empowers the Council to make such decisions.  
 
It is thus unsurprising that one of the Vice-Chancellors of the University between 2009 and 
2013 openly criticised Government agents for interfering too much in the day to day 
governance and management affairs of the University in his speech at the 61st UNIMA 
graduation ceremony held on 20th November, 2013:  
 
Why do some Government departments give directives to public universities instead of giving 
advice and guidance through the Council? Is it possible that Government does not understand 
how the University is supposed to be managed, or Government simply chooses to cross the 
line as it wishes? Whatever reasons might be given by Government, their actions impact 
negatively on the operations of the University, because people start asking questions as to 
who is responsible for what. Such questions result in answers that bring about confusion in 
the University. 
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It can be recalled that similar sentiments were expressed by UNIMA’s first Vice-Chancellor 
in 1978 (See section 5.2 of Chapter Five). Examining the period between 1978 when these 
sentiments were first made and 2013 when almost the same words are repeated by a Vice-
Chancellor creates an impression that State control has further been enhanced in the 
governance context of UNIMA period after the reforms were implemented rather than being 
minimised by the reform measures. Graham (2005:19) has argued that: ‘If Universities are 
institutions of consequence, they must expect Government interference; freedom from such 
interference means that they are of no consequence.’ Meaning Government interference 
should be construed as normal. But the interference Graham (2005) referred to was not of the 
nature and degree described here. Graham (2005) was referring to positive interference where 
the government has an intention of steering the University to meet specific national 
objectives. It can be concluded therefore that much as the Government adopted some of the 
governance reform measures the University had proposed targeted at the macro level as 
discussed in Chapter Six, the consequence of such adoption on UNIMA governance so far 
has largely led to enhanced systemization at the top level of leadership in UNIMA 
governance contrary to what the MIM Report had intended should be achieved. That is to 
say, there has been systematic regeneration in the governance context of the University which 
is out of synchrony with the original intentions of the reformers. As can be recalled from 
Chapter Three, section 4.3.4 critics of the corporate model have argued that rather than 
limiting the role of the State in the governance of higher education institutions, corporate 
governance enhances it (Shore, 2010). This finding therefore agrees with similar findings 
reported in literature regarding what happens when properties of the corporate model of 
governance are introduced in a governance system.  
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Overall, the emergent UNIMA governance to date shows a high level of systematization 
characteristic of the state-centric model described in section 4.3.2 of Chapter Four. In this 
model, the State exerts great control over higher education systems through its education 
ministries (Clark, 1983; Neave & van Vught, 1994; George, 2006).  
 
In addition, the recommendations the Council adopted regarding the Chancellor of UNIMA 
not being a Head of State has not been adhered to by Government as noted in section 6.1.1, 
implying that political interference in the University’s governance remains. In the state-
centric governance model, the Head of State is the Chancellor of the University or is 
responsible for the appointment of the University Vice-Chancellor and members of the 
University governing councils including its Chairperson (Saint, 2009). Such appointments, 
according to Aina (2009), pose serious challenges in the relationship between the State and 
higher education institutions and has been observed to have significant implications on 
University autonomy (Aina, 2009). This continues to be the case in UNIMA in 2013. This 
explains why in UNIMA, as shall be shown in section 7.1.2 below, there are complaints 
levelled at the institutional level of governance that it is not acting in consonance with the 
wave of change.  
 
7.1.2 Governance at institutional and enterprise level  
At the institutional level, there is continued inclination toward business as usual in the wake 
of the devolution of decision-making to colleges. While a lot of Central Office governance 
powers have been devolved to colleges, the UNIMA Act as an overarching governance 
structure has not been amended, implying that the infusion of corporate governance ideas 
emerging from the reforms that have so far been implemented are taking place amidst a 
situation of morphostasis in the structural domain of the University’ institutional governance 
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level and this has had unintended consequences in the University’s governance as shall be 
shown in the subsections that follow.  
 
In addition, the research participants were in agreement that the Central Office continues to 
operate as if it has not devolved its decision-making powers. Emergent from this situation is, 
as RP4 observed, resentment from faculties and academic departments against Central Office 
to the extent that the relationship that is there is characterised by tension. RP4 further stated 
that every time there is a memo originating from the Central Office, staff members react 
angrily to it. 
 
At enterprise level, some departments have seized the opportunity offered through devolution 
of decision-making to colleges to go ahead and implement decisions they feel fit even though 
the devolution in decision-making has not necessarily empowered them to go that far. For 
example, RP1 reported that at the Polytechnic, an academic department, using the new 
powers gained as a result of the devolution, introduced new allowances based on their own 
generated income for their staff members. However, since the University Act has not 
changed, faculties and academic departments are not empowered to take such decisions.  
This, based on the analysis done, has resulted in academic departments being on a collision 
course with the Council.  
 
Data further revealed that much as UNIMA was one institution, operational practices differ in 
almost all academic departments at enterprise level, underscoring that there is morphogenesis 
of structure in faculties and departments. RP1 and RP8 attributed this scenario to the lack of a 
universal implementation plan (structure) for the reforms that were implemented. To me 
these however, according to the morphogenetic theory, are emergent governance practices 
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arising as unintended consequences of the reforms. It appears that the devolution of power 
from the centre to colleges did not mean that each unit should govern itself the way it felt fit. 
However, emergent from this are differing governance practices being experienced in the 
University. For example, RP4 informed me that at the Polytechnic, faculties started admitting 
dependents of members of staff into their undergraduate programmes free of charge, that is, 
they were not required to pay any tuition fees. The University’s undergraduate admission is 
centralized. Therefore, the admission of staff dependents practiced by faculties at the 
Polytechnic was at variance with acceptable institutional practices and was unique to 
faculties at the Polytechnic because it was not reported elsewhere in the University. 
Interestingly, executive management responded positively to this development. The Central 
Office intervened by temporarily stopping the practice while pursuing with the Council to 
have the practice formalised and applied uniformly in the entire UNIMA system. This 
showed that although the Central Office held to the principle of a uniform administrative 
system, suggesting morphostasis, it was willing to propose change where and when cultural 
agency at institutional level found the reforms to be compatible. The pursuit of a uniform 
administrative system here suggests a reluctant morphogenesis. Archer (1995) has argued 
that where there is disjunction between structural morphostasis and cultural morphogenesis, 
differentiation is observed in the structural domain.  
 
A close scrutiny of the system of job descriptions which came into effect in 2007, 
corroborated by some of the research participants I interviewed, showed that in addition to 
what heads of department were asked to be responsible for, some started mobilizing teaching 
resources through other income generating activities and departmental projects which was a 
departure from the expectation but, in my view, in a positive way. RP3 indicated that in her 
College devolution in decision-making enabled academic departments to help in broadening 
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the College’s financial base. Academic departments were, through their own initiative 
winning research grants which resulted in financial in-flows into the College. Unlike at other 
colleges, where resources brought in this manner were personalized, at Kamuzu College of 
Nursing such resources were pooled together and managed by the College administration. As 
a result of this, the College managed to build new classrooms and expanded the cafeteria 
without relying on Government financing. The College had also acquired new vehicles. It 
would seem that a shared culture and strong agency in College management enabled the 
emergence of this outcome. 
 
As a result of devolution, some heads of academic departments were cultivating a research 
and consultancy culture within their respective departments, a practice that was not envisaged 
by the reformers. Some departments were sourcing funds for postgraduate training of their 
junior colleagues on their own. These were activities that previously were centralized and 
performed by the University Research Coordinator through faculty deans. As Archer (1995) 
has argued, as more materials are provided at the disposal of primary agents, there is 
disruption in the social relations which creates cleavages as new corporate agents develop. 
What is happening among faculty staff members now is that as a result of devolution, talent 
has been unlocked in UNIMA to the extent that some active departments are able to generate 
a lot of financial resources. Faculty members therefore rather than looking to the Central 
Office for material support, have started looking inwards to their respective departments for 
financial help to attend external conference or short-term training (RP4). The implication of 
this is that more and more corporate agency is emerging thereby transforming the landscape 
of the University’s governance. 
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Furthermore, in their revised job descriptions implemented by executive management, deans 
are required to provide leadership in departments that fall under their jurisdiction. However, 
according to RP4, sometimes a head is more powerful than the dean. The deans’ office had 
no budget and this meant that every time the office of dean needed materials for the office 
such as stationery the dean had to get these either from the administration or from their 
respective heads of department. So, rather than strengthening faculties, it would appear that 
in some instances the reforms have weakened faculty leadership’s role while strengthening 
that of the department. 
 
Added to this, it was reported that the empowering of academic heads of departments has at 
times compromised standards as well.  The objective of the reforms was to enhance 
‘efficiency and effectiveness in service delivery’ which included teaching and learning. RP1 
complained that with devolution, staff members being recruited now are not going through a 
rigorous selection process as was the case in the past when recruitment was centralised. It 
was also reported by RP1 that some staff members were being recruited on a patronage basis. 
It was difficult though to establish the authenticity of these claims during the study. But this 
might be an interesting subject for further research. If there is any truth to this assertion one 
may conclude that the quality of University education service delivery is now under greater 
threat than was the case before these governance reforms were initiated. What appears to 
emerge is that colleges are increasingly taking control of their destiny than before the reforms 
but possibly at the expense of senior leadership roles and to the detriment of quality.  
 
What was equally interesting to discern from the data is how the morphogenesis of culture 
was occurring in colleges. RP4 and RP6, from two separate colleges, concurred that 
academic departments embraced governance practices which involved everybody in decision-
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making. RP4 and RP6 informed me that for an academic department or faculty to make a 
decision, the head or dean has first to lobby all staff members in their respective faculty or 
department. The dean or head did not have to invite the staff members to their offices but 
they visited each of the staff members in their respective offices and presented their proposals 
to them. Thereafter, the matter was tabled before the whole academic departmental meeting 
or faculty. By this time, there was already buy-in by the majority of the academic staff 
members, such that, decision-making was quick and progressive. However, when one 
imagines the amount of time invested by the head in order to attain consensus in decision-
making as described in the foregoing, it is equally debatable whether this is an efficient way 
of improving productivity. 
 
Another notable cultural elaboration experienced by some respondents is that after the 
implementation of the reforms the strong sense of professional hierarchy previously 
experienced has severely been weakened within departments in favour of collegiality (RP6). 
In academic departments all staff members are treated professionally as equals and members 
of staff in the department call each other by first names a social norm that was not the case 
before (RP6). Furthermore, when it came to material resources at the disposal of the 
department, there was a lot of transparency in the manner in which these were managed and 
apportioned. Everybody knew what resources the department had. Staff members were free 
to go to the head of department’s office and requisition any materials, be it stationery or 
teaching aids such as LCD projectors through the departmental secretary. As a result of this, 
RP6 informed me that he had experienced reduced abuse of resources in the department. The 
transparency generated a governance cultural transformation because everybody was careful 
as to how they use the departmental resources because they knew what is available. In his 
further submission, research participant RP6 admitted that because of this governance 
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approach, there is a sense of ownership in this particular department and nobody polices 
anybody.  
 
In the governance reforms which were adopted, there was an agreement that there should not 
be duplication of degree programmes in the University. Contrary to this, I observed that there 
is a greater proliferation of degree programmes in the University now than existed before. 
Instead of faculties and departments complimenting one another as envisaged by the Council, 
it has been observed that there is now rigorous competition among faculties. For example, the 
Minutes of Senate (RD 12) revealed that Chancellor College and the Polytechnic had 
introduced similar postgraduate degree programmes in 2011. Attempts were made to 
harmonize both programmes so that the faculties concerned could jointly complement each 
other by letting students take some modules in one semester at a faculty in Chancellor 
College and the other modules at the Polytechnic. But Senate failed to resolve this problem. It 
was after protracted debate and revision of the curriculum that both programmes were 
eventually approved in 2012 as separate programmes to be offered by the two faculties. This 
suggests that there is still a lot of wastage in resource utilization contrary to what the reforms 
had envisioned and that in some cases the reforms have led to the kind of competitive culture 
expected in a corporate governance model. The above can be attributed to cultural 
elaboration that is espousing collegiality in UNIMA at enterprise level noted in the preceding 
section. 
 
Related to the above, RP4 reported that one of the service departments (service department in 
the sense that it did not offer a degree programme on its own but offered some prerequisite 
courses that complemented other degree programmes in the college) at the Polytechnic which 
was earmarked to be integrated into another department responded to this move by 
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introducing its own degree programme. This scenario reinforces Archer’s (2003) concept of 
reflexivity. This concept argues that agents have intelligence which allows them to make 
judgements. In constraining circumstances agents manifest behaviour that serves to extricate 
them from such situations. In this case when the department received the directive to dissolve 
and its functions to be absorbed by another department, they construed the directive as a 
contingent incompatibility. Contingent incompatibilities bring about the situational logic of 
opportunism (Archer, 1995). Rather than dissolving, the service department took this as an 
opportunity to become a full department offering its own degree programmes.  
 
The foregoing discussion demonstrates that faculties and academic departments have 
acquired more autonomy as a result of the devolution of power from the centre to colleges. It 
is important to recall that this is happening at a time when Government’s structures have 
intensified its oversight role over the University as noted in section 7.1.1. Because the Central 
government exercise its oversight roles through Central Office, what the findings reveal is 
that the more the systems level governance structures intensify their oversight role over the 
University, that is get elaborated, the more the governance context at institutional level 
(Central Office) appears to regenerate (morphostasis is observed). The above scenario is 
evidenced particularly when mirrored against the cultural elaboration being experienced in 
academic departments pressurising Central Office to transform. Emerging from the foregoing 
are growing disjunctions within the governance landscape of the University, a scenario that 
has been acknowledged by my research participants. For example, as noted earlier, the 
expectation of faculty is that the Central Office should not get involved in operational issues 
as these have been devolved to colleges. The Central Office should, going by the governance 
reforms adopted by the Council in 1997, only concern itself with policy direction. However, 
according to RP3 and RP5, the Central Office continues to take most decisions, including 
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some that were passed over to colleges, faculties and academic departments for 
implementation. According to RP5: ‘the university was supposed to be strategic and looking 
at policy … the university has in fact gone worse I think … it’s now thus looking at small 
small issues not looking at strategic issues … even much worse than before…’(RP5). 
 
According to RP4, this scenario is creating mistrust between the Central Office and colleges. 
Most of the research participants were of the view that the relationship between Central 
Office on one hand and faculties and academic departments on the other is characterized by 
mistrust. It can be concluded therefore that in as far as the University’ governance is 
concerned in the domain of the actual, there has been structural and cultural elaboration in the 
governance context at enterprise (college) level and a corresponding strong systematization at 
systems level with the Central Office, at institutional level of governance caught in the 
middle. This perhaps explains why Central Office’s leadership role is being questioned. The 
end result is that there is a disjunction emergent from the structural and cultural elaboration in 
the governance context of colleges and the structural and cultural regeneration at institutional 
level (Central Office). Similarly, as noted before, there are also disjunctions between 
structural elaboration at systems levels with the structural and cultural regeneration at 
institutional level (Central Office) of governance. According to Archer (1995) in situations of 
this nature, where there are contradictions between internally and necessarily related 
institutional structures, there are potential problems: ‘Structural contradictions represent 
obstructions to certain institutional operations and these translate themselves into problem-
ridden situations for the agents associated with them’ (Archer, 1995:230). This can explain 
why most respondents in this study have observed that there is tension in the University 
governance context, one that seems to threaten the unitary structure of UNIMA.  
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My interpretation of these findings is that the corporate governance model adopted by the 
University under the auspices of the New Public Management ideology has created 
contradictions in the University’s governance context. However, NPM ideology promotes 
devolution of powers with a lot of discretionary powers vested in the corporate agency 
coupled by intense surveillance exercised by the political authorities. This is the scenario that 
is emerging in higher education landscape in Malawi. These findings thus validate the 
criticism levelled against NPM ideology in the context of other studies that have been done in 
other sectors (Christensen & Leagreid, 2002). 
 
7.2 Views of stakeholders regarding governance reforms in UNIMA at T4  
Finally, I sought the views of my research participants regarding the current governance in 
UNIMA that is at T4. In addressing this question, my main aim was to discern through their 
responses, the enabling and constraining mechanism for governance reforms in the 
University. 
 
7.2.1  Agency in change management as a constraining and enabling mechanism of  
 governance reforms at institutional level  
 In their responses, most of the research participants were of the view that there is now need 
for strong leadership at the Central Office level. There is clear indication that if only the 
University had strong agency in change management at the higher levels of the institution, 
most of the reform measures that the Council had adopted would have been implemented 
successfully because they were good for the institution according to the research participants. 
This implies that strong agency in change management would be an enabling mechanism for 
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governance reforms in UNIMA. Corollary, where it is lacking, it becomes a constraining 
mechanism. 
 
7.2.2   Executive leadership as both a constraint and an enabling mechanism of  
 governance reforms at enterprise level  
The research respondents also went on to suggest that they want strong and empowered 
principals, registrars and finance officers at college level. They want principals and deans to 
exercise executive leadership and to use committee structures only as advisory bodies for 
taking decisions and not use them as decision-making bodies. This of course is in stark 
contrast to collegiality that is often associated at this level. However, it seems that the call for 
strong leadership at college management level is being advanced to wrestle power from the 
Central Office so that deans and heads of departments are equally empowered to take more 
responsibilities. This suggests a strong call for greater autonomy within the governance 
structures in colleges emerging from both academic and administrative managers in the 
University I interviewed. Evidence for this is my discovery that the majority of my research 
participants want the Central Office management to test faculty opinion at grass root level 
first before they introduce any future policy change. They also want to see that when the 
Central Office is introducing changes which affect faculties and academic departments, they 
should do so through Senate, implying, there is popular view in the University to see top 
leadership involving the majority of UNIMA stakeholders, particularly faculty in future 
decision-making processes. These respondents are not happy with just being consulted. They 
want to see faculty actively involved in the decision-making processes in the University. 
RP8, for example, stated that: 
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… when the University is bringing in a change, don’t leave it to the Principal, otherwise 
people think, they now blame the Principal but you are the bosses right, so come down and 
explain … engage staff, they will ask you questions but in the end, they will be satisfied as 
long as the principle is good.  That’s the way because to be honest with you, there’s been 
too much of administration, the executive management, is far removed from staff, that’s 
what creates enmity, that’s what creates fear and that’s what creates the gap that has been 
created between us and you and it has now become an issue of them and us… when you 
come up with a new policy, you just write to say this is what will happen; no, no, no, come 
and engage staff and if you know what you are doing is right, the principle governing it is 
good and also equally good for the University, come and explain and once you explain, let 
them ask questions because that’s the way to express [their opinions] and once you have 
explained, I think the main problem that we have in this University is communication, that 
would be the area that I would like us to improve. 
 
Council is a policy maker, when polices have been made, we don’t want you to give them to 
us through a memo, no, lets engage… consultations are important… communication we say 
is a two way process, we have issues as staff which needs to go up …our governors …have 
issues….I think face to face communication is the best, written communication is good for 
record purposes but by the time you write you would have discussed with us and we would 
have known … that’s the kind of communication I am talking about…  I am sure if we start 
engaging with each other, we start consulting with each other on matters, I am sure you 
would come up with a good University.       
     
According to RP6, ‘ ...every employee should feel wanted… they should feel that they 
own the University… people are very knowledgeable, so when you have a leader, the 
leader does not necessarily mean they are experts in everything…’ 
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Strong leadership which is being favoured at college level is aligned to strong agency in 
change management, as noted before. It can be concluded therefore that strong and 
empowered leadership at all levels of governance in UNIMA can enable governance reforms. 
This implies that its absence, which was the case in UNIMA, is a constraining mechanism of 
governance reforms. 
7.3 UNIMA governance context at T4 
At this stage I can claim that the UNIMA governance context at T4 (2013) is one that 
favours strong agency in change management among the leadership of the University at 
institutional level. It also favours executive leadership being exercised at disciplinary level 
of governance. The study has further revealed that the majority of the stakeholders in 
UNIMA would like to see executive leadership practiced at college level primarily when it 
comes to administrative functions. However, when it comes to matters in the academe 
there is an inclination towards a governance culture that embraces shared governance.  
 
As can be recalled from section 4.3.5 of Chapter Four, shared governance is a system of 
governance where de jure of either governing body or academic body is seldom exercised 
and instead a sense of common purpose is nurtured (Shattock, 2002; Dearlove, 2002).  
UNIMA stakeholders do not want one person to arbitrarily make important academic 
decisions absent of the advice of key constituents. They also do not want decision-making 
in UNIMA as regard academic matters to be simply a function of making decisions by 
consensus through committees but that various stakeholders should participate in the 
process. In summary, UNIMA stakeholders want academic members of staff to be given 
primary responsibility over decision-making in academic matters. This augments 
observations made by the research participants as noted in Chapter Six who viewed 
executive deanship as a contingent incompatibility, an affront to academic freedom which 
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is the vested interest of the majority of the academic staff members. There is thus notable 
agency in academic freedom being exhibited by academic members of staff when it comes 
to tampering with academic matters. Thereby confirming that agency in academic freedom 
is a constraining mechanism on such reforms in academic departments and programmes.  
 
The overall picture that is emerging in the University governance at T4 is that much as the 
governance reforms in the University has pushed for adoption of the corporate model of 
governance practices, the emergent governance practice in the domain of the real is one 
that exhibits a combination of properties of corporate governance model with properties of 
the collegial model of governance.  
 
7.4 Conclusion 
In the first part of this Chapter I presented my findings regarding emergent governance 
practices in the University period after the implementation of the governance reforms. I 
demonstrated that there has been an elaboration in governance culture and practices at 
systems (Government oversight) level and enterprise (college) level. It is at institutional 
level, where Central Office operates, where the study has revealed there is greater 
morphostasis – regeneration in governance practices owing mainly to the fact that the 
University Act has not been amended in line with the reform measures. This scenario is thus 
generating disjuncture in overall governance context in UNIMA. The second part of this 
Chapter presented the results of my analysis of what enabled and constrained the University 
governance practice in the period under review particularly at enterprise level. It established 
that agency in change management and executive leadership among the University senior 
leaders are the precursor to governance reforms in UNIMA. Both agency in change 
management and executive leadership are thus identified as constraining and enabling 
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mechanisms for institutional governance reforms in UNIMA. Similarly it has also be shown 
that agency in academic freedom among academic members of staff is the main constraining 
mechanism for reforms in academic programmes. In the third part of the Chapter I presented 
the overall context of governance in UNIMA in 2013 – that is the governance context at T4 
and concluded that the UNIMA governance in 2013 is one that combines elements of both 
corporate and collegial model of governance practices.  
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Chapter 8  
CONCLUSION 
8.0 Introduction 
I set out in this study to investigate the University of Malawi’s (UNIMA) experiences with 
governance reforms after realizing that no comprehensive study had been conducted ever 
since UNIMA embarked on the reforms from 1997 to 2013. My intention for undertaking the 
study was to examine the emergent governance practices in UNIMA and the properties 
enabling or constraining governance reforms. I used Bhaskar’s Critical Realist Theory to lead 
me to the essence of the reforms and the mechanisms driving change in UNIMA governance 
practice. I also employed Archer’s Social Realist Theory, which enabled me to focus my 
attention in the study on the interplay of structures, culture and agency in the higher 
education governance. The investigation led to key findings which I summarize in section 8.1 
that follow. There are also some lessons that policy makers in the higher education sector in 
Malawi might want to learn from this study which I summarize in section 8.2. Equally 
important to note is that this study is aimed at making a contribution to the higher education 
field of study and I demonstrate in section 8.3 the ways in which I believe the study has 
added to this field. The use of judgmental rationality, discussed in section 3.6 of Chapter 
Three, under ethical consideration entailed that I attempt to ensure that this study is as robust 
and unbiased as possible. However, in any study of human behaviour, there are always some 
limitations and in section 8.4 I summarize these in the context of this study.  
 
8.1 Summary of key findings 
The key research question this study sought to answer was: What are the emergent 
governance practices in UNIMA arising from the implementation from 1997 to 2013 of 
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governance reforms and what has enabled or constrained them?  To address this question I 
investigated the objectives of the reforms in the governance of UNIMA. Since I had 
employed Critical Realism in my study, this led me to first answer the following question: 
‘What was the situation of University governance context in 1995 for the above governance 
reforms to be possible?’ In answering this research question I was able to locate the 
ontological premise of the reforms from the realm of the ‘experienced’. The study revealed 
that governance reforms in UNIMA were as a result of the interplay of various mechanisms 
in both internal and external structural and cultural domains of governance.  Internally, the 
governance context period before the reforms were introduced exhibited a state-centric 
model. The structures, culture and some aspects of agency of governance in UNIMA were 
impeding the growth and development of the University. The context was constraining to the 
full realization of the objectives of UNIMA, which were teaching, research and outreach. 
This context was primarily as a result of the external influence of the State organs on the 
University styled on the one-party system of governance that prevailed in the country from 
independence in 1964 to early 1990s. The national political influence spread throughout the 
UNIMA governance context and impeded on academic freedom in the University. The 
governance context therefore was frustrating to most of the stakeholders in UNIMA.  
Furthermore, UNIMA relied heavily on Government funding. The external global forces 
emerging mainly from globalization and its attendant ideologies of neo-liberalism and NPM, 
coupled with coercive policies of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, 
forced the Government of Malawi to introduce public sector reforms which had strong 
dosages of fiscal discipline. The end result was reduction in government funding to public 
sector institutions in Malawi including UNIMA. This scenario greatly undermined the 
capacity of the University to deliver. It is the reduction in funding that triggered the move to 
introduce governance reforms in UNIMA. The frustrating governance context period before 
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the reforms is one that enabled the reforms’ implementation. The study revealed that the 
reforms were therefore introduced to improve operational efficiency and effectiveness of the 
institution with the main aim of increasing students’ intake.  
 
It is important to stress from the literature search that the causal mechanisms to changes that 
have been identified from the foregoing in UNIMA governance are not very different from 
what has been experienced elsewhere. The only difference is the approach taken in 
responding to these causal mechanisms and the emergent consequences. This can be 
attributed to the structural and cultural variations different contexts offer and how they are 
acted upon by key agents in a particular space and time.  
 
I then examined the specific reform measures that were introduced in UNIMA governance 
practices through the implementation of the MIM recommendations between 1997 and 2013 
in the realm of the ‘actual’ using the morphogenic theory. These were the constitutive 
properties of the governance reforms.  I discovered that the reforms took the form of infusing 
a corporate governance model in UNIMA and they were strongly underpinned by NPM 
principles.  They involved introducing governance structures at systems level of education 
hierarchy in Malawi to regulate Government and the University relations and facilitate 
greater autonomy in decision-making in the University. At institutional and enterprise levels 
of the UNIMA governance, the reforms pushed for decentralization in the management of the 
University; introduction of a business culture in the management practices in the University 
through mechanisms of outsourcing of non-core business of the University, retrenchment of 
superfluous non-academic staff members, introduction of private service providers in the 
delivery of University services such as catering, maintenance and security; introduction of 
measures aimed at cost containment and  diversification in the revenue base of the 
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University; restructuring of academic programmes and departments and creating executive 
leadership positions within the University. 
 
Most of the reform measures that were specific to improving the governance structures and 
culture at the systems level were implemented. However these reforms rather than enhancing 
UNIMA autonomy have on the contrary intensified the systematization of UNIMA 
governance practices at that level. The State’s role has strengthened rather than being 
weakened, though it has also become more transparent and thereby potentially more open to 
critique. The Government of Malawi, especially the Ministry of Education, Science and 
Technology, continues to exercise a lot of influence in the governance of UNIMA despite the 
successful implementation of the reforms at systems level. The role of the Government in the 
management of UNIMA is evident mainly through the directives emanating from the 
Ministry of Education, Science and Technology and the Department of Statutory 
Corporations.  
 
The administrative reforms that were introduced at the enterprise level of governance were 
well received fundamentally because they were construed as emancipatory by UNIMA 
stakeholders who had gone through a frustrating governance period at T1 (period before the 
reforms were introduced). The reform measures that focused on academic practices at 
enterprise level received mixed reactions. Some were implemented but the majority of them 
were resisted. The resistance emerged mainly because such reforms were construed by 
UNIMA academics as impinging on cultural practices of academic freedom. The other causal 
mechanism that were identified to the unsuccessful implementation of academic reforms at 
disciplinary level were due the fact that the enabling UNIMA Act has not been revised, lack 
of agency for change management and weak leadership among top leaders in the University.   
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The study has revealed the conspicuous disjunction in the governance practice in UNIMA 
governance context emergent from the implementation of the reforms. At the enterprise 
(college) level of governance, there is cultural and structural transformation of administrative 
practices leading to the elaboration in the governance culture and practices in UNIMA 
colleges. This is evidenced by growing resentment from faculties and academic departments 
targeted towards Central Office to the extent that the ensuing relationship is characterised by 
tension. It has been noted too that some departments are exercising greater autonomy in 
decision-making than envisaged. Equally, operational practices differ in almost all academic 
departments.  
 
There is also strong manifestation of collegial governance practices when it comes to 
academic practices. For example, restructuring of some academic departments and 
programmes has failed to take place; there is duplication of programmes and faculty opinion 
is in favour of shared governance. This is however under pressure from the institutional 
leadership which is tempered by strong government surveillance at systems level.  The 
Central Office is caught in the middle of having to mediate a disjunction between cultural 
morphogenesis and structural morphostasis at college level and the elaboration of governance 
practices at the systems level. The ‘wave’ emerging from the morphogenesis of structures 
and culture in both direction appears however to be very forceful signalling disintegration of 
the unitary structure of the UNIMA. If the UNIMA Act is amended to conform to the 
changes already being experienced, there is little chance that UNIMA Central Office will 
defend its current position. Gradually, the role of Central Office might not be necessary and 
new Universities emerge from the current colleges in UNIMA, something that was not 
intended by these reforms.  
	  234	  
	  
 
8.2  Points for further reflection on the relationship between Government and  
            Higher Education institutions in Malawi 
There are important lessons which this study reveals as regards the future relationship 
between the higher education sector and the Government, which policy makers in Malawi 
might wish to reflect upon. This is the fact that it is not business as usual on the part of 
Government in the manner in which it relates with the University. There is need for the 
Government to take cognisance of the changes that are taking place in UNIMA governance 
and redefine its relationship with the institution to avoid future conflict and foster higher 
education growth. This means that the Government should begin to exercise its oversight 
roles through clearly defined mechanisms of control such as the newly established National 
Council for Higher Education and that such oversight role should be subject to thorough 
discussion by various stakeholders. The Government might wish to utilise the emergence of 
the public regulatory bodies such as Council for Higher Education, to steer higher education 
in the direction it wants to take by introducing control mechanisms such as requiring 
universities to submit annual returns on a number of important aspects to the national 
development such as:- students: staff ratios, students’ enrolments, students’ throughput, 
research outputs (number of publications emanating from academics), and so on, rather than 
adhering to ad hoc control mechanisms. This would make the relationship even more 
transparent and the limits of power of both the State and the University open to discussion. 
The Council for Higher Education could collect such key information which would feed into 
Government’s on-going development programme planning. In this way, the Council for 
Higher Education would safeguard the Universities’ accountability to the public.  
 
On the part of the UNIMA, it is important for the corporate agency to reflect seriously on the 
compelling mechanisms emergent from global and internal economic and political 
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imperatives in the governance of the institution and respond to them proactively. Equally, 
corporate agency, particularly the UNIMA Council should not underestimate the growing 
resentment against Central Office emerging from colleges because it signals impending major 
shifts in the governance of the institution. It is also important that corporate agency are 
sensitised to the interplay of structure, culture and agency and the impact of the emergent 
properties of such interplay in the governance context of the University. The findings of this 
study can offer some insights in this regard. This is one way in which pre-emptive measures 
can be enabled so as to save the University from disintegrating. It is also important for the 
Council to ensure that in the case of future governance reforms in the University, there must 
be strong leaders with the drive to implement change. They should also receive proper 
orientation in change management.   
 
8.3 Contributions of this research to knowledge in the field of higher education 
governance 
This research contributes to the field of higher education studies. It first adds to the literature 
of the under-researched issues in higher education governance in Africa by contributing an 
empirical study to higher education governance reforms from the perspective of a little 
researched country, Malawi. The study has demonstrated that reforms emerge as a result of 
the complex interplay of structure, culture and agency and so, while it is possible to trace 
commonalities across contexts, it is also possible to trace how different contexts lead to 
different reform measures.  
 
Secondly, the study reveals how national and even institutional structures, cultures and agents 
can be enabled and constrained by international forces such as globalization, NPM and the 
economic philosophies of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank.  The study 
has shown that the move toward greater institutional efficiency through the application of 
	  236	  
	  
NPM ideologies when intersected with various internal structural, cultural and agential 
mechanisms produces a governance context which is characterized by tension in the various 
spheres of decision-making influences and this has the potential to even threaten the survival 
of the institution as a unitary structure.  
 
Thirdly, this study has demonstrated that issues of autonomy and accountability underpin the 
governance context in higher education. It has also shown closer links that exist between 
higher education institutional governance and political governance at national level. It has 
demonstrated that events in the national politics in the country can be an important 
mechanism enabling and constraining higher education governance. 
 
Fourthly, the study has revealed that the emergence of the governance model at T4 in 
UNIMA is a significant change in higher education governance practices from the state-
centric model at T1. There has been change towards elements of the corporate model of 
governance, alongside some strongly defended aspects of collegial governance, particularly 
at departmental level. These shifting governance contexts were enabled by both internal and 
external interplay in the governance structures, cultures and of agency over a period of time. 
 
Fifth, the study broadens the application of Bhaskar’s Critical Realist Theory. It has been 
applied successfully in this study as an under labourer in identifying the essence of higher 
education governance and the mechanisms driving change in governance practice from the 
perspective of Malawi. The study also extends Archer’s Social Realist Theory as it has been 
used in this research study to identify the interplay of structures, culture and agency in the 
higher education governance and the enabling and constraining mechanisms underpinning 
higher education governance reforms. The theory furthermore enabled me to account for the 
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morphogenesis/morphostasis that has occurred in UNIMA governance context in 2013. The 
results of this study have therefore established that there is a symmetrical necessary link 
between my research question, Critical Realism the Social Realist Theory, thereby, rendering 
these theories as useful applicable theories to the understanding of organizational change.  
 
Finally, the study has identified leadership and concern for change management in corporate 
agency and strong agency for academic freedom as the underlying mechanisms enabling or 
constraining change in higher education governance practices. In this respect, this study 
further affirms Critical Realism as a research approach that helps a researcher to move 
beyond documenting multiple experience of a phenomenon to the tentative identification of 
the mechanisms constraining and enabling its emergence.  
8.4 Limitations of the study 
Because of the long time it took from the time Government reforms were introduced in 
UNIMA to the period the reforms were implemented and eventually studied, it is possible 
that a lot may have happened in UNIMA governance which this study was not able to 
capture. While the study included analysis of a number of documents, it also relied on the 
views of those who had experienced shifts in governance from T1 to T4 and who were 
involved in the MIM reform process in one way or another. These participants shared their 
recall of events in an open and interested manner, but recall is always partial and so their 
retelling of the past is also incomplete and potentially biased.  
 
Besides, the perspective of the higher education governance reforms reported in this thesis is 
from a particular set of specific theoretical lenses: the Critical Realism and Social Realist 
lenses. It is possible that if the same study was undertaken using a different theoretical 
perspective the findings would have been different.  
	  238	  
	  
 
8.5 Future research agenda in UNIMA governance reforms 
Based on these findings it would be interesting if another study was undertaken in a country 
within the continent of Africa using the same theoretical lenses of Critical Realism and Social 
Realist theories to see whether it shall identify similar mechanisms as responsible for the 
emergence of University reforms as well their enabling and constraining properties. 
Furthermore, it might be necessary also to carry out research to find out whether the above 
reforms led the University to attain the efficiency and effectiveness the corporate agents 
envisaged in 1997 and whether indeed students’ numbers have increased in UNIMA as a 
result. Such a study in my view would complement the findings of this study. Equally, it 
would be interesting to investigate the consequences of retrenching the UNIMA employees 
mindful that such exercise has had negative human consequences elsewhere (Balfour and 
Grubbs, 2000; Lerner, 2008). Furthermore, a scientific investigation might have to be carried 
out in the near future in the event that one or two colleges in UNIMA has generated into a 
separate University just to appreciate whether the mechanisms identified in this study play a 
role in such a transition.   
 
 
8.6 Conclusion 
It is important to stress that higher education is in a state of flux, the role being ascribed to it 
in this era of the knowledge economy and globalisation is shifting and the demands being 
placed on Universities are numerous. Universities in Africa after years of poor funding and 
strong centralised governance are trying to establish appropriate governance models befitting 
the situations they are find in. Studies into these governance models are crucial for policy 
makers, governors, managers and researchers in higher education to understand the state and 
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the direction of higher education governance, nationally, regionally and indeed globally. By 
adding a national dimension following the tracking of the governance models of one 
University in Malawi, I believe that this study has added to the understandings of how change 
in the governance of higher education is triggered and how intended and unintended 
consequences emerge from such change. If the higher education sector is to continue to 
contribute to better opportunities for the citizens of our countries, we need to take careful 
cognizance of the structures, cultures and agency constructing the governance of our 
Universities as this study has done.  
 
 
 
 
 
	  240	  
	  
 
References: 
Adamolekun, L., Kulemeka, N., & Laleye M. (1997). Political transition, economic  
liberalization and civil service reform in Malawi. Public Administration and 
Development. 17(2), 209 – 222 
 
Adesina, J. (2006). Global Trends in Higher Education Reform: What lessons for  
 Nigeria. Journal of Higher Education and Research 4(1), 1-23  
 
Aina T.A. (2010). Beyond Reforms: The Politics of Higher Education Transformation  
 In Africa. African Studies Review, 53 (1), 21–40 
 
Altbach, P.G., Reisberg, L., & Rumbley, L.E. (2009). Trends in Global Higher Education:  
Tracking an Academic Revolution. A Report Prepared by the UNESCO 2009 World 
Conference on Higher Education. Paris: UNESCO 
  
Archer, M.S. (1995). Realist Social theory: the morphogenetic approach. Cambridge:  
 University Press.  
 
Archer, M.S. (2003). Structures, Agency and the Internal Conversation. Cambridge  
 :University Press.  
 
Archer, M.S. (2003). Being Human: The Problem of Agency. Cambridge: University  
 Press.  
 
	  241	  
	  
Armstrong, L. (2007). Competing in the Global Higher Education Marketplace:  
Outsourcing, Twinning, and Franchising.  New Directions for Higher Education .140, 
Published online in Wiley Inter Science (www.interscience.wiley.com) • 
DOI:10.1002/he.287 
 
Assie-Lumumba, N. (2006). Higher Education in Africa: Crisis, transformation and  
 Reform. Codesria Working papers Series, Dakar. 
 
Atuahene, F (2009). Financing Higher Education through value Added Tax: A Review  
of the Contribution of the Ghana Education Trust Fund (GETFund) in Fulfilment of 
the Objectives of Act 581. Journal of Higher Education in Africa. 7 (3), 29 – 60 
 
Babbie, E. & Mouton, J. (1998). The practice of social science research. Belmont, CA:  
Wadsworth 
 
Badat, S. (2009). Globalization and higher education organizational change: A  
 framework for analysis. Studies in Higher Education. 34 (4), 455–467 
 
Baree, R. (2002). The risk of ‘going observationalist’: negotiating the hidden dilemmas  
of being an insider participant observer. Qualitative Research. 2(1), 97 122 
 
Barnett, R. (2000). University knowledge in an age of supercomplexity. Higher  
education, 40(4), 409-422. 
 
Bercher, T., & Trowler P.R. (2001). Academic Tribes and Territories: Intellectual  
	  242	  
	  
 enquiry and the culture of discipline. Buckingham: Open Press.  
 
Bhaskar, R. (1978). On the possibility on Social Scientific Knowledge and the Limits of  
 Naturalism. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour. 8 (1), 1 – 28 
 
Bhaskar, R. (1998). The Possibility of Naturalism: A Philosophical Critique of the  
 contemporary human sciences. London: Routledge 
 
Bhaskar, R. (2008). A Realist Theory of Science. London: Routledge  
 
Birnbaum, R. (2000). The Life Cycle of Academic Management Fads. The Journal of  
Higher Education.  71 (1), 1-16 
 
Bloom, D. E., Canning, D., & Chan, K. (2006). Higher education and economic development  
in Africa (No. 102). Washington, DC: World Bank. 
 
Bowen, G. A. (2009). Document analysis as a qualitative research method.  
Qualitative research journal, 9(2), 27-40. 
 
Bryant, L.R. (2011). The Democracy of Objects. Open Humanities Press sourced on  
line http://hdl.handle.net/2027/spo.9750134.0001.0012011 
 
Chalmers, A.F. (1999). What is this thing called Science? Buckingham: Open University  
 Press 
 
	  243	  
	  
Chavez, C. (2008). Conceptualizing from the Inside: Advantages, Complications, and  
Demands on Insider Positionality. The Qualitative Report, 13 (3), 474-494 
 
Chirambo, R. (2004). “Operation Bwezani”: The Army, Political Change, and Dr. Banda's  
Hegemony in Malawi. Nordic Journal of African Studies, 13(2), 146-163. 
 
Christensen, T. (2001). Administrative Reform: Changing leadership roles?  
Governance: An International Journal of Policy and Administration. 14 (4), 457-480  
 
Christensen, T., & Lægreid, P. (2002). New public management: Puzzles of  
democracy and the influence of citizens. Journal of Political Philosophy, 10(3), 267-
295. 
 
Clark, B. (1983). The Higher Education System: Academic Organization in Cross- 
 National Prospective. Berkeley: University of California Press 
 
Clark, B. R. (1998). Creating Entrepreneurial Universities: Organizational Pathways of  
Transformation. Issues in Higher Education. New York: Elsevier Science  
 
Cloete, N., & Bunting, I. (2000). Higher education transformation: Assessing  
performance in South Africa: Chet 
 
Cohen, L, Manion, L., & Morrison, K. (Eds.) (2007). Research Methods in Education.  
New York: Routledge 
 
	  244	  
	  
Collier, A. (1994). Critical Realism: An Introduction to Roy Bhaskar’s Philosophy.  
London: Verso 
 
Corning, P. A. (2002). The re-­‐emergence of “emergence”: A venerable concept in  
search of a theory. Complexity, 7 (6), 18-30. 
 
Cruickshank, J. (2010). Knowing Social Reality: A Critique of Bhaskar and Archer’s  
Attempt to Derive a Social Ontology from Lay Knowledge. Philosophy of the Social 
Sciences 40(4) 579–602 : http://www aagepub.com/journalsPermissions.nav DOI: 
10.1177/0048393109340664 http://pos.sagepub.com 
 
Danermark, B., Ekstrom, M., Jakobsen, L & Karlsson, J. (Eds.) (2002). Explaining  
Society: Critical realism in the social sciences. London: Routledge 
 
Dearlove, J. (2002). ‘A continuing role for academics: The governance of UK  
Universities in the post-Dearing era’, Higher Education Quarterly 56(3), 257–275.  
 
Deem, R. (2004). The Knowledge Worker, The manager-academic and the  
contemporary UK University: New and Old forms of Public Management? Financial 
Accountability & Management. 20 (2), 107-128 
 
Deem, R., Kevin, J. & Brehony. (2005). Management as ideology: the case of 'new  
managerialism' in higher education. Oxford Review of Education. 31 (2), 217-235 
 
Denzin, N.K. & Lincoln, Y.S., (Eds.) (2005). The Sage handbook of qualitative  
	  245	  
	  
research.  3rd Edition. London: Sage 
 
Dobbins, M., Knill, C., & Vögtle, E. M. (2011). An analytical framework for the cross- 
country comparison of higher education governance. Higher Education, 62 (5), 665-
683. 
Dollar, D., Svensson, J. (2000). What Explains the Success of Failure of Structural  
Adjustment Programme? The Economic Journal. 10 (466), 894 - 917   
 
du Toit, A (Ed.) (2007).  Autonomy as a Social Compact. South Africa: The Council on  
Higher Education 
 
Dwivedi, O.P. (1994). Development Administration: From Underdevelopment to  
Sustainable Development. London: MacMillan Press Ltd. 
 
Egron-Polak, E., &  Hudson, R. (2014). Internationalization of Higher Education:  
Growing expectations, fundamental values. IAU 4th Global Survey. http://www.iau-
aiu.net/sites/all/files/IAU-4th-GLOBAL-SURVEY-EXECUTIVE-SUMMARY.pdf   
 
Elder-­‐Vass, D. (2007). Reconciling Archer and Bourdieu in an Emergentist Theory of  
Action. Sociological Theory, 25 (4), 325-346. 
 
Fabiano, E. (2013, November). The Vice-Chancellor’s Speech at the 61st Graduation  
Ceremony held on 20th November, 2013 at Bingu wa Mutharika International 
Conference Centre. University of Malawi 
 
	  246	  
	  
Ferlie, E., Musselin, C., & Andresani,G. (2008).  The steering of higher education  
 systems: a public management perspective. Higher  Education. 56, 325–348  
 
Feinstein, A. (2011). Arms sales account for 40% of corruption in world trade. New  
Internationalist, Issue 448: 20-21 
 
Feyerabend, P. (1975). How to defend society against science. Introductory Readings  
in the Philosophy of Science. 1 (8), 54-65. 
 
Gawa, A.Q.H.C. (2006).The Cost-Benefit Analysis (CBA) of Privatising University of  
Malawi non-core functions. Unpublished Master’s Thesis. University of Malawi, 
Zomba 
 
George, E. (2006). Positioning Higher Education for the knowledge based economy.  
 Higher Education. 52 , 589 – 610 
 
George, S. (1990). A fate worse than debt: A radical new analysis of Third World debt  
 crisis. England: Penguin Group 
 
Giddens, A. (1979). Central problems in social theory: Action, Structure, and  
Contradiction in Social Analysis (Vol. 241). University of California Press. 
 
Giroux, H. (1992). Educational Leadership and the Crisis of Democratic Government,"  
Educational Researcher 21(4), 4-11.    
	  247	  
	  
Giroux, H.A. (2002). Neoliberalism, Corporate Culture and the Promise of Higher Education: 
The University as Democratic Public Sphere. Harvard Educational Review. 72 (4), 1 
– 31 
Giroux, H.A. (2009). Neoliberalism, Education and the Politics of Disposability. Accessed on 
http://www.counterpunch.org/giroux033 
Graham, G. (2002). Universities: The recovery of an idea. Exeter: Imprint Academic. 
 
Graham, G. (2013). The University: A Critical Comparison of Three Ideal Typed. In  
Kagisano. 9: 5 – 22. The Aims of Higher Education. Pretoria: Council for Higher 
Education 
 
Green, J.E., & Khan. M.S. (1990). The African Debt Crisis. African Economic  
Consortium – Special Paper 3. Nairobi: Initiative Publishers 
 
Groff, R. (2004). Critical Realism, Post-positivism and the Possibility of Knowledge.  
 New York: Rutledge 
 
Hall, M., & Symes, A. (2005). South African higher education in the first decade of  
democracy: from cooperative governance to conditional autonomy. Studies in Higher 
Education. 30 (2), 199 – 212 
 
Harman, G. (2001). Academics and institutional differentiation in Australian higher  
 education.  Higher Education Policy. 14: 325–342. 
 
	  248	  
	  
Harman, G (2002). Academic Leaders or Corporate Managers: Deans and Heads in  
 Australian Higher Education, 1977 to 1997. Higher Education Management 
and Policy 14 (2): 53 - 70  
 
 
Harman, K., & Treadgold, E. (2007). Changing patterns of governance for Australian  
 Universities.  Higher Education Research & Development.  26(1), 13–29 
 
Harvey, D.L (2002). Agency and Community: A Critical Realist Paradigm. Journal for  
 the Theory of Social Behaviour. 32 (2), 164 - 194  
 
Harvey, D. (2005). A brief history of neoliberalism. Oxford: University Press 
 
Haug, G. (2001). The TUNING project in the context of main trends in higher education in  
Europa. Consultado en http://www. europa. 
eu.nt/comm/education/socrates/tuning.(SF).[Links]. 
 
Hellawell, D., & Hancock, N. (2001). A Case Study of the Changing Role of the  
Middle  Manager in Higher Education: Between Hierarchical Control and 
Collegiality. Research Papers in Education 16 (2), 183 – 197 
 
Henkel, M. ( 2007). Can academic autonomy survive in the knowledge society? A  
perspective from Britain. Higher Education Research & Development. 26 (1), 87–99 
 
Henning, E., Van Rensburg, W., & Smit, B. (2004). Finding your way in qualitative  
research. Hatfiled: Van Schaik Publishers. 
	  249	  
	  
 
Hood, C. (1992). A Public Management for all Seasons? Public Administration 69 (1),  
 3 – 19 
 
Johnstone, D. B. (2004). Cost-sharing and equity in higher education: Implications of  
income contingent loans. In Markets in Higer Education (pp. 37-59). Springer 
Netherlands. 
 
Jowi, J.O. (2009). Internationalization of Higher Education in Africa: Developments,  
Emerging Trends, Issues and Policy Implications. Higher Education Policy, 22 (3), 
263 – 281. 
 
Kai, J. (2009). A Critical Analysis of Accountability in Higher Education Its Relevance  
to Evaluation of Higher Education: A Critical Analysis of Accountability in Higher 
Education Its Relevance to Evaluation of Higher Education. Chinese Education and 
Society. 42 (2), 39–51 
 
Kandoole, B. F. (1990). Structural Adjustment in Malawi: Short Term Gains and Long Term  
Losses. In Report of the Workshop on the Effects of the Structural Adjustment 
Programme in Malaŵi, 26 February to 2nd March 1990: Papers presented (Vol. 2, p. 
7). Centre for Social Research, University of Malaŵi. 
 
Keeling, R. (2006). The Bologna Process and the Lisbon Research Agenda: the  
European Commission’s expanding role in higher education discourse. European 
Journal of Education.  41 (2), 203 – 223 
	  250	  
	  
  
Kekale, J. (1999). Preferred’ patterns of academic leadership in different disciplinary  
 (sub) culltures. Higher Education. 37 (3), 217-238  
 
Kemp, S. (2005). Critical realism and the limits of philosophy. European Journal of Social  
Theory, 8(2), 171-191. 
 
Kerr, D., & Mapanje, J., (2002). Academic Freedom and the University of Malawi.  
 African Studies Review. 45 (2), 73 – 91 
 
Kivinen, O., & Piiroinen, T. (2004). The relevance of ontological commitments in  
social sciences: Realist and pragmatist viewpoints. Journal for the Theory of Social 
Behaviour, 34 (3), 231-248. 
 
Knight, J. (2004). Internationalization Remodeled: Definitions, rationales and  
 approaches’ Journal for Studies in International Education.  8 (1), 5 – 31 
Knight, J. (2006) Internationalization of Higher Education: New Directions, New 
 Challenges. 2005 IAU Global Survey Report, International Association of Universities (IAU). 
 
Kweik, M. (2004). The Emergent European Educational  Policies under Scrutiny: the  
Bologna Process  from a Central European perspective.  European Educational 
Research Journal. 3 (4), 759 – 776 
 
Labaree, R. (2002).The risk of ‘going observationalist’: negotiating the hidden  
	  251	  
	  
dilemmas of being an insider participant observer Qualitative Research.  Qualitative 
Research. 2 (1), 97 – 122 
 
Lane, J. (2000). New Public Management. London: Routledge 
 
Lerner, G. (2008). Corporatizing Higher Education. The History Teacher. 41 (2), 219 –  
 227 
 
Lincoln, Y., & Guba, E. (2000). Paradigmatic controversies, contradictions and  
emerging influences, Denzin, N. and Lincoln, Y. (Eds.). Handbook of Qualitative 
Research, 2nd Edition. Sage Publications: Thousand Oaks. 
 
Lynch, K. (2006). Neo-liberalism and marketization: the implication for higher  
 education. European Educational Research Journal. 5 (1), 1-17 
 
Malawi Government. (1995). Budget Statement. Lilongwe: Ministry of  
Finance. 
 
Malawi Government. (2006). National Education Sector Plan. Lilongwe: Ministry of  
Education and Vocational Training 
 
Malawi Institute of Management. (1997). UNIMA Study, Problems and opportunities 
identification and operations assessment. Lilongwe: Malawi Institute of Management 
 
Maistry, S.M., (2012). Confronting the neo-liberal brute: Reflections of higher  
	  252	  
	  
education middle-level manager. South African Journal of Higher Education. 26 (3), 
515-528 
 
Maistry, S.M., (2014). Neoliberalism: Shaping Assessment and Accountability Regimes  
in South African Education. International Journal of Education Science. 6 (2), 177 – 
186 
 
Mamdani, M. (2007). Scholars in the Marketplace. The Dilemmas of Neo- 
Liberal Reform at Makerere University, 1989-2005. Dakar, CODESRIA 
 
Maton, K. (2005). A Question of Autonomy: Bourdieu’s field approach and higher  
education policy. Journal of Education Policy. 20 (6), 687 – 704 
 
McKenna, S. (2012). Interrogating the Academic Project. In Quinn, L. (Ed.)  
Reimaging Academic Staff Development: Spaces for Disruption. Stellenbosch: 
SUN Media.  
 
McLendon, M.K. (2003). State Governance Reform of Higher Education: Patterns,  
Trends, and Theories of The Public Policy Process in C. Smart (ed.), Higher 
Education: Handbook of Theory and Research, Vol. XVIII, 57–144. Great Britain: 
Kluwer Academic 
 
Mercer, J. (2207). The challenges of insider research in education institutions: wielding a  
double-edged sword and resolving delicate dilemmas. Oxford Review of Educations. 
33 (1), 1-17 
	  253	  
	  
 
Meyer, C.B. (2001) .A Case in Case Study Methodology. Field Methods. 13 (4), 329– 
352 
 
Michael, I., & Mnthali, F. (1971). Political Independence and Higher Education in Malawi.  
World Year Book of Education: Routledge. 
 
Michael, I. (1978). Academic Autonomy and Governmental Demands: The Case of Malawi.  
Minerva. 16 (4), 465 - 479  
 
Mnyanga, C. (2005). Structural Adjustment Programs and Education in Malawi: Effects of  
the Cash Budget System on Tertiary Education. Unpublished Master’s Thesis. 
University of Malawi, Zomba 
 
Mok, K. H. (2003). Similar trends, diverse agendas: Higher education reforms in East  
Asia. Globalisation, societies and education. 1 (2), 201-221. 
 
Mok, K. H. (2005). Fostering entrepreneurship: Changing role of government and  
higher education governance in Hong Kong. Research Policy. 34(4), 537-554. 
 
Mok, K.H. (2010). When state centralism meets neo-liberalism: managing University  
governance change in Singapore and Malysia. Higher Education. 60 (4), 419 – 440. 
 
Mutch, A. (2004). Constraints on the Internal Conversation: Margaret Archer and the  
	  254	  
	  
Structural Shaping  of Thought. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour. 34 (4), 
429 – 445 
 
Neave, G., & van Vught, F. (eds.) (1994). Government and Higher Education  
Relationships Across Three Continents The Winds of Change. Oxford: Elsevier 
Science Ltd 
 
Newell, J. (1995). ‘A Moment of Truth’? The Church and Political Change in Malawi, 1992.  
The Journal of Modern African Studies, 33(02), 243-262. 
 
Njeru, J. (2013). A ‘Donor-driven’ neoliberal reform processes and urban  
environmental change in Kenya: The case of Karura Forest in Nairobi.  Progress in 
Development Studies 13 (1), 63–78 
 
Omari, I., & Mihyo, T. (1991). The Roots of Student Unrest in African Universities.  
Kenya: Man Graphics Ltd.  
 
Olssen, M., & Peters. B, (2005). Neoliberalism, higher education and the knowledge  
economy: from the free market to knowledge capitalism. Journal of Higher  
Education Policy. 12 (3), 313 – 345 
 
Porpora, D.V. (2013). Morphogenesis and Social Change in Archer, M.S (ed.), Social  
Morphogenesis, DOI: 10.1007/978-94-007-6128-5_2, Springer Science+Business 
Media Dordrecht  
 
	  255	  
	  
Ramamurti, R., & Vernom, R.  The Search for Remedies. In Ramamurti, R., & Vernon, R.  
(Eds.)1991. Privatization and Control of State-Owned Enterprises. Washington D.C.: 
The World Bank. 
	  
 
Riley, S.P. (1992). Political adjustment or Political Pressure: Democratic politics and  
political choice in Africa. Third World Quarterly. 13 (3), 539 – 551. 
 
Saint, W. (2009). Legal Framework for Higher Education Governance in Sub-Saharan  
Africa. Higher Education Policy  22, 523 – 550. Doi:1057/hep.2009.17 
 
SARUA. (2008). Towards a Common Future: Higher Education in SADC Region  
Research Findings from four SARUA Studies. http://www.sarua.org/ 
 
Sawyer, A. (2004). Challenges facing African Universities. African Studies Review, 47  
(1). 1-59SCHIMANK, U (2005) New Public Management’ and the Academic 
Profession: Reflections on the German Situation. Minerva 43: 361–376 
 
Shattock, M. (2002). Re–Balancing Modern Concepts of University Governance.  
Higher Education Quarterly, 56(3), 235-244. 
 
Shattock, M. (2010). Managing successful Universities. London: McGraw-Hill International. 
 
Shore, C. (2010). Beyond the Multiversity: neoliberalism and the rise of the  
schizophrenic University. Social Anthropology/Anthropologie Sociale. 18 (1), 15–29. 
 
	  256	  
	  
Stark, S., & Torrance, H. (2005). Case Study, w: B. Somekh, C. Lewin (red.), Research  
Methods in the Social Sciences, London: Thousands Oaks. 
 
Taiwo, E. (2011). Regulatory Bodies, Academic Freedom and Institutional Autonomy  
in Africa: Issues and Challenges – The Nigerian Example. Journal of Higher 
Education Administration 9 (1 & 2), 63–89 
 
Tambulasi, R.I. (2009). All that glitters is not gold: new public management and  
corruption in Malawi’s governance. Development Southern Africa. 26 (2), 173 – 188 
 
Tapper, T., & Palfreyman, D. (2002). Understanding Collegiality:The Changing  
Oxbridge Model. Tertiary Education and Management 8 (1), 47–63 
 
Tapper, D., & Salter, B. (2004). Governance in Higher Education in Britain: The  
Significance of the Research Assessment Exercises for the Funding Council Model. 
Higher Education Quarterly.  58 (1), 4 – 30 
 
Taylor, M. (2012). Shared Governance in Modern Universities. Higher Education  
Quarterly. 67 (3), 80–94. 
 
Teferra, D., & Altbach, P.G. (2004). Africa Higher Education: Challenges for the 21st  
 Century.  Higher Education. 47: 21- 50 
 
Titchen, A., & Hobson, D. (2005). Phenomenology. In Somekh. B., & Lewin, C. (Eds)  
Research methods in the social sciences, 114-120. London: Sage 
	  257	  
	  
 
University of Malawi (2006). Calendar 2007 – 2009. University Office. Zomba: Khris offset.  
 
University of Malawi Act of 1974. University Office. Zomba  
 
Vaira, M. (2004). Globalization and higher education organizational change: A  
 framework for analysis. Higher Education 48: (4), 483-510 
 
Vidovicha, L., & Currieb, J. (2011).  Governance and trust in higher education. Studies  
 in Higher Education. 36 (1), 43–56 
 
Wang, L. (2010). Higher education governance and University autonomy in China.  
Globalisation, Societies and Education. 8 (4), 477495 
 
Weinberg, G.S., & Kistner, U. (2007). Introduction: From Ivory Tower to Market  
Place: What Future for the University in South Africa? Journal of Higher Education in 
Africa. 5 (1), 1 – 8 
 
Welsh, J.F., Ross, E. W., &  Vinson, K.D. (2010). To Discipline and Enforce:  
Surveillance and Spectacle in State Reform of Higher Education. New Proposals 
Journal of Marxism and Interdisciplinary Inquiry.  3 (2), 25 – 39. Special Issue 
 
Williams, M. (1995). International Economic Organization and the Third World.  
New York: Harvester Whearsheaf 
 
	  258	  
	  
Williams, K.F. (2009). ‘Guilty knowledge’: ethical aporia emergent in the research  
practice of educational development practitioners. London Review of Education. 7 (3), 
211–221 
 
World Bank. (2010). The Education System in Malawi. World Bank Working paper No.1  
182. Washington D.C.  
 
Yizengaw, T. (2003). Transformation in Higher Education: Experience with Reform  
and Expansion in Ethiopian Higher Education System. Keynote paper prepared for a 
Regional Training Conference on Tertiary Education in Sub-Saharan Africa: Things 
that work. Accra, September, 23 – 25 
 
Zeleza, T., & Olukoshi, A.O. (eds).(2004). African Universities in the Twenty-first  
Century: Knowledge and society. Vol. 2. Pretoria: Unisa Press. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	  259	  
	  
Appendix : Interview schedules  
 
A. INTERVIEW SCHEDULE FOR POLICY MAKERS (VC, AND  OTHERS) 
 
Introduction 
1. Could you give a background to the consultancy that MIM undertook in 2005? 
a) What were the reasons for the consultancy? 
b) Who decided that it should take place? 
c) Were other stakeholders in the University involved in the decision? 
d) Why were others not involved? Why was it important to involve those 
stakeholders? 
 
2. What role did you play in the decision about the consultancy? 
 
Objectives and kinds of reforms proposed 
3. Following the consultancy, MIM proposed some reforms pertaining to governance in 
UNIMA. 
a) What are these reforms? 
b) Why or what were the justifications for such reforms? 
c) Which of these reforms were justified from your perspective as a policy maker? 
 
Kinds of reforms implemented 
4. Which of the proposed governance reforms were implemented during your time? 
5. Which ones have been implemented in subsequent years? 
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6. Do you recall any governance reforms which MIM recommended but have not yet 
been implemented? What do you think are the reasons for this? 
 
Emergent practices on implemented reforms 
7. For the reforms that have been implemented in this stated period, what have been 
your experiences in terms of: 
a) Acceptance by the UNIMA concerned stakeholders such as Deans, Heads of 
Department? 
b) Actual practices of the concerned stakeholders 
 
8. Can you give me some examples of success stories of implementation of the 
governance reforms? 
 
9. In your opinion what factors contributed to this success? 
 
Constraints to implementation of reforms 
10. What challenges have been experienced in the implementation of the reforms in the 
Colleges? 
11. How have these been mitigated?  
 
Suggestions for improvement 
12. What suggestions do you have to improve the implementation of the reforms that are 
already operational? 
13. If you were to recommend governance reforms today which areas would you suggest 
should be improved? 
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B INTERVIEW SCHEDULE TO REFORM IMPLEMENTERS (DEANS OF  
 FACULTY, HEADS OF DEPARTMENT) 
  
Introduction 
1. Do you know anything about the MIM Report?  
- probe for what it is about?  
- What are the main things you know about it?  
- How was it disseminated to you?) 
2. What role did you play in the decision about the consultancy? 
3. What role did you play in the implementation of UNIMA governance reforms? 
 
Objectives and kinds of reforms proposed 
4. Following the consultancy, MIM proposed some reforms pertaining to governance in 
UNIMA. 
a. Which of these proposed reforms do you know? 
b. Why or what were the justifications for such reforms? 
c. Which of these reforms were justified from your perspective as a Dean, HoD 
etc? 
 
Kinds of reforms implemented 
5. Which of the proposed governance reforms have been implemented over the years? 
6. Do you know of any governance reforms which the UNIMA Council adopted but have 
not yet been implemented? What do you think are the reasons for this? 
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Emergent practices on implemented reforms 
7. For the reforms that have been implemented in the stated period,  
a) Which ones were you involved in its implementation?  
b) How were they disseminated to you?  
c) What roles did you play? 
d) How did you feel about doing things in the way suggested by the reforms? 
 
8. Can you give me some examples of success stories of implementation of UNIMA 
governance reforms where you were involved? 
 
9. In your opinion what factors contributed to this success? 
 
 
Constraints to implementation of reforms 
10. What challenges did you experience in the implementation of the reforms as HoD/ Dean  
11. How were these been mitigated during your tenure of office?  
12. What challenges are still being experienced to date? 
 
Suggestions for improvement 
13. What suggestions do you have to improve the implementation of the reforms that are 
already operational? 
14. If you were to recommend governance reforms today which areas would you suggest 
for improvement? 
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